The Prognosis for Domestic Policy

460 Rhetoric & Public Affairs The Prognosis for Domestic Policy David Zarefsky Two recent books suggest limitations on presidential initiative in domestic policy by pointing to the friction that such efforts encounter. One is the revised edition of Stephen Skowronek's The Politics Presidents Make.1 In the first edition, Skowronek plotted cycles of political time—periods in which political order was reconstructed, then the reconstruction received its fullest articulation, and then a disjunction developed between this order and the exigencies of the situation, leading finally to another reconstruction. Four such cycles were plotted. In the first, Jefferson represented reconstruction, Monroe articulated Jeffersonian principles, and John Quincy Adams witnessed their disjunction from political realities. In the second cycle, Jackson, Polk, and Pierce represented the respective positions. The third cycle was described by reference to Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Hoover. Finally, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Carter represent reconstruction, articulation, and disjunction in the most recent cycle. Skowronek plots these cycles against the linear development of secular time, which is characterized by increasing friction in the system, making the work of political reconstruction more difficult. In the revised edition, Skowronek adds a chapter on the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidencies. There he hypothesizes that the growing friction of secular time has led to a waning of political time. Rather than fully developed cycles, Skowronek predicts that we will witness a state of continual opposition, in which each presidency will define itself by opposition to its predecessor. If this is so, the collapsing of political time substantially weakens the president's ability to develop an innovative domestic program or to trace its articulation through subsequent presidencies. This statement is true whether one envisions another New Deal articulated into a Great Society or a Reagan revolution articulated into a new federalism. The other book, by journalist Jonathan Rauch, is called Government's End.2 Rauch argues that the increasing pressures and demands the public places on government have paralyzed it and reduced its ability to function—a condition he labels "demosclerosis." Rauch traces this phenomenon over the past 40 years and recommends measures that might arrest the trend, but he finds that the antidotes are weak and unlikely to reverse the trend. He concludes therefore that we should adjust ourselves to expecting less from government. He urges that political moderates become David Zarefsky is professor of communication studies and former dean of the School of Speech at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. © Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 3, No. 3, 2000, pp. 460-65 ISSN 1094-8392 Forum on the Future of the Presidency 461 more active advocates for realism, countering the tendency of both politicians and ideologues to over-promise. Whatever else one might say about these two analyses, they certainly leave little room for a latter-day Lyndon Johnson, championing a Great Society and proclaiming , "We have the power to shape the civilization we want."3 Such a boast literally belongs to another time. Now the stress is on the limits, not the possibilities, of what government might do. Contemporary developments echo the themes of these recent books. First, American society has learned "the lessons of the 1960s" through the filter of the Reagan years. It has become something of a commonplace that "big government programs don't work" and that "problems cannot be solved by throwing money at them." The political failure of the Clinton health care reform proposals of 1993-94 can be taken as evidence of the futility of large-scale efforts. The failure of either major party to propose a new assault on poverty during the late 1990s—unlike previous eras of record prosperity—illustrates the willingness to accept that we face problems without solutions. Moreover, the past 25 years have been characterized by the rise of "identity politics ," in which the validation of one's identity becomes a political issue. Identity is variously defined by race, gender, ethnicity, sexual preference, class, geography, occupation, and other factors too numerous to list. This trend toward "identity politics " marks a new openness, tolerance, and celebration of diversity, all of which are to the good. But it also has an atomizing effect, making it harder for leaders to develop appeals that transcend...