Let Poland Be Hungary?: Fact versus Fiction in Poland

LET POLAND BE HUNGARY? FACT VERSUS FICTION IN POLAND Jan Zielonka . he political situation in Poland has changed drastically since the military coup d'état in December 1981. Those Poles who were never able to distinguish between dreams and reality are profoundly disappointed. Those who believed exclusively in the power of Solidarity's populistic slogans got a sobering lesson in pragmatism. On the other hand, however, the position of the military regime does not look altogether comfortable. GeneralJaruzelski's efforts to eliminate political opposition, to improve the state of the economy, and to win popular support have not yet succeeded. He has managed to transform neither his "strength into right" nor the peoples' "obedience into duty."1 The climate of Western discussion about Poland reflects the confusion taking place in Poland itself. The initial policy of sanctions against the Polish regime has gradually been replaced by milder and more persuasive rhetoric which is more in harmony with the general framework of a policy of détente. One hears extraordinary arguments which advocate that the West help Jaruzelski establish a system of government similar to that introduced in Hungary by its Communist leader, Janos Kadar. Let us recall, however, that Kadar came to power on the wave of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and it was only after a period of 1 . Rousseau insisted that "the strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his strength into right, and obedience into duty," in The Social Contract and Discourse (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920), 8. Jan Zielonka wrote this article during the course of his research fellowship at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS). Dr. Zielonka wishes to acknowledge the support of NIAS and to thank Mark Blaug for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. 105 106 SAIS REVIEW severe repression that he succeeded in introducing an original socioeconomic program. This system has allowed Hungary to build up a relatively prosperous economy, thereby leading the way to establishing open relations with the West and constraining political repression. Supporters of the Hungarian example argue that while the model of Solidarity is unacceptable to the Soviets, the Kadar model at least gives East European countries the chance to develop some kind of independence that the Soviets do find acceptable. Moreover, they contend that, in view of the dangers inherent in the dogmatic Stalinist aspirations within the Communist parties of both Poland and Russia, it is sensible to recognize that the Polish version of Kadar's Hungary represents the "most realistic outcome for post-Solidarnosc Poland."2 For some authors, this outlook is part of a broader policy toward the East which seeks the "Kadarization" rather than the "neutralization" of Eastern Europe.3 In fact, the slogan, "Kadarization of Poland," was invented not by Western commentators but by GeneralJaruzelski himself. Kadar's model is obviously more attractive than the model of Husak. Gustaw Husak (the new leader of the Czechoslovak Communist party, who was supported in 1968 by Soviet military forces) is known as one of the most dogmatic statesmen of Eastern Europe. It was therefore not surprising that soon after the military coup in Poland, the government made every effort to convince the public that it intended to follow the "Kadar way"—first, by introducing heavy repression, and then by adopting social and economic reforms that would, in turn, lead to greater political democratization.4 This slogan served to justify the government's iron-fisted approach, while creating hopes for future liberalization. The careful study of parallels between developments in Hungary after 1956 and those in Poland after 1981 may therefore lead to important political conclusions. This study will seek to indicate not so much what is best for Poland (e.g., Stalinism or Kadarism), but rather what is realistically possible in the present Polish economic and political climate. A brief comparison of some of the basic features of the Hungarian and Polish economies should furnish the reader with an appreciation of Poland's overall advantage over Hungary—a much smaller country whose size, population, and gnp are approximately one-third those of Poland. Apart from...