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BOOK REVIEWS 239 and how the advice of experts advocating political means to hold the Sandinistas accountable was discarded. Although the stated goal of the administration's policy was to get the Sandinistas to the negotiating table, Gutman demonstrates that when an agreement was within reach, hard-liners, such as UN AmbassadorJeane Kirkpatrick and Constantine Menges, torpedoed any chance of attaining the government's stated goal. Menges did this on at least three occasions, heading off Secretary ofState George Shultz's attempts to open a dialogue with the Sandinista government by calling in both CIA Director William Casey and Ambassador Kirkpatrick to meet with President Reagan, who then told Shultz not to pursue his plans. Furthermore, when a viable peace plan was put on the table inJune 1984, it also fell apart. Because the United States was unwilling to send an observer to, or establish any links with the Contadora meetings, it had no knowledge of the Contadora and its proposals. The policy of negotiation was concomitant with the policy of confrontation. The contradictions inherent in this approach doomed the peace process from the start. The book's greatest asset is its examination of how foreign policy was made and conducted during the Reagan administration. According to Gutman, often contradictory policies and ignorance on the part of high-level administration officials, especially Secretary of State George Shultz, undermined foreign policy efforts and exacerbated problems. The author further states that at one point in 1 984 National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane deceived Shultz by not telling him that the Saudis were contributing a million dollars a month to the Contras. At the same time McFarlane was being deceived by his aide Oliver North, who was not telling McFarlane of his plan to create a private network to supply the Contras, according to Gutman, on the advice of William Casey and with the help of Richard Secord. Eighteen months after he resigned, McFarlane summed up the administration policymaking thus: "The organization of the administration for the conduct of foreign policy is, I believe, intrinsically unworkable. . . . There must be one person who is advocate, conceptual creator, and implementor of foreign policy. That is the Secretary of State." Roy Gutman gives a good account of the events surrounding the making of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, showing its lack of direction and inconsistencies . In the process, he demonstrates that when ideologues took over policymaking toward Nicaragua, policy suffered as a result. Making Sense of Europe. By Christopher Tugendhat. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 230 pp. $25.00/hardcover. Reviewed byfohn T. Shaw, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Making Sense ofEurope is a valuable addition to the literature on the European Community (EC). Christopher Tugendhat, a former journalist, member of 240 SAIS REVIEW the British House of Commons, and member of the European Commission, has written a book that is successful on several levels: it outlines the history of the European Community; explains the key institutions; describes how the various member states work within the community; considers the major problems facing Europe; and sketches an agenda for the future. Tugendhat argues that the evolution of the EC has been shaped by the competition between the ideas of federalism and intergovernmentalism. The federalist view, championed by Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, envisioned a "United States of Europe" administered by a powerful supranational institution , the European Commission. The intergovernmentalist view, advocated most vigorously by Charles de Gaulle, envisioned an association of European nations in which the nations would work together on certain matters while retaining complete sovereignty. Intergovemmentalists fought to ensure that decisionmaking authority for the European Community was vested in the Council of Ministers, where representatives of member states bargained and protected their nations' interests. Tugendhat believes that the battle between these competing views was resolved in favor of the intergovemmentalists by the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, following a crisis engineered by de Gaulle. This ensured that, among other things, member states could invoke "vital interests" to halt EC action if they found it unacceptable. Tugendhat writes, "This row marked the moment at which the supremacy of the inter-governmental over the federal approach was established .... It gradually became clear that the Community would evolve as...

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