Can Any One Theory of Emotion Really Do?

As a clinician reading Maxwell and Tappolet’s stimulating application of insights from the philosophy of emotion to a consideration of mechanisms for cognitive–behavioral therapy, I had two primary reactions. First, their call to replace the rather naïve and simplistic view of how cognitive–behavioral therapy works with one incorporating more recent thinking about cognition and emotion is long overdue. Second, their alternative model could be vastly richer and more reflective of the range of clinical experience by paying more serious attention to differences between persons and circumstances, including those differences captured by various diagnoses.

The postulating of two cognitive systems—the intuiting (IS) and reasoning (RS) systems—is compatible with a large body of data. The identification of the perceptual theory of emotion (PTE) as the mechanism for generating emotion via the IS seems unproblematic. But this is followed by the assumption that this is the mechanism for generating emotions. The implication is that the conceptual processes of the RS can only alter emotion indirectly by pounding through the highly modular IS. By definition, modules are informationally encapsulated. Hence, this task is difficult and thus likely infrequent. So although Maxwell and Tappolet clearly want to preserve some role for cognitive interventions, that role seems to be doomed to secondary significance. In fact, it is not altogether clear how any success of such interventions could be explained by a PTE.

But how valid is this assumption? It is made to seem unproblematic by the range of evidence considered. The types of emotions used for illustration are “basic” emotions such as fear, disgust, and shame. These fit well with the PTE and the IS. But what of more complex emotions, such as moral indignation, sense of justice, or disappointment with self for failing to live up to one’s ideals? These seem better characterized as flowing from considerations of the RS than perceptions of the IS.

This tendency to generalize from one type of example is even more obvious when pathological conditions are considered. Evidence cited for the superiority of behavioral over cognitive interventions from studies of obsessive-compulsive disorder are subsequently discussed as the general superiority of behavioral over cognitive interventions. But obsessive-compulsive disorder is the encapsulated disorder par excellance. Such patients characteristically are painfully aware of the inability of their rational processes to touch their highly autonomous symptoms. The same is generally true with simple phobias, the other condition most frequently used for illustration. Most patients know their fears are excessive, can articulate the rational arguments against their fears, and are frequently embarrassed that their fears persist nonetheless. That behavioral interventions have advantages over cognitive ones with such ego dystonic symptoms is not surprising, because the patient’s own attempts to apply rational considerations have already failed, and the PTE provides a plausible explanatory model for this failure. But the fit with other sorts of conditions is not so obvious. Consider the case of O. Rex:

This middle-aged, recently widowed monarch was admitted with symptoms of major depression after blinding himself with his deceased wife’s brooch. This followed a public hearing during which he gradually came to realize, through a series of revelations brought forth by his own stubborn insistence, that he had some years ago unwittingly killed his father and married his mother by whom he fathered several children. His premorbid personality was characterized by a proud self-confidence in his intellectual and leadership abilities that at times bordered on the arrogant. He was quick to distrust others and was prone to paranoid interpretations of their motives. He was highly principled and had a strong sense of duty and commitment to the truth. As the hearing unfolded he described a growing sense of dread at the revelations, anger and suspicion toward several of the witnesses, shame at the revelations of his prior behavior coupled with humiliation that he had been so blind to everything for so long. He felt both self-pity and guilt. He described a feeling that his entire sense of...