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POST-KHOMEINI IRAN:___ GLOBAL AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Shahrough Akhavi .he death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1989 marks the end of an era in Iranian politics. Of course, there will be continuities with the Khomeini period: the clergy will likely continue to rule for some time; a peace treaty between Iran and Iraq will no doubt still confront enormous obstacles; and Iranian links to radical Islamic and secular movements—especially in the Middle East—will presumably endure. Yet, in view of recent developments inside and outside Iran, it is hard to imagine that previous policies will persist across the entire gamut of Iranian diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural relations with regional and non-regional states. The reasons are several. First, Cold War calculations no longer remain decisive in U.S.-Soviet relations. This leaves Iran with less leverage to play the superpowers against each other. At the same time, glasnost and perestroïka should make Tehran feel secure enough to expand relations with the USSR. Second, the removal from the scene of Khomeini — the Iran-Iraq war's most ardent advocate—will increase pressure on the leadership to begin reconstruction. The task is staggering. But at least the country has incurred no foreign debts— a remarkable fact, given the huge expenditures on the war effort over many years. Third, there will probably be fewer provocations involving the European states (as, for example, Khomeini's anathematizing of Salman Shahrough Akhavi is editor of the Middle East Series of the State University of New York Press and book review editor of Iranian Studies. He is a professor in the department of government and international studies, University of South Carolina, Columbia , and the author of numerous publications on Egyptian and Iranian politics. 149 150 SAIS REVIEW Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses) and hence more stability in Iranian-European relationships. Fourth, the neighboring Middle Eastern countries, feeling more secure in the post-Khomeini era, will try to normalize relations with Tehran. Fifth, the United States, the main focus of Iranian wrath over the last ten years, is unlikely to renew its military confrontation with Iran in the Persian Gulf, where its naval presence has declined significantly from 1987-88 levels. Also, the American imbroglio in Lebanon is over and is unlikely to be repeated, eliminating another cause of Shiite hostility. And finally, barring an open challenge to the power of President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iranian domestic politics should have a less disruptive effect on international politics. Under Khomeini internal conflicts spilled over into the international arena, in great measure because the Ayatollah refused to support decisively any of the domestic factions. For example, the refusal to release the American diplomats for 444 days during the Carter administration was largely due to infighting inside Iran. Khomeini's departure will not end elite conflicts, but in the future they should have fewer international ramifications and repercussions. The Khomeini Decade: 1979-1989 The Khomeini decade was characterized by tumultuous developments affecting Iran's internal and foreign policies. Between February 1979 and March 1983, the Iranian revolution passed through three of the four stages identified by Crane Brinton in his famous study of the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions: the rule of the moderates, the takeover of the extremists, and the reign of terror and virtue.1 In rapid order, hard-liners in the regime organized a single-question, closed-ended plebiscite on the nature ofthe political system (March 1979); held elections for a narrowly based Council of Experts—rather than a broadly elected Constituent Assembly— to draft a constitution (August 1979); forced the resignation of the moderate cabinet of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; encouraged the seizure of the American embassy and its personnel (November 1979); administered a referendum on the constitution empowering Khomeini with supreme authority (December 1979); staged elections for the presidency (January 1980); mounted elections for the Parliament (March and May 1980); deployed the armed forces against an Iraqi invasion (September 1980); and impeached President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr (June 1981). I. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, Inc., 1938). POST-KHOMEINI IRAN 151 In retaliation for the impeachment, members of the main guerrilla opposition, the Mujahidin...

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