Zaire: The Politics of Penury

ZAIRE: THE POLITICS OF PENURY Crawford Young iL/aire, as a territorial entity, was created by the international (then European ) community at the Berlin Congress. Over time, Belgium succeeded in transforming the territory bequeathed by Leopold II into a chasse gardée, largely excluding other external influences. In 1960, with the breakdown of the decolonization formula, Zaire suddenly became a battleground for influence among a number of competing forces, with the United Nations and its peacekeeping forces holding the ring, and the United States playing a dominant role. This struggle, largely conducted in the political realm, revolved around the nature of the postcolonial Zairian state, and its pattern of external affiliations in a broader international context still dominated by the "cold war." During the Mobutu years the character of external relationships has changed. With the resurrection of the Zairian state, a somewhat higher degree of autonomy was achieved. At the same time, major new economic linkages were forged, through the grandiose copper-energy development strategy of the nouveau régime. When the expansive dreams of the new order were shattered by socioeconomic crisis that struck one hammer blow after another from 1974 on, the Zairian state found itself enmeshed in quite a new kind of external bondage, this time much more economic in nature. The tributary relationship to Western states and economic institutions that emerged in the late 1970s seemed much more durable in character than the political dependency of the first republic. The first public tipoff of the impending crisis was the suspension of Crawford Young is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and president of the African Studies Association for 1982-83. Professor Young is author of Ideology and Development (1982) and The Politics of Cultural PluraUsm (1976). 115 116 SAIS REVIEW export insurance guarantees by the Belgian Office Ducroire in the spring of 1975. Soon thereafter, Zaire began to fall behind in debt repayments, which was revealed by the Wall StreetJournal on October 20, 1975. At this juncture, with the United States deeply embroiled in partnership with Zaire in the Angolan civil war, an effort was made to provide a governmental bailout through a special $60 million infusion (one-third each Export-Import Bank, pl (Public Law) 480, and aid credit).1 At that time, State Department sources privately shared President Mobutu's argument that the Zairian financial problem was short term and primarily provoked by the copper price fall. It therefore sufficed to throw up a bailey-bridge over the turbulent but narrow torrent of insolvency to help Zaire across to the abundance that lay on the far shore. Zaire made its first quiet gesture toward fending off bankruptcy in the spring of 1975. Mobutu approached Irving Friedman, Citibank vice-president , with whom he had developed a personal relationship when Friedman was serving as an imf official. Friedman had had a major role in establishing the hefty Citibank commitment to Zaire. From 1972 to 1974, with an office established in Kinshasa, Citibank and its affiliates in Paris and London helped arrange loans of $164 million, or 59 percent of all private bank borrowing.2 Mobutu was eager to obtain a reprieve on the debt without passing through the imf, to which he had a strong antipathy; its conditions were likely to be too stringent, and he had privately pledged in 1967 that he would never again commit himself to following Fund prescriptions.3 Citibank, however, was not willing to go along with this scheme; Friedman was convinced imf involvement was indispensable. By this time, ninetyeight banks worldwide held debts totaling $887 million, ofwhich about $500 million was unguaranteed. The claims were roughly equally divided among American, European, and Japanese banks. When payments gradually stopped during 1975, banks began to make inquiries. To their dismay, it was exceedingly difficult to determine Zaire's financial situation. By the fall of 1975, Mobutu had no choice but to invite an imf team and to enter into discussions about drawing the relatively easy "first tranche" of credit to which members were entitled. The imf was flabbergasted to discover that no one in Zaire knew exactly what the debt was. Zairian borrowing had been undertaken through various...