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  • Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism
  • Ron Kroeker
Edith Foster . Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xi + 243. US $85. ISBN 9780521192668.

In this work the author takes up the issue of Thucydides' attitude toward the materialistic imperialism of the statesman Pericles, whose confidence in the triumph of imperial Athens was based upon the efficacy of the revenues of empire and the materials of war such as walls and ships. Disagreeing with those who treat Thucydides' Pericles as a spokesman for the views of the historian himself, Foster's basic thesis is that "Thucydides was not an exponent of Pericles' materialistic imperialism" (4). Broadly speaking, Foster is not the first to put forward this thesis but her approach is distinct and her research is thorough and for the most part quite compelling. Much of her argumentation is based on the contrast she perceives between the attitude of Pericles as displayed in his speeches and the Thucydidean narrative of events leading up to and surrounding these speeches. Her focus remains almost exclusively on the first two books of the History, since it is more widely accepted that the later books reflect a negative view toward Athenian imperial materialism.

In the first chapter ("War Materials and Their Glory in the Archaeology") Foster argues that Thucydides' Archaeology presents the history of Greece as a series of minor high points of power and material prosperity that was ultimately destructive to those involved. Accordingly, the greatest acme of power and prosperity, that of Athens and Sparta (1.1.1), did not lead to great glory but to the greatest degree of pain and upheaval (1.23.2-3 [41-42]). The thrust of the Archaeology, therefore, ultimately undermines the confidence in war materials and the glories of expansionist imperialism displayed in Pericles' speeches (43).

Foster concentrates on the account of the battle of Sybota between Corinth and Corcyra in the second chapter ("Arms and Passion: Corinth and Corcyra at War"). This battle was largely the result of Corcyraean arrogance—an arrogance that sprang from an over-confidence in the size of her navy (49-59). After winning an initial battle, the Corcyraeans were successful in forging an alliance with Athens that was based mainly on the [End Page 299] security that would come to Athens if she gained the naval resources of Corcyra. Foster asserts that the appeal to security based on naval superiority is a very Periclean trope, but that it appears quite specious in light of Thucydides' account of the battle of Sybota, in which impressive naval forces fell prey to the vicissitudes of the battle itself, and the much-vaunted Corcyraean navy was largely destroyed. Although Foster's narrow focus here does not take into account other Thucydidean concerns that may have influenced the form of the narrative, her persuasive discussion has the added virtue of explaining why Thucydides should spend so much time detailing this incident which, according the historian himself, was not the "truest cause of the war" (1.23.5-6).

The third chapter examines how Thucydides presents the Athenian acme of power in the Spartan War Congress (1.68-88) and in the Pentecontaetia (1.89-118). Here Foster seeks to show that Thucydides' narrative does not support Pericles' perspective on Athenian power and war strategy but rather serves to explain how Pericles could come to hold his views. These sections show how impressive the Athenian imperial war resources were, but also occasionally hint at their limits and vulnerabilities. The Athenian acme, moreover, was the cause of the war which, in Foster's view, was tantamount to the end of Athens' empire (117).

Foster turns to an examination of Thucydides' treatment of Pericles himself in Chapter 4 ("Pericles in History"). Here she focuses on Pericles' exploits as recorded in the Pentecontaetia and on his first speech. In the Pentecontaetia, Pericles, although generally energetic, daring and successful, was rather ruthless and displayed a misplaced confidence in walls and ships (122-127). He is presented overall as a man of his own time, who saw things as he did because of the particular perspective that the Athenian experience of Empire gave him. He is...

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