Russian Policies in Central Asia: Change or Continuity

RUSSIAN POLICIES________ IN CENTRAL ASIA: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY ElizabethKridlValhenier Wince 1991 Western forecasts about the future ofthe former Soviet Central Asian republics have run through several scenarios: the "Great Game" competition, the Turkish/Iranian models, and the domino-effect theory. At present, the forecast of a resuscitated Russian imperial drive is in vogue. Like the preceding analyses, this one, too, is excessively one-sided and unilinear. It tends to interpret Russian policies in terms of geo-historical determinants and inevitability. It fails to take into account the full range ofinternal and external factors that affect Russian-Central Asian relations. And it discounts the substantial differences in the goals and methods ofYeltsin's foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, and of the Zhirinovsky nationalists or the conservative military—both being portrayed as conducting a well-orchestrated drive to restore imperial controls.1 There is no denying that during the past year or so Moscow has started purposefully to reassert hegemony in this and other regions of the former USSR. But it is my contention that diis policy is not tantamount to a restoration ofthe old empire—be it Russian or Soviet Too much has changed to permit a reversion to the former patterns. The domestic political scene is different so is the international environment as well as the regional situation. 1 I am not differentiating in this article between the benign and stringent imperial controls that is attempted in some Western analyses. What concerns me is the frequent blanket use of the concept of empire or imperial to cover the entire spectrum of actual Russian policies. Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier is resident scholar at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University and president-elect ofthe Mid-Adantic Association ofSlavic Studies. She is the author of many books, including The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind (1983, 1985), and numerous articles on Russian and Soviet foreign policy and art. 15 16 SAIS Review SUMMER-FALL 1994 For one, the proclaimed self-image and the raison d'être oí the Yeltsin government—despite the recent strong-arm rhetoric about Russia's security and interests in the former Soviet space—is that ofa democratic power that rejects its imperial past. At ate same time, there are political forces in Russia that challenge the current government and make the restoration ofthe empire part oftheir agenda. Moreover, Moscow's more aggressive stance on strengthening the Commonwealth of Independent States (eis) structure is not the consequence of internal dynamics alone. To some extent, it is also a response to what the Yeltsin government perceives to be Western reluctance to accept Russia as an equal partner. Finally, the Central Asian republics, though admittedly weak, are not altogether helpless. While well cognizant of their dependency on the northern neighbor and ofthe need to continue many ties, they are also quite adept at exerting leverage by resorting to open-door policies that connect them with China and South Korea, India and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, not to mention the United States. Overall, I would argue that Russian-Central Asian relations should be examined not in terms of imperial continuities peculiar only to Russia—an oudook diat is somewhat reminiscent ofdie Cold War absolutes. Rather, diey should be de-tdeologized and analyzed under the prism ofrealpolitik or nationalinterest principles that are universally applicable to all states, and especially to continental powers. From that angle it would be unreasonable or naive not to expect Russia—given its geographic and economic position—to seek a dominant position in Central Asia. What should be examined instead is: by what means and dirough what type ofinstitutional framework does the government and the opposition propose to exercise those interests. A much clearer view of the current-day hegemonic (not imperial) intentions ofthe Yeltsin government can be gained ifone examines the phases and the evolution of Russian policies toward Central Asia since 1991 and looks at the debates that accompanied the definition ofRussia's post-Sovietinterests and identity. Awareness of the original stance of the democrats on Central Asia enables one to gauge to what extent their actions are still guided, though in a much attenuated form, by those principles. Evolution of Policies During the first phase, through...