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CONTAINMENT, COMPETITION, AND COOPERATION: SUPERPOWER STRATEGIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF Hanns W. Maull .he gulf war, an ongoing battle of attrition for more than seven years now, has evolved from a bloody but remote regional conflict into a major international zone ofcrisis. In 1987 three major developments contributed to the changing face of this crisis: the escalation of the land war, the increased number of tanker attacks, and the geopolitical involvement due to strikes against third-party vessels.1 The escalation of the land war in 1986-87 shattered facile assumptions about a military stalemate: Iranian offensives, starting in February 1986 with operation DAWN VIII (the capture of the Faw peninsula) and culminating in the advance toward Basra from December 1986 to February 1987 (KARBALA IV, V, VI), showed the world that a decisive military breakthrough by Iran could not be ruled out. Although Iraqi forces repulsed the Iranian attacks against Basra, they have suffered heavy casualties and loss of territory.2 These events have put into stark relief a fundamental asymmetry in this conflict: on the battlefield, Iraq can only lose.3 1 A widely quoted estimate of casualties at the end of 1986 was 350.000 dead and 650,000 wounded. Some casualty estimates advanced by intelligence sources are considerably higher: they claim some 300,000 Iraqis and 420,000-580.000 Iranians had died by 1985. See the New York Times, September 23. 1986. See SIPRlJahrbuch (Reinbek: Rororo Aktuell. 1987), no. 7, part IV, 219f. (German edition of SIPRI Yearbook 1987.) 2.See The Economist, January 3. 17. 24: February 14, 1987; International Institute for Strategic Studies (HSS), Strategic Survey 1987-88 (London: HSS, 1987): 126ff, Shahram Chubin. "La conduite des operations militaires dans le conflict Iran Irak." Politique Etrangère, no 2 (1987), 303-316. 3.Milton Viorst. "Iraq at War," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1986-87, 348 65 (358ff). Hanns W. Maull holds the chair for international relations at the Catholic University of Eichstaett in West Germany. He is also a visiting professor at The Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center. His publications include Energy, Minerah, and Western Security (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), and Strategische Rohstoffe, Risikenfur die wirtschaftliche Sicherheit des Westens (Munich/ Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1988). 103 104 SAIS REVIEW At sea, 1987 was the worst year in the war thus far.4 From 1984 to 1987 about 300 ships were attacked by both sides; in the six months alone from October 1986 to March 1987, Iraq hit thirty targets to Iran's twenty. A direct link between escalation at sea and the land war was evident: in response to Iranian successes on the ground, Iraq intensified its aerial strikes against Iranian strategic targets— cities, oil installations, and tankers carrying Iranian oil exports— thus using its key asset in the military confrontation: superior air power.5 Iran retaliated with attacks on tankers carrying Kuwaiti and Saudi oil exports (both countries have provided substantial financial assistance to Iraq's war effort). Iran then deployed Chinese Silkworm missiles in 1987, adding a new dimension to the conflict.6 The Iranian reprisals against third-country tankers reflected a broader trend: the geopolitical widening of the war. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were being drawn into the conflict not only by tanker attacks but also through "accidental" air or missile strikes. Kuwait became the principal target of terror and sabotage as Iran pressured Iraq's Arab allies. Saudi Arabia suffered the political agitation of Iranian pilgrims and the resulting bloodbath in Mecca in July 1987.7 By early 1987 previous assumptions about the war no longer seemed appropriate: there was no longer a clear military stalemate, but, at best, a precarious balance with a distinct possibility of a decisive shift in Iran's favor.8 Moreover, Iran's stubborn persistence in opting for a military solution carried with it a double threat for the regional status quo—namely the risk of a collapse of Iraqi morale and stamina under the twin burden of heavy losses and a repressive political leadership, and the danger that hostilities might spread to other states in the region became serious possibilities . The conflict could no longer justify smug third-party satisfaction that...

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