Perspectives on Practice
A Pragmatic Comparison of the Praxial
Philosophies of David Elliott and
Thomas Regelski
J. Scott Goble
University of British Columbia
In a highly influential paper, "What Should One Expect from a Philosophy
of Music Education?" (1991), philosopher Philip Alperson outlined three
possible "basic strategies" for understanding and explaining music and
music education. He began by describing the "formalist aesthetic view"
that originated with such Enlightenment philosophers as Immanuel Kant,
according to which "disinterested contemplation" (that is, attention
solely to the formal, qualitative aspects of something—such
as a musical work—without reference to concepts or to its practical
significance) gives rise to "aesthetic experience," a particular, highly
pleasurable state of mind. According to this view, music is a fine
art, and music education should involve training people to perceive
and respond appropriately to musical works (that is, by cultivating their
"taste" for "masterpieces") in order to evoke aesthetic experience in
them and perhaps also to prepare them to produce works that might evoke
such responses in others. Aesthetic formalists hold that such education
will enhance an individual's understanding and enjoyment of music.
Next, Alperson gave an account of what he termed an "enhanced" version
of
[End Page 23]
aesthetic formalism, focusing especially on what he termed "the
expressivist version of the aesthetic cognitivist" view. This strategy
extends the formalist aesthetic view by taking into account such
additional features as the expressive, representational, and symbolic
properties of a musical work to account for the meaningfulness of its
content. Alperson went on to explain that the primary purpose of music
education according to this view is to make insights into these properties
accessible to people and thereby to refine their understanding of human
feeling: "Music education, then, is a means to the education of feeling."
1
This is, he noted, the strategy adopted and developed theoretically
by Susanne Langer that was, in turn, appropriated and developed for
educators by Bennett Reimer as "aesthetic education."
After challenging these two strategies on various bases, Alperson
concluded by proffering a so-called "praxial" view of music and music
education, according to which "[t]he attempt is made . . . to understand
[music] in terms of the variety of meaning and values evidenced in actual
practice in particular cultures."
2
In using the term "praxial," Alperson was drawing upon the ancient
Greek distinction (discussed by Aristotle) between three areas of
knowledge: theoria, techne, and praxis. Roughly
equivalent to the contemporary English words theory, technique,
and practice, theoria denoted for the Greeks speculative
knowledge of pure, eternal truth; techne designated the kind
of knowledge required for making, producing, or creating something;
and praxis signified knowledge that takes into account the
sorts of reasoning and critical thinking necessary for getting
"right results" for the benefit of people in a given domain or
situation. According to the praxial view of music and music education
articulated by Alperson, different forms of musical endeavor are
regarded as different practices, and the aesthetic approaches
to music described above are best "placed alongside" the functions
that different musical practices serve and have served in different
cultural contexts. (That is, each aesthetic approach is considered one
of many approaches to understanding music, and it is understood that
it is not shared by all cultural groups.) Most notably, Alperson's
praxial view of music education enlarges the range of music regarded
as appropriate for music education to include music outside the
Western art tradition (thus including works composed without
"aesthetic" goals in mind), and it focuses attention on the motives
and intentions of those who undertake them, as well as "the social,
historical, and cultural conditions and forces in which practices of
music production arise and have meaning."
3
Subsequent to Alperson's public delivery of this paper, music education
scholars David Elliott and Thomas Regelski took on the task of further
elucidating implications of the notions of music as praxis
and music education as praxis independently, though each
has occasionally acknowledged and adopted aspects of the other's
thinking. Their writings have been in the forefront of dialogue concerning
[End Page 24]
the philosophy of the music education profession in North
America for the past decade. Both scholars' views stand in opposition to
"aesthetic" perspectives of all kinds, and each has presented his own
critique of the aesthetic philosophy of music and music education.
4
While each of them, like Alperson, has on occasion made reference
to the praxial philosophy in his writings (as if, perhaps,
there was only one way of applying the Greek concept of praxis to
music and music education),
5
their views do in fact differ in important respects. My purpose in
this paper is to review briefly what I take to be the most prominent
aspects of Elliott's and Regelski's "praxialisms" on their own terms,
to make note of their most important similarities and differences,
and then to consider from a pragmatic perspective the suitability of
their ideas for the present and future practice of music education
in the public schools of pluralistic, democratically governed nations.
Before beginning to discuss the praxial conceptions of these two scholars,
I want to point out that each has described his philosophical views in
great detail and at considerable length, and the brief sketches I present
here do not provide a full accounting of each scholar's vision. Since
their writings present more highly nuanced and well-developed explanations
of their ideas, and because they have already done and are continuing to
do much to stimulate thinking and influence practice within the music
education profession, I strongly encourage readers to explore their
original expositions.
The Praxial Strategy of David Elliott
As a doctoral student of Bennett Reimer at Case Western University,
Elliott had a good opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the
basic tenets and the workings out of aesthetic approaches to philosophy
of music education. A review of his writings reveals, however, that
by the mid-1980s he had already developed an interest in framing the
practices of the profession in a different way.
6
In 1995, Elliott published the first book-length philosophy of music
education based on his understanding of the notion of praxis, Music
Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education.
In the first section of this book, Elliott asserted that the nature
of music education depends on the nature of music itself and that the
significance of music education must depend on the significance of music
in human life. He reviewed and assessed "the aesthetic concept of music"
manifested in the writings of such thinkers as James Mursell, Susanne
Langer, and Bennett Reimer, concluding that these writers' philosophies
are ill-founded, illogical, and not credible, owing largely to their focus
on the object of "music" as a form of "art," their adherence to
the notion of "aesthetic experience" as a highly questionable "special"
realm of human experience, and their attendant reductive view of "music
education as aesthetic
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education" (that is, the education of feeling).
7
In seeking to provide a more plausible alternative, Elliott drew
conceptions from the writings of philosopher Francis Sparshott,
cognitive theorist Daniel Dennett, and psychologist Mihalyi
Csikszentmihalyi (among others) to form a foundation for his own
philosophy.
