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234 SAIS REVIEW Podhoretz glosses over complexities that might weaken his argument. For instance , he asserts that due to a single factor— the Soviet challenge after World War II — the American people "experienced a surge of self-confident energy," avoided a depression, and led the West to prosperity. Similarly, he dismisses the issue of whether the pre-Kennedy situation in South Vietnam was one of overt Communist aggression, North Vietnamese subversion, or internal strife. One need not quibble over such "legalistic definition." He also contends that the Soviet advance into Afghanistan is the first step toward seizure of the Persian Gulf—no other motive is worthy of discussion. Finally, he includes an unimaginative chapter on the Findlandization of America. Podhoretz's basic problem is that he spells communism with a capital "C." Not only does he disregard the distinctions between Marxism and Maoism or Eurocommunism and African socialism, he also ignores the different roles these policies play in the various countries. How do Podhoretz's ideas translate into policy? On certain points he draws back from an explicit statement of his position. He doubts that even Nixon "would have had the stomach" to back the shah fully, and to acquiesce in the massacre "of many thousands of demonstrators"—would Podhoretz? He complains that open and graphic discussion of the effects of nuclear war put the United States at a psychological disadvantage—would Podhoretz suppress such a discussion? The general tenor of the book suggests that, yes, he would. On other matters Podhoretz is blunt. In his treatment of the 1973 oil embargo (an issue that involves U.S. support of Israel, although he does not mention this factor), Podhoretz contends that OPEC actions "in very recent past" would have been considered acts of aggression or war. The United States, therefore, should have taken military action. On another issue, he argues that the overtures to the People's Republic of China should be halted, since this alignment with a "Communist" power is inconsistent with containment policy. Finally, he believes that the lesson of Afghanistan will be that "unless we intervene under certain circumstances, we will find ourselves at the mercy of our enemies." The Present Danger is a disappointing book. The parts of it that propose containment policy diminish the value of Podhoretz's occasionally perceptive analyses. The arguments in these sections are simplistic and blustering. Yes, the United States must face any threat to the "free institutions which are our heritage and the political culture which is our glory" with policies that are consistent and clear. But Podhoretz's idealized containment policies, which rule out flexibility in the face of complex and changing international realities, are decidedly not the way to attain this objective. — MARTIN D. FlNNEGAN Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. By the Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. New York: Basic Books, 1981, 706 pp. $37.50. The introduction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki tells of an American reporter who held a news conference in Hiroshima in August 1945. The reporter "noted the total BOOK REVIEWS 235 devastation of the city and extolled the obvious superiority of the bomb's potential." When asked of his impressions of the destruction wrought in terms of human lives, he refused to comment, choosing instead to focus on the technical aspects of the bomb's lethal power. The reporter was not alone in his focus, for to Americans in 1945 the ruins of Hiroshima represented superiority on the battlefield and preeminence in the world. Why worry about casualties? Today the technical focus remains largely unchanged and the ruins evoke a certain nostalgia for our days of military superiority. Recall, for example, the gathering of 40,000 people at Harlington, Texas, one October weekend in 1976, where the Enola Gay's pilot, in a reenactment of the Hiroshima mission, flew a B-29 "Superfortress" over the grandstands as an Army demolition team detonated a charge that produced a bang and a big mushroom cloud to the evident delight of the crowds. Contrast this with the memories of an elderly widow who was carried to safety...

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