The PLO in the Aftermath of Rebellion

THE PLO IN THE AFTERMATH OF REBELLION Jonathan T. Kamin O? the eve of the Lebanon War in June 1982, the Palestine Liberation Organization (plo) was in a stalemate, pulled in many different directions by its members and supporters. The results of that war brought these tensions to the surface where they erupted in a rebellion that has had historical significance for the organization. For nearly three years the plo struggled to repair the damage. Finally, in fall 1984 it recognized the futility of these efforts. The Palestine National Council (pnc), the official assembly of the plo, convened its seventeenth congress to condone the split that the rebellion had created and to lay to rest a hallowed Palestinian tradition—unity and consensus. Some have lamented that this split has signaled the organization's swan song. Others, however, have lauded it as a blessing in disguise, a chance to break away from the constraints of the past. Here was a historic opportunity to invigorate the plo with a new dynamism that would help it overcome its divisions and move toward the goal of establishing a Palestinian homeland . Predicting which of these two views is closest to the truth is a difficult task. In the past, the Palestinian movement has been characterized by contradictory behavior and evasive tactics well-suited to the vagaries of Arab politics. As the Middle East has changed, however, these characteristics have become counterproductive in advancing the plo's objectives . In fact, in this most recent period, the plo leadership, led by Yasir Jonathan T. Kamin is an M.A. candidate at SAIS. Mr. Kamin has written previously for the East European Quarterly. 91 92 SAIS REVIEW Arafat, relied on old patterns of behavior which prevented it from quickly deciphering the variables of the postwar environment. Thus, it has continued to act indecisively and at cross-purposes with itself. In spite of these shortcomings, this has been a period in which the plo has faced considerable challenges and has proved adaptable enough to meet them successfully. Is this a temporal success or does it portend a qualitatively new phase for the plo in which the movement can overcome its deficiencies and realize its goals? There are four key elements in this latest episode in plo history: the changing Arab world and its effect on plo tactics, the divisions within the plo at the time of the Lebanon War, Arafat's activities in the critical months preceding the rebellion and his mistakes in dealing with key groups in this period, and finally, the environment in which the seventeenth congress took place. After the Six-day War an amorphous ideology and diverse support allowed Arafat's plo some autonomy. As long as pan-Arab unity dominated Arab thinking, Arafat could deflect the efforts of states, directly or through their representatives within the plo, to control the organization. The drift away from pan-Arabism and toward state-centered, more chauvinistic political initiatives in the past ten years weakened the efficacy of Arafat's approach. Egypt's independent course, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the widening gulf between the rich and the poor induced Middle Eastern countries to search for domestic stability and increased influence in the region.1 Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia all have embarked on policies that have strengthened their own positions but that have conflicted with one another's objectives. In the two years preceding the Lebanon War Arafat strove to placate these countries, seeking at various times political and economic support from them. Inevitably, this made the plo more susceptible to pressure and thus often compromised its goals. This was particularly true in the case of Syria, whose physical location, support of key plo groups and control of contingents of Palestinian troops gave it significant political leverage. Increasingly isolated in the Arab world because of its support for Iran in that country's war with Iraq, Syria found it necessary to utilize that leverage. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's refusal to attend the Arab summit in November 1980 forced Arafat to stay away as well. In autumn 1981 Syrian and internal pressure caused Arafat to reject Saudi Prince Fahd's eight-point...