Borrowing first from Sparshott, Elliott observed that "[w]hat music is,
at root, is a human activity that involves (1) a doer; (2) some kind of
doing; (3), something done; and (4) the complete context in which doers
do what they do."
8
Noting that the noun praxis derives from the Greek verb
prasso, meaning (among other things) "to do" or "to act
purposefully," Elliott explained that he adopted the adjective
"praxial" to describe his philosophy for the purpose of emphasizing
that "music ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and
values evidenced in actual music-making and music listening in specific
contexts" rather than on aesthetic principles.
9
For Elliott, "musicers" (that is, persons who actually make music)
are practitioners of "a diverse human practice" called MUSIC that is
manifested in many different ways throughout the world. He set forth his
premises for considering the value and significance of MUSIC in human
life as follows.
First, the fact that most (if not all) human societies have shown an
interest in some form of musicing [i.e., music-making] and music listening
does not establish the presence of a specific human need for which musical
practices are a necessary satisfaction. . . . Second, in considering what
tendencies might underpin MUSIC, both common sense and logic suggest that
we are under no obligation to identify one overriding tendency. Third,
in attempting to explain its significance, we must not lose sight of
what is most obvious and curious about MUSIC: that the actions of music
making and music listening often give rise to experiences of positive or
satisfying affect. Indeed, even a quick glance around the world is enough
to show that while some people make music chiefly for money, status,
and other tangible rewards, most do not. Most musicers and listeners
find the actions of musicing and listening rewarding in themselves.
10
On these bases, Elliott concluded that the keys to understanding the
human valuing of MUSIC (including the valuing of musical works) are
likely to be found in "the nature of human consciousness" and the human
tendencies that stem from it.
Turning next to the writings of the contemporary cognitive scientists who
informed his thinking, Elliott cited Dennett's argument that consciousness
is a characteristic of the human nervous system that has resulted from
the evolution over several millennia of certain biological processes
through both natural selection and cultural development.
11
As each individual person is born, grows, and matures, the individual's
consciousness develops to form an integrated whole that he
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or she comes to regard as the "self." Elliott also cited
Csikszentmihalyi's observation—congruent with Dennett's
view—that the self is an epiphenomenon (that is, an
occurrence or fact that is "over" or "above" that which can be perceived
directly by the senses). In Csikszentmihalyi's view, the self is "the
result of consciousness becoming aware of itself."
12
According to Elliott, Dennett and Csikszentmihalyi assert that
consciousness evolved to meet certain needs of the human organism,
and they have argued from this point that the attendant central goal
of each self is to bring order or strength to itself.
Elliott observed that while some life experiences (such as the loss
of a loved one or other traumatic event) may tend to weaken or bring
disorder to the self, an individual's undertaking of activities that are
congruent with her or his self-goals tends to bring order and strength to
the self. Csikszentmihalyi has termed the positive affective experience
associated with such challenging activities "optimal experience, autotelic
experience, or flow (italics added)."
13
The enjoyment the individual experiences while engaging in such
behaviors, Elliott affirmed, is "the affective concomitant of
self-growth."
14
Elliott reported that Csikszentmihalyi and his fellow researchers
have observed that the various flow entailing, self-growth producing
activities undertaken by human beings have several characteristics in
common. First, flow experiences generally occur in certain specific
kinds of action contexts that involve challenge and challenge-related
knowledge (for example, sports, games, and the arts); notably, the
acquisition of knowledge is the key to enjoyment and control in these
"mini-worlds of effort." Second, these experiences typically entail the
individual's complete focus of concentration on her or his actions. Third,
this absorbing concentration tends to be facilitated by pursuits or
activities that involve clear goals and feedback within the context of
a distinct tradition. Fourth, such experiences typically entail a loss
of self-consciousness while one is engaged in the activity. Finally,
these consciousness-ordering pursuits are usually undertaken for the
enjoyment and order they bring to the self, rather than for external
reward. Elliott observed that a consequence of the self-growth that
occurs as one meets the challenges that arise in any such action context
is raised self-esteem, the awareness that one has achieved or come to
possess desirable qualities.
Seeking to draw connections to MUSIC from this set of assertions, Elliott
argued that the development of skills and the taking on of challenges
in both music-making and music listening (in all world traditions)
represent unique and important ways of effecting flow and bringing order
to consciousness, and that they lead to self-growth, self-knowledge,
and raised self-esteem. Asserting that "the musical works that make up
the body of most music cultures spiral upward in complexity,"
15
Elliott concluded that the task of music education must, therefore,
be to develop the musicianship of learners—and thus to effect
their self-growth—
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through progressive musical problem-solving in balanced relation to
appropriate musical challenges.
16
Earlier in his book, Elliott put forth the notion, noted above, that
musicers (or music-makers) are practitioners of "a diverse human practice"
called MUSIC that is manifested in different ways worldwide. In his view,
this practice "has various subpractices, subspecialties, or arts of
music that go by such names as jazz, choral music, rock music and opera."
17
Different musical practices "pivot on" the understandings and efforts
shared by musicers who are practitioners of that practice. Furthermore,
each such practice produces "listenables" that manifest the "shared
principles and standards" of those who make them.
This is how we know Baroque choral singing, bebop jazz improvisation,
Balinese kebyar, and Korean kayagzm sanjo when we
hear them: by the stylistic features manifested in the musical sound
patterns themselves. Specific musical practices eventuate in distinct
musical styles.
A musical style is a body of musical products that share certain auditory
features in common. These commonalties are explained by the fact that
the musicers and listeners of a musical practice share a certain set of
musical beliefs, understandings, and preferences in common.
18
Since MUSIC consists in many different musical practices, Elliott
asserted, music educators have a fundamental responsibility to induct
children into a variety of such practices during the time they spend in
music education programs.
