Compulsions, Compatibilism, and Control

I am grateful for both thoughtful comments on my paper on obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), free will and (loss of) control.

In his comment, Walter Glannon (2012) extends my argument in two directions: In the direction of a compatibilist account of free will and control, based on Fischer and Ravizza (1998), and in the direction of neurobiology. In this response, I briefly consider these two directions.

Basically, there are three main positions in the philosophical debate on free will: Compatibilism, libertarianism, and hard determinism. In my paper, I have tried not to take a position on the truth of determinism and its compatibility with free will, stating: “The pressing question is, then: Is freedom of the will possible in our (allegedly) deterministic world? However, I do not go into the discussion about the compatibility of free will and determinism” (Meynen 2012, 325). The reason for not taking a position in this debate is that I would like my argument to be relevant for more than one philosophical position (see also Meynen 2010). Notwithstanding this strategy, I much appreciate Glannon’s integration of my line of thought on the one hand and Fischer and Ravizza’s influential compatibilist account on the other. In fact, in their account, two senses of control are developed and contrasted: ‘Guidance’ control—nicely described by Glannon in his comment—and ‘regulative’ control. An agent has regulative control over his actions if he has the ability to do otherwise. This ability, which we usually assume we have, however, requires alternative possibilities, and, therefore, is problematic if determinism is true. And the philosophical discussion about Fischer and Ravizza’s proposal revolves, in part, around the question whether or not ‘guidance’ control is indeed sufficient for moral responsibility and free will, or that, as incompatibilists have argued, ‘regulative’ control is required for real freedom and responsibility. Because my account of control is also meant to be, in principle, applicable in the everyday situation of clinical care, I did not want it to rely on a specific compatibilist definition of control (guidance control). Nevertheless, it is important that Glannon has shown how, from a compatibilist perspective, control and OCD can be linked, and how the three elements of free will distinguished, based on Walter, can be considered as interrelated.

The second issue (the neurobiology of control) is, in part, related to the first. Neuroscience is often seen to pose serious problems for a libertarian notion of free will. Meanwhile, from the compatibilist perspective elaborated in the first part of Glannon’s commentary, it seems only natural to proceed to a neuroscientific account of control. Still, when entering the neuroscientific domain, Glannon (2012, 336) makes an interesting remark:

Although mental states are necessarily generated and sustained by the brain, their content and qualitative aspects are not reducible to neural processes. Brain and mind are mutually interacting systems that promote the subject’s adaptability to the environment.

In my view, this statement is motivated by Glannon’s sensitivity to the conceptual complexities surrounding mind–brain interaction, freedom, and control. Because of these complexities, I chose to leave an account of ‘the neurobiology of control’ out of my paper.

My response to Glannon up to this point shows that in the article I aimed to develop an argument about OCD and free will that evades, as far as possible, conceptual complications and controversies. I intended to provide a focused argument that could, in principle, be broadly acceptable and applicable, and does not rely on specific views of free will, control, and brain–mind interaction.

Dan Stein’s comments touch on several aspects of my paper, like the nature of OCD, the literature on OCD, the relationship between mental disorder and freedom, and the relationship between philosophy and psychiatry. I focus on his comments on control and dyscontrol because, by responding to these, I hope to further clarify the strategy and scope of my paper.

Stein (2012, 339) notes that “It is true that reference to increased control can also be found in the OCD literature.” But he adds that

typically authors immediately note that the...