From Hinge Narrative to Habit: Self-Oriented Narrative Psychotherapy Meets Feminist Phenomenological Theories of Embodiment

In what follows, I offer some friendly amendments to Potter’s psychotherapeutic model—‘the hinge narrative’ (HN)—designed to help bipolar patients cultivate self-trust. My primary contribution is to suggest an alliance between narrative theory and feminist phenomenological theories of embodiment. I argue that these projects are mutually supporting in both the metaphysical and therapeutic project of constituting a rich moral self, that is, a self who has self-trust and thereby satisfying relationships with others.

I also register a slight disagreement with Potter concerning the effect that bipolar illness has on agency. Potter claims that with conventional narratives patients have difficulty perceiving themselves as agents—at least in excessive manic or depressive phases. I argue, however, that conventional narratives do not make it difficult for bipolar patients to see themselves as agents, but rather makes it difficult for them to see themselves as consistent agents.¹

Conventional Narrative Selves and Self-Trust

Potter makes clear that self-trust is crucial to living a flourishing life. Although Potter does not clarify precisely what she means by a ‘flourishing life’ within her argument, one could surmise that at least she means satisfying relationships with others, for example, trusting, reciprocal, affective, and cooperative relations. Self-trust, Potter clarifies, enables us to confidently undertake tasks, fulfill obligations, and plot future goals. Thus, self-trust is a necessary feature of satisfying relationships with others because it enables us to believe we can be counted on by others.

Bipolar patients, Potter claims, do not appropriately develop self-trust. In manic states, patients may trust themselves too much at the cost of valuable critical reflection on one’s projects and desires. In depressive states, on the other hand, patients do not trust themselves to be capable of carrying out projects, including, perhaps being a good friend. The oscillating and contradictory experiences of self-trust for the bipolar patient, therefore, undermine a sense that she is one, coherent self with persisting goals or values.

A coherent self—which is one of the logical properties Potter enumerates of self-trust—is a conventional narrative self (NS).² Minimally, a NS is a self that experiences—most likely implicitly—past actions and values as impacting one’s current situation and are helpful both for framing and predicting one’s future actions and values. In other words, a basic feature of a NS is that she experiences herself as linear, that is, moves through time in a linear fashion. Second, a NS is also a self who recognizes himself as an agent, namely, a self that chooses, acts, and, more important, is accountable to both. A narrative that portrays me as an agent is one in which I can make explicit, at least in specific cases, why I undertook past actions or how those past actions bear upon my current situation (perhaps to explain ‘reportable events,’ i.e., bizarre, uncharacteristic, or irresponsible events). Third, a NS is one who does not feel alienated from, but identifies (appropriates as part of one’s story) with, past actions and values that shape one’s present sense of self. Alienation is an effect of not being able to see past or present actions as congruent with one’s values.

Although all three criteria play an important role in Potter’s understanding of a NS, I submit that the third criterion should be weighted more heavily.³ In fact, it is precisely because bipolar disorder tends to alienate the sufferer from past actions that continue to shape his future sense of self that a conventional (i.e., linear) narrative is so devastating for a bipolar patient. Potter argues that in conventional narratives: “[patients] cannot see their goals and actions as a reflection of their agency” (2013, 60). However, I have enumerated these three criteria to suggest that a NS is devastating and shaming to a patient, not because they cannot see themselves as agents, but rather as consistent agents. They are accountable to past actions, but they feel alienated from them.

To further illustrate...