Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Volume 11, Number 1, March 2004
Special Issue: Delusions

CONTENTS

Special Issue : Delusions

    Bayne, Tim.
    Pacherie, Elisabeth.
  • Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions
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    Subject Headings:
    • Campbell, John, 1956- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.
    • Delusions.
    Abstract:
      A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism, Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
    Keywords:
      monothematic delusions, rationality, meaning, rationalism, empiricism
    Georgaca, Eugenie.
  • Factualization and Plausibility in Delusional Discourse
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    Subject Headings:
    • Delusions.
    • Plausibility (Logic)
    Abstract:
      According to social constructionism factuality, the establishment of accounts as corresponding to an objective external reality, is an interactional accomplishment ordinarily achieved in everyday conversations. In cases of disagreement regarding the interpretation and nature of events, however, not only the plausibility of the account, but also the rationality, integrity, and accountability of the participants is at stake. Delusions present extreme cases of such disagreement. This paper analyzes extracts from an interview with an individual diagnosed as delusional focusing on the factualization devices used in the negotiation of accounts. The question of whether the observation of conversational rules documented in the interview is sufficient to establish the plausibility of an account and the rationality of its teller leads to arguments around the necessity of shifting the focus from the grounded micro-analysis of talk to wider social and institutional processes.
    Keywords:
      discourse analysis, social constructionism, psychopathology, reality, delusions, psychosis, mental illness, context
    Klee, Robert, 1952-
  • Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs
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    Subject Headings:
    • Delusions.
    • Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951.
    • Davidson, Donald, 1917-
    Abstract:
      After presenting and criticizing recent theoretical work on the nature of delusional belief, I argue that the works of the later Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson offer heretofore underappreciated insights into delusional belief. I distinguish two general kinds of delusion: pedestrian and stark. The former can be explained as cognitive mistakes of various kinds, whereas the latter I argue are necessarily inexplicable. This thesis requires the denial of the Davidsonian dogma that rationality is constitutive of mental content. I claim that the dogma holds only for normal cognition and is violated precisely in the case of stark delusion.
    Keywords:
      belief content, Donald Davidson, rationality, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Commentaries

    Broome, Matthew R.
  • The Rationality of Psychosis and Understanding the Deluded
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    Subject Headings:
    • Campbell, John, 1956- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.
    Gerrans, Philip.
  • Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism
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    Subject Headings:
    • Campbell, John, 1956- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.
    Ghaemi, S. Nassir.
  • The Perils of Belief: Delusions Reexamined
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    Subject Headings:
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.
    Harper, David J.
  • Delusions and Discourse: Moving Beyond the Constraints of the Modernist Paradigm
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    Subject Headings:
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.
    Hohwy, Jakob.
  • Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation
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    Subject Headings:
    • Campbell, John, 1956- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.
    Keywords:
      delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding
    Sass, Louis Arnorsson.
  • Some Reflections on the (Analytic) Philosophical Approach to Delusion
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    Subject Headings:
    • Campbell, John, 1956- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.
    • Bayne, Tim. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions.
    • Pacherie, Elisabeth.
    • Georgaca, Eugenie. Factualization and plausibility in delusional discourse.
    • Klee, Robert, 1952- Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs.
    • Delusions.

Responses to the Articles

    Georgaca, Eugenie.
  • Talk and the Nature of Delusions: Defending Sociocultural Perspectives on Mental Illness
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    Subject Headings:
    • Delusions.
    Keywords:
      discourse, social constructionism, delusions, psychosis, mental illness, context

About the Authors

Concurrent Contents

  • Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology
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    Subject Headings:
    • Philosophy -- Bibliography.
    • Psychiatry -- Bibliography.
    • Psychology -- Bibliography.

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