The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, Rome and Mogadishu from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope (review)

Book Reviews 121 The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, Rome and Mogadishufrom Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope Paolo Tripodi New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 219. Since the outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1990 a cottage industry has developed within the academy aimed at explaining the faüure of the post-colonial Somali state. Most authors have focused their attention on the place of Somalia as a Cold War pawn or on the role of "clan" as explanations for the collapse of the state and the subsequent chaos that has plagued the region for the last ten years. Paolo Tripodi's The Colonial Legacy in Somali explores a previously ignored culprit in the collapse of Somalia: Italy, its former colonial master. Tripodi rightly notes that while in most European countries, scholars over the last 50 years have dissected the role of former colonial powers in shaping the post-colonial destinies of their former subjects ad nauseam, the legacy left by Italy to its former possessions remains largely unexplored. Professor Tripodi seeks to remedy this situation by providing a broad overview of the Italian role in Somalia from the beginning of colonial rule in the 1890s through the debacle of "Operation Restore Hope" a century later. The author's study begins with an overview of the colonial period from its beginnings under the early nationalist government through the fascist period that ended in 1941 with the occupation of the colony by British forces. Tripodi's most significant contribution, however, lies in his examination of the never-before-studied Italian trusteeship (AFIS— Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia) of the 1950s that was supposed to oversee Somalia's progress toward independence and subsequent efforts by the Italian government to prop up various Somali governments during the intervening 30 years of independence. Using never-before-examined AFIS documents from the Italian Foreign ministry archives {Archivio Storico del Ministero Affari Esteri), Dr. Tripodi explores the various shortcomings of the Italian administration that, he argues, created a seriously flawed post-independence government that was doomed to fad. The main difficulties, he contends, arose largely from poor economic and political judgments exercised by Italian authorities and a general lack of appreciation for 122 Book Reviews the place of "clan" loyalty in SomaH social structure and political life. Italian trustees bequeathed the Somali state an extremely fragile economy by overemphasizing abanana industry that was too closely tied to Italian subsidies and not competitive on the world market. At the same time they failed to develop other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, livestock and manufacturing. On the political front, the Italian administration sought to implement an Italian-based state system and constitution that failed to take into consideration traditional methods of governance and power sharing. To make matters worse, Italian officials eventually dealt almost exclusively with the dominant Somali political party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), to the exclusion ofall other opposition parties, even those that were pro-Italian. Italian actions, Tripodi argues, were driven primarily by economic self-interest and a desire to be rid of the expensive trusteeship as quickly as possible. Thus, at the time of independence in 1960 the Somali inheritance consisted of a one-party pseudo-democracy and a weak mono-crop economy. The Republic of Somalia was an accident waiting to happen. Over the next 30 years Italy helped worsen an already bad situation by continuing to meddle in Somali internal affairs. Dr. Tripodi presents convincing evidence of steady Italian support for the Somali government, regardless ofwho was in power. From the earliest days of the first civilian government through the most repressive years of the Barre military dictatorship in the 1980s, the Italian government remained a staunch backer of the post-colonial Somali state, providing economic and political support to the bitter end. The reasons for this unswerving backing range from a desire ofthe Italian government to fix its mistakes to corruption among civil servants and contractors who made large profits from various economic assistance programs. In the end, while not absolving Somalis of blame, Tripodi convincingly implicates the Italian government as a willing co-conspirator in the collapse of the Somali nation. If this...