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THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON Samih K. Farsoun and Rex B. Wingerter A heJuly 1981 Palestinian-Israeli war over Lebanese territory made it clear that there can be no peace in the Middle East without a stable Lebanon. Every small, unpredictable military flare-up there has the unsettling possibility of igniting a fifth Arab-Israeli war. The Reagan administration sought to minimize this threat by defining— a few days after the shaky ceasefire was established between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel—a policy that would deal with the entire "future of Lebanon." The specific goals of the United States, according to State Department spokesmen, will be to strengthen the Lebanese central government, expand UNIFIL forces, and disarm various political factions, among which the PLO ranks first. To achieve these ends the administration is willing to speak to, and involve, all "internal parties" to the Lebanese conflict, including all religious communities and political groups. All, that is, except the PLO. In interviews held by the authors in Beirut shortly after the July conflict, a deep sense of dismay and apprehension over U.S. objectives was found among Arab intellectuals, PLO leaders, and representatives of various Lebanese political parties, especially those of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). There was a consensus that the Reagan administration is insensitive to the realities of Lebanese politics and is inclined to military solutions for what are essentially political problems . Current administration goals, which exclude a dialogue with the PLO, reveal a perhaps fatal misunderstanding of the Lebanese crisis and how the dynamics of the Palestine question play on Lebanese stability. The issues that plague Lebanon Samih K. Farsoun is an associate professor at The American University in Washington, D.C, and chairman of the Department of Sociology. He has written extensively on the political sociology of the Arab world, including all aspects of Lebanese society and the Palestinian communities and movement. Rex B. Wingerter is director of public affairs at the Palestine Congress of North America. 93 94 SAIS REVIEW include not only the national question of the Palestinians —that is, their agitation for a national homeland in a part of Palestine—but, also, the profound problem of how to reorder and develop Lebanese society. These two issues have become inseparable . Indeed, the basis for the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war was the violent interaction of these questions—intensified by the intervention of Israel and the United States. If the Reagan administration wishes to resolve the crisis that periodically explodes into Palestinian-Israeli conflicts in Lebanon, it will first have to understand the awesomely complex political problems that triggered the civil war and then, come to peaceable terms with the sociopolitical forces that are solidly in place. Although the problems in Lebanon can be traced back to the nineteenth century, they surfaced in their modem form in 1926 when the French expanded Mount Lebanon to incorporate the surrounding plains, thus creating Grand Liban, or the modern republic of Lebanon. As a result, large numbers of Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims were added to the country's population, and the relative sizes of the various sects shifted so that, after the Maronites, the largest were the Sunnis, followed by the Shi'ites. From the start of the mandatory regime France encouraged religious, sectarian , and ethnic distinctions, cultivating them against Islamic and Arab nationalism . Despite a great deal of popular and organized resistance from the Muslims, especially in the newly gained areas, the French were able to secure Lebanon's new territories and to establish sectarianism in the form of a chamber of deputies, or parliament, with proportional sectarian representation. The powerful offices of the presidency and the army command were reserved for the Maronites. This practice was formalized in the "National Pact"—a gentlemen's agreement, not a law—between Maronite and Sunni leaders in 1943. The terms of the agreement also included reserving the prime minister's post for a Sunni Muslim, and that of head of Parliament for a Shi'ite Muslim. In addition, cabinet ministries were to include representatives from the other major sects: Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Druze. Based on the practice of the mandate period, all political appointments were made...

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