Will the Two German States Solve the Problem of European Security?

WILL THE TWO GERMAN STATES SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY? Jonathan Dean . he "Gorbachev Era" and the improvement in East-West relations associated with it have not changed the basic political facts of the European situation: the division of Germany into two separate states and the continued incorporation of these states into opposing military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is regarded by most governments in both alliances as the precondition of military and political stability in Europe. True, the three Western wartime allies — France, the United Kingdom , and the United States— undertook a contractual obligation three decades ago in the 1954 Bonn Convention to promote the reunification of Germany, but this commitment does not alter the political facts. Even the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), while insisting that the possibility of ultimate self-determination must be kept open for the population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), also insists that any chance of fulfilling this possibility is distant in time and that the security of the Federal Republic can be assured only by continued Federal German membership in the NATO alliance. Majority public opinion in the Federal Republic supports the government position, although this support could shift if the German public thought other possibilities were real and would at the same time assure continuation of their current level ofeconomic well-being, political freedom, and security. For its part, the government of the GDR insists that the status of the GDR as a separate state is permanent and that it has every intention of continuing GDR membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Jonathan Dean is arms control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists. This article is based on a contribution to a forthcoming book, The German States and European Security, edited by F. Stephen Larrabee, to be published under the auspices of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York. 173 174 SAIS REVIEW At present, only a portion of the GDR population (whose size cannot be measured given the authoritarian nature of the GDR system, but which is probably large) actively desires a change in the status quo, and then only under conditions that would maintain at least current standards of living and security. The forces supporting continuation of the status quo of the division of Germany and the membership of the two German states in opposing alliances are very strong. Yet, since their mutual acceptance as separate states in the Grundlagenvertrag , or Basic Treaty of December 1972, the Federal Republic and the GDR, in each case pushed by strong domestic public opinion, have entered into a complex relationship whose increasing scope and intensity has caused considerable concern in both East and West. To the allies of the two German states who have these worries, no aspect of the inner-German relationship is more sensitive — because it is, at least in appearance, so directly related to possible change in the status quo in Europe — than the possibility of inner-German collaboration on security and arms control issues. Starting from timid beginnings in the early 1970s, the security dialogue between the two German states has intensified with the emergence of the reform-minded Gorbachev leadership in the USSR. The policies of the two Germanies already overlap on an increasing number of arms control and security issues. The circumstances surrounding conclusion of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty have brought strong support in Federal Germany for negotiated reduction of tactical-range nuclear weapons, vigorously seconded by coordinated East German and Soviet pressures for the "third zero" — total elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe. The next five years may bring the conclusion and implementation of a United States-Soviet accord on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, a second Stockholm-type agreement on confidence-building measures covering NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces, a NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement to reduce these forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area and, possibly, a worldwide prohibition on production and storage of chemical weapons. Such developments would intensify the inner-German dialogue on security and arms control issues. This article examines the possible extent of such intensification, its implications for the inner-German relationship, for the security policies of...