19
In three later chapters on "Musicing in Context," "Music Listening in
Context," and "Musical Creativity in Context," Elliott argued that "the
development of musicianship is intimately related to the authenticity of
the musical situations in which it is taught, learned and used; that is,
musical action and musical context work together to coproduce musical
understanding." In his discussion of "musicing," he examined issues
concerning composition, performance, improvisation, and arranging
in different cultural circumstances, affirming that one must have
a knowledge of the practices within a particular tradition in order
"to music" (that is, to engage in music-making) successfully in that
tradition. Next, in his discussion of listening, he acknowledged that
"compositional designs and musical performances are influenced by and
reflective of their cultural ideological contexts," and he suggested
that listeners should learn "how to apprehend cultural information in,
and attribute cultural meanings to, musical patterns and musical works
by convention." Then, in his chapter on creativity, Elliott observed
that "creative achievement results from know-how, from ideas generated
and selected by deliberate choice, by plans continuously altered, by
commitments to goals, and by judgments of creative promise."
20
He noted that various studies have suggested that creative achievement
in general is motivated by desire to search
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out gaps in what is already known, to advance a practice, or to extend
the practice beyond what is already accepted.
Finally, in the last major section of his book, Elliott returned to his
conception of engagement in a musical practice as self-growth eliciting
behavior, and he made recommendations on this basis for the implementation
of music education curricula in the schools. He asserted that students
should be "inducted" into different "music cultures" during the course
of their education, with music education programs serving as reflective
musical practicums in which children learn to work with one another in
solving musical problems. In concluding his penultimate chapter, Elliott
observed that students participating in such practicums may learn "to
make music well through deeper understandings of the beliefs (artistic,
social, and cultural) that influence music-making and listening in
different practices," thus realizing the goals of a humanistic education.
21
He stated the matter succinctly at the end of the chapter in which
he first set forth the essential aspects of his philosophy.
To conclude, if we conceive music education as the systematic development
of musicianship in balanced relation to progressive musical challenges,
then music education programs will provide the optimum conditions for
realizing the values and aims of music education. What this means, in
turn, is that students will come to view the development of musicianship
as a specific kind of process that they are capable of pursuing, learning,
and enjoying. In this process, students will also learn firsthand why
and how MUSIC is a valued global practice.
22
The Praxial Strategy of Thomas Regelski
Thomas Regelski's interest in attending to "what music is 'good
for'" independent of the claims of writers who espouse aesthetic
philosophies—and then predicating the practice of music education
on such a foundation—seems to have begun emerging in the early
1980s. His first book, Principles and Problems of Music Education
(1975), served as a college-level introduction to the psychology of
music teaching and learning, and it addressed matters of "feeling" and
aesthetic responses to music as "covert affective behaviors" in ways
congruent with Susanne Langer's thinking.
23
In his second book, the short opus Arts Education and Brain
Research (1978), Regelski presented then-recent research into
brain function, explaining what was understood at the time about
the functional asymmetry of the cerebral hemispheres (that is,
left brain/right brain theory), to make the argument that schools
"have long educated only half the child,"
24
to support notions of aesthetic learning and to suggest future
directions for research. His second college textbook, Teaching
General Music (1981), while still influenced by aesthetic perspectives,
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represented something of a departure from them, as it advocated an
"action learning" approach to music education that "seeks the closest
possible connection or relevance to a student's life."
25
However, it is in his writings since 1994 that Regelski has focused
most directly on developing the notions of music as praxis and music
education as praxis. His elucidations of these notions differ from
those of Elliott in several noteworthy respects, but, since he has not
yet produced a book-length account of his philosophical perspective,
it is necessary for one to read several of his articles (published in
various places) to get a full sense of the implications of his unique
vision for music education. It becomes apparent when one considers
his writings collectively that his intention is to challenge aesthetic
notions systematically and to seat or establish music education firmly
on a praxial foundation.
In "Taking the 'Art'of Music for Granted: A Critical Sociology of
the Aesthetic Philosophy of Music" (1994),Regelski presented
an historical account of the origins of the idea of "music asart," demonstrating that "the aesthetic paradigm of the 'fine Arts'
is predicated largely on a social ideology that is essentially at odds
with both the expectations for and the 'reality' of schooling as a
social institution."
26
He argued that aesthetic concepts of "taste," notions of "beauty,"
and ideas of "the sublime" are not "disinterested" and thus universal
(as had been argued historically by Kant and supported by others),
but are instead socially rooted and thus in the province of ideologies
held by people in positions of power. In particular, he pointed out,
the concepts that have undergirded music education throughout its
history have actually been legitimated by an institution of cultural
elitism. Even when music of different cultural traditions has been
embraced by music education organizations in the United States, such
as the Music Educators National Conference, their inclusion has been
"undertaken in 'conceptual' and 'analytic' terms according to the
aesthetic education paradigm."
27
He concluded this paper by advocating a praxial philosophy of music
and a rationale for music education that would equitably accord
all forms of music their pragmatic value "in the total scope
of human agency."
28
In 1996, Regelski published "Prolegomenon To a Praxial Philosophy of
Music and Music Education," a paper which, despite evidently having
been intended as an introduction, arguably represents the most complete
single exposition of his praxial view to date. He began by observing
that though the aesthetic basis of music is largely taken for granted
by some audiences, a growing volume of critical thinking against the
"aesthetic ideology" has appeared in recent years, out of which a new
"praxial" view of music is emerging. After defining again the ancient
Greek words theoria, techne, and praxis (described
above) as vocabulary necessary for his argument, he introduced the
additional Greek term phronesis—which denotes a capacity
for realizing the proper values of rational human conduct in a given
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situation—to highlight the "reflection in action" that guides
any genuine musical praxis toward the good results it is intended to
realize. For Regelski, praxis implies that one is enjoined to get
"right results" with one's music-making in particular situations
where contextually unique results are called for.
Drawing support from arguments made previously by scholar Ellen
Dissanayake, writer of such books as What is Art For? (1988)
and Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why (1992),
29
Regelski expressed three additional tenets of his praxial view: that
music is a "universal human trait," a way by which moments in life are
"made special," and a "key means by which life is well-lived."
