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In the last 25 years many thousands of formerly state-owned firms have been privatized in transition economies, generating over U.S. $400 billion in sales proceeds. In addition, thousands of firms have been privatized by methods in which no money was raised. The vast majority of economic studies praise privatization's positive impact at the level of the firm, as well as its positive macroeconomic and welfare contributions. Even so, public opinion in the developing world is quite hostile to privatization. The process has proven harder to launch, and more likely to produce errant results in institutionally weak states. A successful privatization process requires mechanisms that give private investors incentives and comfort, that create and sustain the policies and regulatory institutions that make governments competent and honest partners with private partners, and that protect consumers, particularly the most disadvantaged, from abuse.
This article explores the difference that the institution of property rights has made to the economic and political life of developed countries and the promise it holds for developing countries. By shaping the incentives of individuals and undergirding the institutions of society, a strong property rights regime lays the foundation for growth, freedom, and overall well-being. For individuals, property ownership entails opportunity, responsibility, and economic freedom. For society, these translate into investment, innovation, the possibility of widescale exchange, and even improved governance.
For most of two decades, Russia's political economy has been characterized by an intense struggle for property that has passed through numerous phases. The most recent phase, which began with the government takeover of prime oil assets from the Yukos company in 2003-04, has seen the central state reassert itself as the dominant player in the competition and demonstrate its intention to expand its control of the petroleum sector for both economic and foreign-policy reasons. Nevertheless, the federal government is far from the only competitor for assets in today's Russia. An analysis of the actors, motives, and resources at play points to multiple cracks in the current system that may serve as fault lines in a new round of destructive competition after Putin leaves office.
In 1980, Zimbabwe's white minority owned commercial farms covered nearly half the country's agricultural land. Yet today, the state of Zimbabwe, controlled by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front party, holds titles to almost all formerly white . . . owned agricultural land. The removal of constitutional constraints, which accelerated after 2000, was the crucial variable that enabled this transfer of ownership. By developing such a land regime, Zimbabwe has come to resemble most African states, which control rural land and can allocate and re-allocate it unimpeded by constitutional constraints. Today, significant private land ownership in Africa is confined to two former settler states, South Africa and Namibia.
This paper examines land in Mindanao as both a root of conflict and a key to potential, long-term conflict resolution. It reviews the history of Moro land ownership and political dominance in the sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu, which pre-dated Spanish and U.S. colonial rule. It looks at the Moro conflict with the Philippine government as a response to Moro land loss and marginalization, and reviews the failure of various peace agreements to resolve Moro grievances. Finally, the paper analyzes current negotiations between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government (GRP) on ancestral domain, and examines how ancestral domain could promote long-term peace and development in Mindanao.
Today, territorial ownership of states is essentially fixed, in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. This change has affected states in two very different ways. In regions in which most states are socio-politically strong, fixed territorial ownership is a blessing. It enhances peace, stability, and cooperation between states. In regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, however, fixed territorial ownership is largely a curse. It perpetuates and exacerbates states' weakness, and contributes to internal conflicts that often spill over across international borders.
Current ownership dogma has had pernicious consequences for fledgling democracies from Bosnia to Iraq to East Timor. Ownership advocates insist that democracy will only take root when local stakeholders (not outside actors) make and implement decisions. But ritualistic application of this theory imposes severe costs. Ownership doctrine, this paper sets out, has three core errors. First, it ignores the fact that some societies are unable to take ownership of their affairs, hence the need for dispassionate outsiders to occasionally assert their authority. Second, ownership doctrine asserts that meddlesome outsiders are the bane of young democracies or transition countries. Yet, ample evidence exists to challenge this view. Third, ownership doctrine substitutes ownership per se, rather than responsible behavior by local institutions and actors, as the over-arching goal. Encouraging disputants (or even non-disputants) to take the leading role in managing their country and their relationships is healthy; permitting them to do so in a way that aggravates tensions and subjects populations to risk is irresponsible. This paper argues for striking the balance between inculcating dependency by assuming too much authority and permitting chaos to reign by indulging prematurely in local ownership.
The February 2006 national election in Canada was driven by numerous political scandals rather than by a positive sense of what needs to be accomplished in Canada. The two key scandals were the events leading to the resignation of David Dingwall as president of the Royal Canadian Mint and the Sponsorship Program scandal that lead to the Gomery Inquiry. This article examines these two financial scandals to determine if they may have been driven by a shift from traditional democratic, public-sector values to the market-based, private-sector values of the New Public Management (NPM). It appears that the NPM played little role in these scandals, although the model of contracting out for government services bears some responsibility for the Sponsorship scandal because this tool was used to avoid transparency.
Water is essential for social and physical health and is a key factor in promoting development. A vast majority of people in the lesser-developed world, especially those who live in urban areas, lack any established right to water within domestic legal regimes. The international community has begun to recognize the significance of water, acknowledging that it is a human right necessary to sustain life. This article focuses on Manila, Philippines—the site of many recent changes in water policy—to demonstrate the precarious legal position of urban water users, who have no secure water rights and face declining quality and increased costs due to privatization. Domestic implementation of the human right to water could alleviate this problem by recognizing an individual justiciable right of water users, thus protecting accessibility, affordability, and quality.
Countries that rely on others for military capabilities or security guarantees face questions of 'defense ownership' in national strategy and domestic politics. This paper develops the concept of defense ownership and examines different campaigns for ownership in current South Korean and Japanese security policies. South Korea's defense ownership campaign focuses on national autonomy while Japan's focuses on international reputation. Traditional factors of security policy such as national capabilities, external threat perception, and ally reliability do not explain the differences between these campaigns. The ownership campaigns can, however, be understood within the context of South Korean and Japanese national identity debates about the appropriate role and position of the state in international affairs. In South Korea, the focal points of national identity debates are eventual unification with North Korea and overcoming a history of treatment as an international object rather than international actor. In Japan, national identity debates concentrate on regaining Japan's status as a 'normal' country and filling the vacuum of national pride once filled by the Japanese economic miracle, especially in the present context of a rising China. The paper concludes with recommendations for avoiding nationalist-driven policies that could cause spirals in regional security relations.
This paper examines recent incidences of 'economic patriotism' to determine whether this new wave of protectionism against foreign ownership represents a new breed of mercantilist fervor or a reincarnation of protectionism from years past. By placing the examples in their socioeconomic and historical context, the paper analyzes the future of economic nationalism within the world economy and the global trade system. This paper predicts that the current round of ownership protectionism will remain a transient occurrence that will not prevail over the long term. Economic patriotism may resurface in various countries on an intermittent basis but it will not be a sustainable force.
Despite increased international recognition that it is incumbent upon state governments to provide for the food security of all of their citizens, hunger remains an enormous problem throughout the developing world. Many countries have begun to implement constitutional and statutory changes to their administrative structures, radiating decision-making and spending power outward from the central government. This decentralization has aided municipal governments in caring for their citizens. In the case of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, food distribution programs have succeeded in reducing hunger, unlike similar federal programs conducted throughout the twentieth century. Political changes that have allowed cities like Belo Horizonte to redefine the nature of municipal responsibilities and citizen rights over the past decade involve the entire community in administrative efforts to proffer needed services. This case should be viewed as a "best practice" that may be extended to municipalities in other emerging democracies.
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