Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy, and: New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel (review)

224 SAIS REVIEW its dynamic impulse? Indeed, did it lose this impulse before 1982, as it sought to extend its power in Jordan, and later in Lebanon? These are questions raised by Mishal's evenhanded, if unexciting, account of the Palestinian dilemma. The book is not particularly captivating, yet it never strays far from its original thesis. Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy. By Avner Yaniv. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. 324 pp. $35.00/cloth. New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System ofIsrael. By Ofira Seliktar. Carbondale , 111.: Southern Illinois, 1986. 308 pp. $32.50/cloth. Reviewed by DavidJ. Pervin, M.A. candidate, SAIS. In the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 a plethora of articles and books appeared that sought to explain the war. While most of this literature is valuable, much of it suffers from two drawbacks: a degree of ahistoricism and a lack of theoretical framework. Put another way, the literature has been strong on description but weak on analysis. These failings have been most acute in addressing the central question from the war: what led Israel to undertake what arguably was its first offensive and explicitly political war? In Ofira Seliktar's New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System ofIsrael, and Avner Yaniv's Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics ofIsraeli Strategy, both authors focus on this question. The books investigate the contribution that Israel's historical backround made to the events of 1982. Seliktar argues that the most important changes in Israel's society were the growing proportion of oriental Jews in the population and the growing salience of religion in Israel. As a result, Israel's political culture became more statist, idealistic, and ideological. The implications for Israel's foreign policy were manifold. First, the Arabs, if not the entire external world, were perceived as uncompromisingly opposed to Israel's existence. Second, the West Bank became more than a strategic concern; as the heart of biblical Israel, it also had ideological, even spiritual, relevance to Jews. Third, since the West Bank was considered an integral part of the state, the Palestinian conflict was perceived as "zero-sum." Fourth, Israel's continued existence boiled down to the maintenance of military superiority over its adversaries. Foreign policy, given its existential importance, thus became the dividing line between Israel's two competing political camps. On one side, the Labor party represents a more pragmatic and reactive approach, while, on the other side, the Likud advocates a policy that is more idealistic and assertive. As Israel's political culture changed it became more compatible with the Likud's approach, which explains, according to Seliktar, Likud's domination of Israeli politics since 1977. Seliktar argues that the implications of this change for the goals and conduct of Israel's foreign policy were radical. Whereas Labor had sought to defend the regional status quo, Likud wanted Israel to initiate changes in its immediate environment, through offensive measures, in order to make the state "safer." The result, according to Seliktar, was the war in Lebanon. BOOK REVIEWS 225 Seliktar's argument, while convincing, is also monistic; the changes in Israel's political culture did not occur in a vacuum. The author does not account for the role of political personalities or the regional and geopolitical forces that affected Israel's foreign policy. This broader approach is taken by Avner Yaniv in Deterrence Without the Bomb. Yaniv defines nonnuclear deterrence as a state policy aimed at dissuading adversaries from taking actions inimical to its state security; this relies on threats of punishment or retribution, using diplomatic, economic, psychological, and, if necessary, military means. In this context war is not necessarily a failure of the policy but a reinforcement mechanism meant to buttress deterrence for the future. Deterrence is used by the weaker state, Yaniv argues, to maintain the status quo. The weaker state outlines the "rules of the game," violations of which constitute casi belli. The deterring state will thus fight only defensive wars, but, given its relative weakness, will use offensive tactics. Yaniv argues that Israel is a status quo state, the status quo defined as "a regional order in which a sovereign Jewish...