30
Quickly drawing a line between these three key ideas and any notions
that could be misconstrued as having metaphysical or transcendental
overtones, he emphasized the importance of understanding music in
terms of its pragmatic consequences. In his view, "the goods of music
. . . are rooted . . . in the situated and highly specific conditions
of the here and now—to current life, the experienced quality
of 'good time' between the recently remembered past and the avidly
anticipated future."
31
With notions involving the contemplation of music such as those usually
associated with aesthetic philosophies thus carefully set aside,
Regelski stated an additional tenet of his view, that "a praxial
philosophy of music in and through education is concerned to get
people into action musically."
32
In Regelski's view, all music should be regarded as "functional" in
some way, whether it is a central focus of a given praxis (as it is,
for example, at a concert) or is not the central focus (as in, say,
advertising). For him, the all-important question is: What is music
"good for" in each situation in which it is present? Regelski observed
that the greatest percentage of music made in the world is not
made for concert listening, and he stressed that the traditional aesthetic
distinction between "pure music," attended to strictly for its own sake,
and "functional music," which serves some other purpose (or praxis),
is simply not valid. He noted further that while important "goods"
can of course be served without the presence of music, "the Being and
Becoming involved with musical practice—it's 'making special' of
human time and events—is unique and available in no other manner."
33
According to Regelski, there is a unique set of "process values" present
in every musical praxis that is associated with the "qualia" given
to sounds by human beings (such as pitch, rhythm/meter, intonation,
and so on) by which we come to recognize music as music. The fact
that we give attention to these values does not mean, however, that an
amateur performance, being less well in-tune or having "less-refined"
tone than that of the professional, will be any less meaningful for
the amateur performer; the "good" associated with the praxis for that
individual may be served whether or not these process values are fully
achieved. Moreover, it is important to note that the "training" required
for an individual to become competent in one musical praxis (say, the
"in-tune" performance of Western art music)
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may be at odds with the requirements of another musical praxis (say,
the "microtonal" constructions of the music of another world culture,
the uniqueness of which may cause it to be heard by a Western listener as
"out-of-tune"). However, he stressed, it is not true that one must be an
"insider" of a given praxis to find value in it; all that is required
is an informal familiarity with the nature of the activity. Notably,
even where one has never been (and never expects to be) involved in
its performance, many aspects of a musical praxis can be accessed via
listening. Listening, he noted further, is a unique praxis of its own,
distinct from the praxis of performing.
Continuing his discussion of musical process-values, Regelski pointed out
that these values are assessed as "good" by those persons involved with
a particular musical praxis only when they conform to the individual,
social, religious, and/or cultural meanings the praxis is intended
to serve. While it is possible to attend to musical process-values
without regard to the praxis with which they originated, doing so can
neutralize or negate the original intentions of the attendant praxis,
as when one treats madrigals as concert music rather than as a means
of social interaction (as they were originally intended to be). Still,
musical process-values can legitimately be separated from a praxis,
as when the performers engaged in one praxis "are influenced by" or
"borrow from" another.
Regelski argued that it is intentionality that defines a praxis as
music, and it also establishes the musical process-values involved. Thus,
the intention to "make special" certain human ends via music is
a musical praxis, and the intention determines the way it is actualized
musically. Challenging once again the views of those who hold aesthetic
views, Regelski re-asserted that "music . . . is rarely if ever to be
about or for itself," but that it rather "serves a wonderfully complex
variety
of social and other human 'goods.'"
34
Moreover, he noted, music is not a mere servant in such processes;
instead, "means and ends, process and product are inseparable and
are jointly conditioned by the intentionality governing the situated
context of music-making."
35
He pointed out that while some people regard strictly intra-musical
processes as worth considering and undertaking for their own sake,
such intentions are very rare in the world, and are held mostly
by trained musicians. He noted that Paul Valery's term "esthesic"
provides a helpful way of denoting such matters in order to keep them
distinct from "aesthetic" notions.
Regelski concluded by explaining the difference between his position and
Alperson's and what he believes to be Elliott's position with regard to
"the aesthetic ideology." In his view, Alperson is not concerned with
establishing a universal characteristic of all music, but rather focuses
on what different forms of music have meant to people in their different
cultural contexts, thus including and acknowledging the existence and
the cultural significance of "aesthetic experience" to those people who
find the concept meaningful. Elliott, on the other hand,
[End Page 32]
seems to have replaced the idea of aesthetic experience with
Csikszentmihalyi's notion of "flow," and he regards the aesthetic response
"to be a social fabrication or myth."
36
Regelski explained that he personally follows "the pragmatic criterion
that the worth or value of a proposition or belief is seen in the
actual results that obtain from its use,"
37
noting that belief in aesthetic experience can "produce something
like the experience predicted."
38
Like belief in God (whose existence, he stated, cannot be definitely
proved any more than it can be disproved), belief in aesthetic
experience is associated with "right results" or a musical "good"
for some people. However, he stated that he would discourage "the
aesthetic motive" for music praxis within the context of education "if
only for the pragmatic reason that the privateness and intangibility
claimed for aesthetic responding makes it impossible to evaluate
either teaching or learning."
39
He is thus in agreement with Elliott that aesthetic philosophies should
no longer be used as the basis upon for music education curriculum
and pedagogy.
