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BOOK REVIEWS 277 an element of self-exploration and self-expression. Bonner began this trip when he was in his mid-sixties and already a renowned and experienced reporter with several accolades and a family with which to be contented. However, his achievements seem to have given birth to a renewed sense of freedom to break conventions and confront challenges that most younger journalists would not dare. For Bonner, surviving the experience and completing the book represent nothing less than a personal victory. "There are many handicaps in reporting about Afghanistan, of which the dangers, the distances, the difficulties of travel, and the differences in food and language are only the most obvious," Bonner comments midway through his journey. As a journalist, Bonner has steadfastly explored the current political and military quagmire in Afghanistan. As a writer/artist, he has dutifully exposed the plight of humanity (himself included) facing staggering adversaries. Covering everything from drugs to defectors to diarrhea, Aurther Bonner has surmounted every reporting difficulty and produced an outstanding overview of the current political situation and living conditions of the Afghan rebels. Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. By Marc A. Celmer. Westport , Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 132 pp. $29.95/cloth. Reviewed by Kristina Zissis, M. A. candidate, SAIS. The Iran "arms-for-hostage" affair, representing the failure to abide by the stated U.S. policy of refusing concessions to terrorists or their state sponsors, will be one of the more unfortunate legacies of the Reagan administration. Marc A. Celmer's Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, the first work on terrorism to include this event, provides the most up-to-date and comprehensive analysis available of U.S. anti- and counterterrorist policies. The U.S. government under President Reagan has attempted to develop and promote a tough antiterrorist policy. On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138), a "decision in principle to use force against terrorism." Celmer examines the hypothesis that the United States is inadequately prepared to execute the active self-help measures called for by NSDD 138. In a concise but essential chapter Celmer explores the history, definitions, causes, and goals of international terrorism. His purpose is to explain the phenomenon and to emphasize the need for policymakers to understand the origins of terrorism before formulating policy. The coordination of a U.S. antiterrorist program did not begin until 1972 when, responding both to an overall increase in terrorism and two particular incidents (the Lod Airport Massacre and the Munich Incident), president Nixon established a cabinet committee and working group to examine possibilities for combatting terrorism. Subsequently, president Carter's election triggered a major review and restructuring of the antiterrorist bureaucracy established in the Nixon/Ford era. Although the Carter administration was the first to feel the sharp political consequences of international terrorism, during the Iranian 278 SAIS REVIEW hostage crisis, Celmer concludes, "in the area of revamping the institutional machinery for dealing with terrorism, the Carter administration's record is a good one." Under President Reagan, antiterrorist policy has not changed dramatically . However, the U.S. response to terrorism has evolved from the passive and reactive defense of the early 1970s to the more active steps sanctioned in 1984 by NSDD 138. Celmer criticizes current coordination and policy efforts to respond to terrorism, citing the administration's responses to recent terrorist incidents in the Middle East, including the raid on Libya and dealings with Iran, to demonstrate a clear lack of understanding of terrorism and to support his judgment that the issue is being handled on an ad hoc basis. Next Celmer discusses the roles of the thirty agencies, departments, and offices that compose the antiterrorist bureaucracy. The recommendations that follow seek to enhance inter- and intradepartmental coordination efforts and integrate the U.S. response to terrorism with other components of U.S. foreign policy. Celmer's evaluation of past U.S. military operations against terrorism highlights a continual lack of preparedness, which leads the author to conclude that the United States must develop and implement an effective military capability in order to execute the type of action against terrorism prescribed by NSDD 138. He does...

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