The Second Transition: America in Asia Under Carter

THE SECOND TRANSITION: _______ AMERICA IN ASIA UNDER CARTER Kim Woodard -oday, it is commonplace to believe that the United States and its foreign policies, particularly in Asia, are well beyond the disasters of the war in Vietnam. Following the American withdrawal from Vietnam under Nixon and Kissinger and the subsequent collapse of the American-supported regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh, we are said to be in the "post-Vietnam period," having weathered one ofthe greatest transitions in the history of American foreign policy, reordered our priorities and objectives, and rationalized our defeats. No longer the "policeman of the world," we must settle for strategic parity, steep competition in trade and technological development, a diminished dollar , energy dependence, and other constraints on our growth and power. Our image is more modest on the scale of the world, but we comfort ourselves with the belief that it is also more humane. If the Vietnam transition in American foreign relations is widely appreciated and understood, the same cannot be said regarding the shift in our policies that came during the last year ofthe Carter administration . In 1980,just as we were settling into our new role as a rational and constrained participant in the global community, we were faced with the crises in Afghanistan and Iran. Suddenly our foreign policy was once again in transition, responding to the pressure ofnumerous crosscurrents and groping for clear lines ofinitiative. This second transition in American foreign relations in less than a decade has been just as wrenching as the first andjust as important to the survival ofour basic political values. If our inability to force the recovery of our diplomatic hostages in Iran illustrates the constraints on American foreign policy, Kim Woodard isAdjunctResearchAssociate with theHonolulu-basedEast-West Centerand the author of numerous publications on Asia, including his recent book, The International Energy Relations of China. He is currently engaged in research on international energy and security problems. 129 130 SAIS REVIEW the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates beyond much doubt that the industrial democracies are vulnerable to attack, both direct and indirect, on their lifelines. What is peculiarly threatening about the crises in the Persian Gulf is that they reveal fundamental weaknesses at the intersection ofour security policy and our economic policy. In an era ofbudget constraints and resource limits, the United States and the other industrial democracies must somehow design a response and take new initiatives that simultaneously protect the sovereignty and political integrity ofthe Third World, permit us sufficient time to adjust our energy systems and economies, and guarantee the defense of established zones of political democracy and human freedom. A unilateral American response is already clearly insufficient to the task. Even granting our technological lead, our political and organizational assets, and our moral imperatives, the Soviets are outspending us in both relative and absolute terms in the arms race. No amount of political sophistry or budget-juggling is likely to return to us the margin ofmilitary superiority that we enjoyed during the 1950s and 1960s.1 No amount ofgovernment and private investment in new energy technologies could at a stroke relieve our energy dependence on the least stable region of the world. As a result of the sharp constraints that affect our defense budgets and our economy more generally, we must increasingly turn to multilateral relations to ensure our defense and our economic stability. A unilateral response to Soviet imperialism and military pressure is both inappropriate and obsolete. This is not an argument for capitulation, but a description of reality and a definition of strategic choices. As we turn increasingly to multilateral support for basic security and economic policy, we are naturally inclined to look first to the structure of formal alliances, organizations, and agreements that have served the industrial democracies so well since World War II. NATO, the EEC, the OECD, the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan, the ANZUS Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and a host ofothers protect and stabilize the industrial democracies and mitigate competition among them. But the crises in the Persian Gulf also demonstrate the weakness ofthese formal arrangements in efforts to achieve concerted action beyond the perimeter defined by their memberships...