In "Action Learning: Curriculum and Instruction as and for
Praxis"(1997),Regelski returned to the notion of "action learning"
he had explored in his 1984 textbook, reiterating and elaborating on
the Greek concept of praxis (as distinct from theoria and
techne) he had explored in subsequent writings, and advocated that
the two be used as tools in guiding the formation of music education
curricula. His recommendations on curriculum include two especially
notable aspects. First, according to Regelski, "action learning" is
predicated on answering the question: What of all that can be taught
is most worth teaching? Not surprisingly, he answered this question by
reiterating the praxial values of music he had identified previously, that
music is a way by which moments in life are "made special" and that it
is an important means by which life is well-lived. Second, in Regelski's
concept of "action learning," the teaching process operates as a form of
"action research," as the teaching "practitioner-as-researcher" reflects
on results, evaluates the methods and materials used in instruction,
and reconsiders the actual value ultimately manifested by the ideals
that initially motivated the instruction. Regelski underscored his point
that the value for the student must be a concern at all times in order
that the student might be well-prepared for present and future musical
experiences: "Whatever the curriculum hypothesizes to be good 'musical
health' must be validated in relation to students' actions outside the
classroom and later in life in the 'real world.'"
40
Regelski explained that he envisions several important results
stemming from such an approach to curriculum. First, all knowledge
will be approached as a skill (for example, doing, making, creating,
and listening) and not as abstract concepts or inert information. Those
who learn music in schools in which a praxial curriculum guides their
learning will come to return music-making and music consumption to the
private sphere (that is, to the home and to amateur circles), and
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public support for music in educational contexts and elsewhere will
increase. As a result of undergoing such a curriculum, no one in
society will feel the need to say anything more than "I am a musician"
(the qualifiers "amateur" and "real" will be unimportant). Most notably,
music will come to be seen not as a frill but as "basic cultural capital
necessary to making a life worth living."
41
Regelski described succinctly the kind of music education he envisions
in the following statement:
A praxial approach to music education . . . will stress getting people
into action musically. It will stress the kinds of musical praxes
that have the greatest likelihood of contributing to a life that is
more fully lived through musical involvement. It will provide choices
for such musical meaning-making by modeling valuable alternatives for
musical involvement and by insuring that students are both capable of
and interested in regularly making music a meaningful part of their
lives. In sum, a praxial approach to music education will demonstrate
and teach what music "is" and "is good for" in the broadest and most
relevant functional terms.
42
Similarities and Differences in Elliott's
and Regelski's Praxial Views
Elliott and Regelski have independently sought to provide philosophical
accounts that embrace all musical practices, and both scholars
thus hold theses about what is universal in the various practices
undertaken by the world's diverse peoples that they regard collectively as
"music."
43
In Elliott's view, "MUSIC" is a "diverse human practice" that is
manifested in many different ways in different world cultures.
44
For Regelski, music is (as ethnomusicologist John Blacking once
proposed) "a universal human trait."
45
On this point, the two scholars appear to be in agreement, generally
speaking, as it is easy to imagine that a "universal human trait"
might be manifested in different human practices in different cultural
contexts. However, we should also note that this apparent congruity in
the views of the two scholars is not shared by all ethnomusicologists
or even by all music educators. "Cultural relativists" oppose efforts
to "universalize" like those of Regelski and Elliott, and they assert
that the various different practices involving sound undertaken by
different cultural groups (which some people might call "music")
must be understood on their own terms (that is, in the terms of their
unique conceptual systems). It is important, therefore, to keep two
points in mind. First, that though Elliott and Regelski appear to
be in general agreement about this, the concept "music" itself is
not a cultural universal,
46
and, second, that they are members of a profession that has a vested
interest in seeing it as such.
This point notwithstanding, each of these scholars used his foundational,
universalizing
[End Page 34]
thesis as the basis for setting forth a philosophy of
music education that he (presumably) advocates as a basis for school
curricula in the pluralistic society (that is, the nation) in which
he lives. (Neither scholar has indicated specifically the intended
scope of his recommendations.) According to Elliott's philosophy,
engagement in performing within one musical tradition (or more)
represents a unique and important way of effecting "flow" and bringing
order to consciousness, and it can lead to self-growth, self-knowledge,
and raised self-esteem. Therefore, he has asserted, the goal of music
education should be to develop the musicianship of learners, thereby
effecting their self-growth through progressive musical problem-solving
in balanced relation to appropriate musical challenges.
47
In making these assertions, Elliott grounded his philosophy in a
particular branch of Western psychology, albeit one that seeks to
take in and account for different cultural practices and perspectives,
and his philosophy is thus strengthened and limited by the strengths
and limitations of that psychology. Regelski, on the other hand, has
predicated his philosophy on somewhat more "loose," and thus perhaps
more culturally inclusive, concepts of music and music education. For
Regelski (as I noted above), musical engagement is a way by which
moments in life are "made special," and it is a "key means by which
life is well-lived." While he would likely agree with the notion that
engagement in music-making may lead to some sorts of personal growth,
he has emphasized instead that the goal of learning a particular
kind of music-making should be in line with the individual, social,
religious, and/or cultural practices, traditions, and contexts within
which it usually takes place. In making his curricular recommendations,
Regelski has promoted "general musicianship—the kind
of 'knowing' and 'doing' that travels well and thus has potential
relevance for use across a variety of styles."
48
In establish-ing his philosophy on this basis, Regelski kept it "open"
to the "ways of knowing" held in different cultural traditions. (His
conception thus seems closer to Alper-son's original praxial account.)
By the way, Elliott is a citizen of Canada; Regelski is a citizen of the
United States. Numerous musical traditions are alive and well in both
of these pluralistic nations, though the systems of government under
which the two nations operate differ in important ways. It thus seems
curious that Regelski, as a citizen of the United States—a "one
official language" nation in which national unity is actively promoted
by its government and national media under the banner "e pluribus
unum"—holds a philosophy more culturally embracing in its
central motivation than that of Elliott, a citizen of Canada—a
"two official language" nation in which cultural diversity is actively
supported by its government and national media. On the basis of their
citizenship, one would think that each of their respective orientations
would be held by the other.
