Latin American populism was widely thought to have run its course by the 1980's as the region embraced far-reaching market reforms. In recent years, however, new and strikingly diverse populist movements have returned to political prominence, reopening historic debates about the meaning of populism and its political and economic correlates. This article suggests that populism should be understood as a top-down process of political mobilization that is directed by a dominant personality, and it traces the resurgence of populist movements to the political and economic limitations of Latin America's "dual transitions" to democracy and market liberalism at the end of the 20th century. In particular, populism's revival is rooted in the institutional frailties and market insecurities of contemporary Latin American democracies, conditions that have made the region prone to new patterns of social and political mobilization.
While scholars have tended to view the rise of Evo Morales in the light of a regional resurgence of populism, the author argues that we may gain better insight into the significance and role of Morales when viewed against a backdrop of Bolivian political and social history. In particular, the author suggests that Bolivian political instability is rooted in popular power, and that in this context, it may be useful to regard populism itself as a feature of Bolivian political development, rather than as a distinct political phenomenon.
Populists are making headway across Europe and from all points on the political spectrum. Their success is symptomatic of the weakness of European political parties and party systems. Some of these populists seek to reinvigorate European democracy and yet most—with their xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric—seem intent on making matters worse. The challenge in Europe is to reconstitute national party systems as effective institutions for representing the popular interest. Such a challenge can be met only over the long term. For now, Europeans must deal with those populists who emerge at the national level. Some of these can be dealt with safely and others cannot. So far Europeans have succeeded in keeping the most unsavory populists from power. However, such success is not guaranteed. Indeed, failure to restrain European populism may be just a matter of time.
Populism is a dynamic phenomenon. Yet scholars studying populism in post-communist Europe have often treated their topic as static. For example, in the 1990s researchers concentrated on the idea of a politically scary marriage of populism with nationalism, without allowing for variation or complexity among individual cases. This text contends that populism in East Central Europe (ECE) should be treated as a dynamic phenomenon in which radical ideological components are becoming overshadowed by pure anti-establishment appeal. It explores ECE populism through Western-developed populism frameworks. Finally, it argues that in this context populism's strong anti-establishment posture is based on blaming the post-communist mainstream for its political and moral misconduct, rather than on the challenges inherent in the democratic transition.
Left-populism is a phenomenon attracting much attention, particularly in Latin America, but also increasingly in Europe. It is not a wholly new phenomenon; indeed it is a longstanding tradition shadowing more orthodox socialist approaches. However, the decline of traditional Marxism allows contemporary left-populism to adopt a specific post-Cold War form with some parallels and key differences between Europe and Latin America. This new left-populism has the potential to become a major feature of contemporary (left) politics, albeit one often still in the shadow of traditional socialist approaches. Like so many other forms of populism, left-populism has both a progressive and an illiberal 'dark side' that depends very much on context and the nature of the populist actor, but it should not be seen as inevitably inimical to democracy.
Populist political forces have played significant roles in Indian politics, and have varied in their vision of political community, in the social groups they targeted, in the policies they pursued, and in their impact on democracy. The Indian National Congress had populist aspects in the interwar period, and then again under Indira Gandhi's leadership from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Movements and parties that represented particular language and caste groups also employed populist rhetoric and methods of mobilization, and pursued populist policies. The nature of the populist organizations influenced the effect of populism on democracy. While Indira Gandhi's populism weakened Indian democracy, leading to a period of authoritarian rule, the populism of many of India's language and caste parties strengthened democracy. Populism is likely to continue in Indian politics, and is particularly significant currently in the mobilization of the lower castes.
This paper encourages scholars to draw comparisons between Latin America and India as the author suggests the two regions are converging towards similar democratic and economic systems. It draws on examples of populist leaders from both regions to show that comparisons can be established in terms of their social bases and identity politics, and how they handle neoliberal reforms and poverty alleviation programs.
Using quantitative data to examine the impact of United States and People's Republic of China (PRC) policies on Taiwanese nationalism and desire for independence, this paper catalogues a timeline of 'stages of cross-strait relations' whereby each stage can be identified as having an identifiable U.S. or PRC policy stance toward Taiwan. It finds that PRC military actions directed at coercing Taiwan into submission and explicit U.S. expressions of commitment to defend Taiwan increase the tendency of those in Taiwan to identify themselves as 'Taiwanese' and desire independent statehood. Conversely, shifting U.S. support to the PRC on cross-strait issues, conciliatory PRC-Taiwan exchanges and rhetoric, and stern verbal PRC warnings to Taiwan independence-leaning policies have a stagnating effect on Taiwanese nationalism.
Global modernity has transformed the nature of religious belief and the practice of religion. One crucial change has been the resurgence of publicly active religious populism. However, policymakers and social scientists, burdened with a secularist bias, have failed to grasp the full nature of this phenomenon. A more complete understanding of contemporary religious populism can be attained by examining their distinctive narrative forms—that is, the way that they describe their worldview and fundamental goals. This article focuses on of one of the most extreme forms of religious populism: the global jihad.1 A cursory examination of this single case suggests that despite strong rhetorical similarities between the most prominent forms of religious populism, both at home and abroad, crucial differences persist in their political effects.
Resource populism is a dominant feature of today's energy market: politicians around the world are attacking oil companies with both words and deeds. This battle has caused tension and has amplified business risk, the result being reduced investment in future energy projects. And although there appears to be no end in sight, there is still hope that the trend towards more resource populism is not sustainable in the long term; sooner or later politicians will need to reach out to the oil companies they have made a habit of demonizing.