Soviet Relations with the Islamic Republic

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Muriel Atkin B, >y the time the Iranian monarchy collapsed in January 1979, relations between the shah's regime and the Soviet Union had evolved from hostility into fairly stable cooperation, above all in economic affairs but to some degree in military and cultural spheres as well. There were some points of friction, especially regarding rivalries of the two countries' regional allies, but Tehran and Moscow both viewed the benefits they derived from cooperation as far more important. The revolution that produced such great upheaval within Iran also knocked the established pattern of Iranian-Soviet relations off kilter. Since the revolution, both countries have been moving, sometimes rather haltingly, to restore the equilibrium in their dealings with each other. The revolution has dramatically altered the style, but much less of the substance , of relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. Even though the leadership of postrevolutionary Iran has seen the precipitous rise and fall ofa number ofkey figures and heated factional conflicts, there is a general resemblance in the way those who have held power in Tehran since 1979 have viewed the Soviet Union. Iran's new leaders are, if anything, more openly critical of the Soviet Union than Mohammad Reza Shah had been during the last years of his reign. Yet, like him, the successive republican governments have concluded that Iran can use its northern neighbor to make certain advantageous economic agreements and, since the outMuriel Atkin is assistant professor of history at The George Washington University . She is the author oí Russia and Iran, 1780—1828, and of several articles on Russian and Soviet relations with Iran. This article is excerpted from a forthcoming collection of essays entitled The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: New Assessments, eds. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Washington, D.C: Middle East Institute, 1982). 183 184 SAIS REVIEW break of the war with Iraq, probably weapons-purchases as well. The reason has remained fundamentally the same before and after the revolution. Tehran has made such agreements with the Soviet Union when the former was unwilling or unable to obtain such goods and services from the West in the desired amounts. As the Soviets came to grips with the unforeseen course of events in Iran during 1978, they tried to sustain, and if possible expand, the accommodation with Iran that had developed in the years before the revolution by declaring their support for Ayatollah Khomeini. Although he was perceived as cool to the Left,1 his polemics had made him known as impeccably hostile to America and to the shah's political monopoly. Since the fall of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953, the Soviet Union concluded that it missed an excellent opportunity for advancing its interests in Iran because it had failed to give the prime minister adequate support through the Tudeh party. With the political situation once more in flux, the Soviets were determined not to repeat the mistake because of a preoccupation with ideological purity.2 Since November 21, 1978, the Soviets have consistently voiced support for Ayatollah Khomeini. Their public stance toward members of the central government has varied, but has often been positive, particularly even after the Islamic Republicans replaced President Abolhasan Bani Sadr, who was unacceptably moderate from Moscow's perspective. By far the most pleasing consequence of the Iranian revolution from Moscow's point of view has been the utter collapse of Iranian-American relations. While the hostility toward the United States was internally generated , Soviet broadcasts to Iran in Persian and other public statements have been designed to intensify this attitude. The predominant theme since 1979 has been that the United States would use every means at its disposal, including military force, to destroy the revolution and restore the monarchy. There were frequent alarming reports about the menacing implications of United States naval activities in the Indian Ocean. The American embassy in Tehran was described as a base of espionage and subversion directed against the new order. The hostage crisis was at the time and in retrospect portrayed sympathetically in Soviet media. From the Soviet point of view, that crisis was a double asset. It brought down the moderate...