Both scholars apparently seek to explain music education in such a way
that it
[End Page 35]
will henceforth be well supported in the curriculum of schools in
pluralistic, democratic societies. In this respect, Elliott's philosophy
may be more readily embraced by many people (especially citizens of the
United States), since methods of education to promote "self-growth" and
increases in "self-knowledge and self-esteem" are potentially accessible
to empirical measurement and refinement, and they have pragmatic value for
persons living in a democratic capitalist society. Regrettably, however,
Elliott has not yet demonstrated that musical learning is in some way
unique in effecting personal growth in these areas. Regelski's
philosophy, on the other hand, is more in line with the ideas of cultural
inclusiveness and equality alive in all pluralistic, democratic nations,
and he has asserted that in the different contexts in which it appears
music "serves a wonderfully complex variety of social and other human
'goods.'" Since he is at pains to make his philosophy as culturally
inclusive as possible, he has regrettably not identified many of these
"goods" in any but the most general of terms.
In 2000, Regelski presented a paper in which he identified six general
themes in Elliott's work that differed with his own views and critiqued
them with the aim of making "the concept of praxis even more broad based
and richly productive."
49
These may be worth noting here, as they provide insights into the
two scholars' different ways of thinking. First, Regelski challenged
Elliott's claim in Music Matters that only those who have
experience as performers of music can fully experience music. Regelski
explains that, in Elliott's view, "the ability to listen to music
intelligently or competently is directly and necessarily dependent on
cognitions and insights that only result from the ability to perform
music intelligently or competently, and vice versa."
50
Indeed, in Music Matters, Elliott wrote, "achieving an
experience [as a listener] of the special kind of event-performance we
call a musical work requires an understanding of musical performing; it
requires that students learn how to perform and improvise competently
themselves, as well as to compose, arrange, and conduct."
51
Regelski challenged this statement by asserting that while the
praxis of listening may be governed by unique conditions of its own,
an individual can develop listening skills without forming
performance competencies. This seems a minor point of difference,
since it is clear in the writings of the two scholars that they both
regard listening as a distinctive and important praxis in its own
right, and both see a place for the teaching of listening in music
education curricula.
52
Second, Regelski took issue with Elliott's decision to ground his
argument on the relatively complementary conceptions of mind
held by Dennett and certain other contemporary philosophers of mind,
saying "Music Matters is based on a materialist reduction of mind
to brain . . . and an equating of human consciousness with 'self.'"
53
He observed that while such a view usefully challenges the focus
on propositional knowing and abstract concepts found in Reimer's
aesthetic
[End Page 36]
philosophy and elsewhere (primarily by calling into question dualistic
models of mind), Elliott's account downplays consideration of affectivity
and subjectivity and also fails to address intentionality adequately. In
Regelski's view, Elliott's conception thus "risks losing the mind in
the brain and of falling into the reductionist conclusions of some
cognitive scientists that the mind/brain is 'nothing but' a computer
and its programs."
54
Philosopher Pentti Määttänen raised related issues
about Elliott's philosophy in his paper "Elliott on Mind Matters."
55
For his part, Elliott either sensed that his philosophy was in need
of adjustment or felt the need to challenge these claims of Regelski
and Määttänen, as he published the paper "Music and
Affect: The Praxial View" in 2000.
56
Whether he succeeded in addressing Regelski's and
Määttänen's concerns to their satisfaction is uncertain.
Third, Regelski asserted that Elliott's discussions of praxis tend to
focus more on the concerns of experts, especially theoria
and techne (theory and technique), and that they do not adequately
take into account the notion—attendant to the Greek notion of
praxis—of phronesis, according to which the quality of a
given musical performance would be judged on the basis of "what the music
is 'good for'" (that is, is intended for, or trying to achieve) in the
situation in which it is undertaken and whether it achieves that
"good" result.
57
Regelski went on to say that in his view, "A praxial philosophy of
music for general education should provide an account of the kinds
and levels of performance which, though falling considerably short of
the knowledge and skill of experts, is nonetheless proficient enough
for the individual(s) concerned to be personally satisfying. . . ."
58
It is true that Elliott's philosophy does seem to emphasize mastery
of technique over praxial understanding of the musical practices
undertaken by different cultural groups, but we should also note that
in this he is in line with much public school music teaching of the
past and present. In the United States, at least, music educators have
seldom given in-depth attention to the socio-cultural backgrounds or
contexts from which different forms of music stem, though lip service
has often been paid.
59
Fourth, Regelski turned to the topic of value in music. He
questioned Elliott's focus on Csikszentmihalyi'snotion of "flow"
in his praxial account, charging that "flow" does not adequately account
for all the values people experience in connection with music in their
daily lives. He suggested that while "flow" may provide a good description
of the ways in which people are often "caught up" in performing or
listening at concerts (for instance), it does not explain what we find
valuable in other, more ubiquitous musical praxes. (I discussed this
well-taken point previously.)
Fifth, Regelski took issue with Elliott's discussion of musical
creativity, observing that even though Elliott allows that
"musicing and its outcomes are always practice-specific," his discussion
of creativity seems only to include musical practices
[End Page 37]
in which standards of professional excellence are in place. Regelski
went on to point out that there is "notorious difficulty" in getting
agreement on what constitutes "excellence" from the practitioners of any
musical practice, and that, in any case, criteria should "vary, expand,
and flex" according to the situated needs of different musical praxes.He cautioned that by equating "creativity" with the highest standards
of excellence, the important contribution that musical composition
could make to the curriculum would be obscured. It seems important to
note that Elliott encouraged attention to the "cultural-ideological
dimension" of musical creativity not only in Music Matters, but
also in a paper he published in 1997, but he did not suggest in either
of these places means by which students might learn to "think praxially"
in Regelski's sense (that is, in terms of broader personal, social,
and cultural efficacy) in their musically creative efforts.
60
Finally, Regelski suggested that Elliott's praxial orientation to
curriculum should be broadened, especially his idea that the
aims of "self-growth, self-knowledge, and flow" are the "central values
of MUSIC and, therefore, the central aims of music education." Where
Elliott advocated focusing on "musical actions, transactions, and
interactions that closely parallel real music cultures," Regelski has
promoted engagement in "real life musical actions." In Regelski's view,
"Curriculum as practicum . . . will be an apprenticeship for nurturing
and advancing amateurism in the best avocational and recreational
sense. . . ."
