Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel (review)

270 SAISREVIEW will rise to the surface, a la Gephardt. It is particularly at this point that readers may notice the book's complete dearth offootnotes or bibliography. Also, there are recurring syntax errors which, coupled with a sometimes awkward stylistic approach, affects the readability of the book. Olsen arrives at the amenable though not unique conclusion that the U.S. and South Korea have reached an impasse in shifting from a relationship of dependency to one of parity, and that adjustments are needed to resolve this difficulty. Similarly, Olsen's advocation of a U.S. policy comprised of a firm yet consistent approach to the North Koreans with a concurrent possibility of economic involvement with the flourishing Pacific Rim countries is a solid conclusion. However, the reasoning behind the advocation of this stance is odd. Olsen urges the United States to "emulate South Korea's flexibility toward the U.S.S.R. and [the Peoples Republic of China] by adopting comparable flexibility toward North Korea." But the relative military and economic positions and concerns of the two nations are so different that the comparison is ludicrous. South Korea is merely following the lead of other countries similarly assured of U.S. military protection, such as NATO members, who seek economic relations and overall reductions in tension without having to mediate security concerns. South Korean policy makers are well aware of their situation, and the "chaebol" (South Korean business conglomerates) are moving into the previously forbidden Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European markets with contracts and joint venture proposals in hand. Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia's City ofSteel. By John Scott; enlarged edition by Stephen Kotkin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. 306 pp. $27.50/cloth, $9.95/paper. Reviewed by Daniel B. Berg, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. Russia has been through three revolutions this century. We are familiar with the first revolution in 1917 which established Soviet power, because the Bolsheviks were internationalists and their tenuous hold on power could not prevent Western snooping. We have easily followed the most recent, since Gorbachev has opened the Soviet Union with the hope of gaining assistance for his cause. Like Peter the Great, Mikhail Gorbachev is a westernizer. The man who guided Russia through her second great revolution this century, Joseph Stalin, was a Slavophile, and his xenophobia led to an autarkic, isolated Russia. Therefore, our understanding of his revolution is incomplete. It is the legacy of the Stalinist system—the Soviet political, economic and social systems (all ofthem centralized and "taut")—with which today's reformers must deal. To fathom Gorbachev's goals, successes and failures, we must understand Stalin's legacy. John Scott offers one of a few first-hand accounts of Stalin's Russia. Scott, a disillusioned American in the midst of the Great Depression, heard the calls to BOOK REVIEWS 271 "go to Russia" and join in a great socio-economic experiment. He lived with Russian workers, and felt completely at home with their historic task: "While political leaders in Moscow were scheming and intriguing, planning and organizing, I worked with the common soldiers, the steel workers, the simple people who sweated and shed tears and blood." Though a socialist, Scott does not shy away from an honest appraisal of the failures of Stalinism. Simultaneously, he portrays the spirit, determination and true enthusiasm of the Soviet people for their country and their revolution. Scott often witnesses the failures of economic centralization: "The Commissariat of Heavy Industry . . . ran thousands of mines, shops, mills throughout the country. [ItJ was created by a stroke ofthe pen and was expected to begin functioning immediately .... The result was what might have been expected . . . boundless devotion, and hard work; and unbelievable . . . disorder and stupidity." Inefficiency has been built into the system by central planning and subsidies to ensure full-employment. Scott noted that "while an American furnace of one thousand cubic meter volume was tended by seventy to eighty men, in Magnitogorsk it took one hundred and sixty-five." In Stalin's industrialization rush, administrators developed an uncaring attitude for the people, and environmental issues lost significance. Gorbachev faces the impact of past overzealous programs, such as the raping of...