61
He concluded by underscoring the point that true praxis is guided by
the ethical need to "make a difference" in the quality of people's
lives through one's musical endeavors.
Suitability for the Public Schools of
Pluralistic, Democratic Nations
In summary, it seems fair to say that both Elliott's and Regelski's
praxial philosophies are highly important contributions to the literature
in philosophy of music education. Both have helped to extricate music
education philosophy from certain conceptual limitations under which
it has suffered for many years. In particular, Elliott's effort to
locate the origins of "musicing" in human biological processes seems
commendable, in that, if it is developed further, it has the potential
to move music education philosophy into the range of an arguably more
ideologically neutral lens through which different cultural forms of
"musicing" can be considered. Even without further development, his
philosophy as it stands now has the potential to focus the efforts of
music educators around values that are shared by many parents, students,
and school administrators in pluralistic, democratic nations.
At the same time, one can also say that Regelski's praxial philosophy
provides a useful compass for considering "what music is good for"
(that is, the personal
[End Page 38]
and social impact of different forms of "real" musical practices)
and predicating the practice of music education on such bases. In
this important respect, his philosophical account is closer to both
the original Greek notion of praxis as well as Alperson's idea of how
this notion might be applied to music education. Regelski's curricular
recommendations provide a guide for a music education by which
students may become not only deeply interested in music, but also capable
of making musical engagement a meaningful part of their lives. Both
scholars' philosophical efforts warrant enthusiastic applause, not only
for the power of their ideas, but also because they are now motivating
other scholars and teachers to reflect seriously on the reasons for
their instructional choices.
To conclude, I want to consider one more point of commonality in Elliott's
and Regelski's praxial "strategies" (as Alperson might call them), that
concerns their suitability for the practice of music education in the
public schools of pluralistic, democratically governed nations (such as
the U.S. and Canada). Both of these scholars have gone to great lengths
to challenge on various bases "the aesthetic philosophy" they believe
to be tacitly held at present by many if not most music educators in
the United States and Canada. Regelski has studied the ideas of the
ancient Greeks (especially Aristotle), the writings of Enlightenment
philosophers (including Baumgarten, Kant, and others), and the strategies
of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (including Jurgen Habermas
and others) in order to expose the roots of "the aesthetic philosophy"
in his writings, and to argue (as noted previously) that "the aesthetic
paradigm of the 'fine Arts' is predicated largely on a social ideology
that is essentially at odds with . . . schooling as a social institution."
62
Elliott, on the other hand, has critically reviewed the writings and
assertions of such "aesthetic" philosophers as James Mursell, Susanne
Langer, and Bennett Reimer, and concluded that their philosophies of
"music education as aesthetic education" are ill-founded, illogical,
and not credible, owing to their focus on the object "music"
as a form of "art," their adherence to the notion of "aesthetic
experience" as a highly questionable "special" realm of human
experience, and an attendant reductive view of music education as
"the education of feeling."
63
Elliott's and Regelski's historical analyses are generally
well-founded, and it would be difficult if not impossible to challenge
their conclusions logically. Both of these scholars seek to replace
"the aesthetic philosophy" as he has characterized it with "the"
praxial view as each has conceptualized it.
However, there is one aspect of the "aesthetic philosophy" (or,
perhaps better, the "ideology of the aesthetic") that neither
scholar has considered fully in his writings and that—it would
seem—must be handled with the greatest of care in any "praxial"
philosophy. Philosophy historian Terry Eagleton has noted that,
historically speaking, the emergence of aesthetics as a branch of
philosophy was attendant upon the marginalizing and commercializing of
"art" (including music)
[End Page 39]
in European industrialized society, and he has emphasized that this
marginalization had important and far-reaching effects:
The emergence of the aesthetic as a theoretical category is closely
bound up with the material process by which cultural production, at an
early stage of bourgeois society, becomes 'autonomous'—autonomous,
that is, of the various social functions which it has traditionally
served. Once artifacts become commodities in the market place, they
exist for nothing and nobody in particular, and can consequently be
rationalized, ideologically speaking, as existing entirely and gloriously
for themselves.
64
Indeed, the "aesthetic" idea emerged in Europe just as the United
States was taking form as a nation, adopting freedom of expression,
separation of religion and state, and dedication to democracy as some
of its guiding principles.
65
Attendant to this, it is important to note that the notion of "the
aesthetic"—as a special realm for music and "the arts"—that
was tacitly adopted at the same time has served an important purpose
over the history of the nation. Specifically, it has provided a
forum—or, stated perhaps more precisely, it has served as an
ideal, ideologically-neutral mental space—within which the forms
of music produced by the nation's constituent cultural groups (and
those from outside the nation) could be considered intellectually
(primarily as "objects") in the nation's public forum, without
necessarily giving attention to their particular cultural
origins and their potentially politicized content. Because many
musical practices (particularly those associated with nationalistic
beliefs and religious practices) are highly emotionally charged, this
"bracketing" provided by the notion of "the aesthetic" has contributed
to the relative internal peace the nation has enjoyed throughout its
two and a quarter centuries of existence.
66
Encouraging students to give attention now to musical meanings and
their social origins (as both Elliott and Regelski have advocated in
their writings) will need to be handled judiciously by music educators
beginning to adopt praxial orientations in their teaching. After all, once
students are encouraged to reflect on their own cultural and ideological
differences in their musical studies they may tend to focus on them in
socially unhealthy ways. While it may be highly desirable to acquaint
students with their own musical heritages, the musical heritages of their
fellow students, and especially the meanings of the music alive in the
"real" world of which they are a part, the result of putting too much
focus on the social implications of those different meanings without
also addressing the ways citizens of the United States (and Canada)
have agreed to handle these matters (that is, problems stemming from
cultural differences) in the public forum could have tragic results. This
is something that many advocates of "multicultural education" have not
adequately taken into consideration.
[End Page 40]
Philosopher Richard Rorty has made an important observation related to
this issue. He wrote (with concern), "Pluralism is the attempt to make
America what the philosopher John Rawls calls 'a social union of social
unions,' a community of communities, a nation with far more room for
difference than most. Multiculturalism is turning into the attempt to
keep these communities at odds with one another."
67
The praxial philosophies of Elliott and Regelski are more well-founded
historically and logically than the aesthetic philosophies they have
challenged, and by their very nature they make music a more socially
relevant topic of study. Tempering them by also teaching principles
of social tolerance that arose attendant to the concept of "the
aesthetic" will make them viable and societally appropriate guides
for the practice of music education in pluralistic, democratically
governed nations such as the United States and Canada.
Notes
1.
Philip Alperson, "What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music
Education?" Journal of Aesthetic Education 25 (Fall 1991): 228.
4.
Elliott's most pointed critiques of aestheticist conceptions of music and
music education may be found in "Music Education as Aesthetic Education:
A Critical Inquiry," The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and
Learning 2 (Fall 1991): 48-66, and in his book Music Matters
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 21-38. Regelski's strongest
critique of aestheticist notions are in "Taking the 'Art' of Music for
Granted: A Critical Sociology of the Aesthetic Philosophy of Music,"
in Critical Reflections on Music Education: Proceedings of the Second
International Symposium on the Philosophy of Music Education, June 12-16,
1994, ed. Lee R. Bartel and David J. Elliott (Toronto: Canadian
Music Education Research Centre, University of Toronto, 1996), 23-58.
5.
Allusions to "the" praxial philosophy began with Alperson and appear in
the writings of both Elliott and Regelski. See, for example, Alperson,
"What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music Education," 236;
Elliott, "Music and Affect: The Praxial View," Philosophy of Music
Education Review 8 (Fall 2000): 79; and Regelski, "Prolegomenon to
a Praxial Philosophy of Music and Music Education," Musiikkikasvatus:
The Finnish Journal of Music Education 1 (1996): 24.
6.
See, for example, Elliott, "Jazz Education as Aesthetic Education,"
Journal of Aesthetic Education 20 (Spring 1986): 41-53.
7.
Elliott had raised these issues prior to the publication of Music
Matters in his article "Music Education as Aesthetic Education:
A Critical Inquiry," The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and
Learning 2 (Fall 1991): 48-66.
11.
Dennett presented this argument in Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness
Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1991).
12.
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Isabella Csikszentmihalyi, eds. Optimal
Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness.
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 20.
13.
Csikszentmihalyi has described his notion of flow and his research
on autotelic experiences in a manner accessible to non-specialized
readers in Flow:The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York:
Harper and Row, 1990) and various subsequent books.
29.
See Ellen Dissanayake, What is Art For? (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1988) and Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From
and Why (New York: Free Press, 1992).
30.
Regelski, "Prolegomenon to a Praxial Philosophy of Music Education," 25.
40.
Regelski, "Action Learning: Curriculum and Instruction as and for Praxis,"
in Music Education as Praxis: Reflecting on Music-Making as Human
Action, ed. Marie McCarthy (College Park, Maryland: University of
Maryland, 1997), 108.
43.
The books and papers cited to this point in this article set forth the
basic tenets of Elliott's and Regelski's praxial views. Subsequent
to the publication of these works, both scholars have added further
refinements to their philosophies in additional papers; these are cited
in the remainder of this paper when further clarification of their views
seems to be required.
45.
Regelski, "Prolegomenon to a Praxial Philosophy of Music Education,"
25. Ethnomusicologist John Blacking raised the question of whether music
might be a "species specific trait" in his book How Musical Is Man?
(Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1973), 34.
46.
Related to this point, both Elliott and Regelski have regrettably used
the word "style" to refer to the social practices of different cultural
groups that involve sound which they personally regard as "music," when,
in fact, for the peoples who undertake them, many such practices have
nothing to do with one another or with the concept "music." See, for
example, Elliott, Music Matters, 44, and Regelski, "Prolegomenon
to a Praxial Philosophy of Music Education," 82.
48.
Regelski, "Accounting for All Praxis: An Essay Critique of David Elliott's
Music Matters," Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music
Education 144 (Spring 2000): 82.
59.
I found this to be the case while I was conducting research into the
rationales that have been provided for the inclusion of music in public
school curricula over the history of the United States. See James
Scott Goble, "Ideologies of Music Education: A Pragmatic, Historical
Analysis of the Concept 'Music' in Music Education in the United States"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1999), 270-393.
[End Page 43]
60.
Elliott, "Teaching Musical Creativity: A Praxial View," in Music
Education as Praxis: Reflecting on Music-Making as Human Action,
ed. McCarthy, 41-59.
64.
Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford, England:
Basil Blackwell, 1990), 8-9.
65.
The United States Bill of Rights was written and adopted with the specific
purpose of making the nation an anideological state in which individuals
and communities of diverse religious (or cultural) backgrounds could
coexist peacefully, but in which no group would have its beliefs or way of
life sanctioned as the official religion of the state. Certain Canadian
laws (perhaps most notably the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
have had similar peace-keeping effects in that nation, especially in
recent years.
66.
However, it is important to note that while the bracketing of cultural or
religious differences from the public forum was indeed the stated intent
of the authors of the U.S. Bill of Rights, many European immigrants and
their descendents in fact denied the non-European peoples then living
within the new nation (such as the African peoples brought as slaves to
North America and the various tribes of Native Americans) the right to
reconcile problems stemming from such differences via the juridical and
legislative means
established for this purpose, precisely on the basis of their racial,
religious, and cultural difference. Indeed, these peoples were often not
allowed to "coexist peacefully" or to have a voice in the public forum,
and their distinctive worldviews were frequently denied, derogated, and
in some cases all but destroyed by persons of European descent. Societal
reparations for these wrongdoings continue to this day.
67.
Richard Rorty, "The Unpatriotic Academy," in Philosophy and Social
Hope (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999), 252-54.
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