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Reviewed by:
  • Neoplatonism
  • Sara Magrin
Pauliina Remes. Neoplatonism. Berkeley/Los Angeles: Acumen Publishing, 2008. Pp. xii + 244. US $18.95. ISBN 9780520258600.

Scholars of ancient philosophy are by now well acquainted with the volumes of the series Ancient Philosophies published by Acumen. These volumes provide introductions to the main philosophical schools in antiquity, and they are meant to help students approach “core ideas” in ancient philosophy. To present Neoplatonism in a way accessible to non-specialists is undoubtedly a difficult task, not only because of the large amount of material that one has to cover, but especially because to understand Neoplatonism one needs to engage with a long history of interpretative issues raised by the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Remes deals with these challenges by organizing the discussion thematically rather than chronologically, and by examining the history of Neoplatonism as a series of answers to problems stemming from Plotinus, whose thought is in turn presented against the background of Plato’s and Aristotle’s. Thus, after a substantial introduction that sets Neoplatonism in its historical context and examines its relations to other philosophical movements, in Chapter 2 Remes discusses the development of Neoplatonic metaphysics from Plotinus to Damascius.

Chapter 2 is remarkably well organised. Remes begins by laying out what she takes to be the two most general metaphysical concerns of Neoplatonism (35), and she shows how these concerns stem from problems in the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. The first concern is what she calls “the question of one versus many.” Taking the first hypothesis of the Parmenides and the description of the form of the Good in Republic VI as their starting points, the Neoplatonists argue that the first principle of reality must be an absolute simple thing: the One. This conception of the first principle leads to a problem: that of explaining how multiplicity can derive from unity and simplicity. The second general concern that Remes introduces is “the question of constancy versus [End Page 379] change.” This is the problem of explaining the role of Platonic forms as causes of the relative stability and intelligibility of sensible particulars. From these two very general concerns Remes gradually proceeds to a more in-depth analysis. In a manner that is reminiscent of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, she introduces and discusses a list of basic metaphysical principles shared by all Neoplatonists. Thus we find, for instance, “Principle I. ‘All that exists is caused by a single first cause’” (42), and “Principle II. ‘The principle of spontaneous generation’” (43). The list is followed by a discussion of Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy (One, Intellect, and Soul) and of its role in his response to the two concerns outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Plotinus’ hierarchy is then used as a starting point for considering the more elaborate hierarchies introduced by later Neoplatonists. The only topic that, I think, could have been examined more carefully in this chapter is Plotinus’ metaphysical theory of causation: the theory of internal and external activity. According to Plotinus each thing has two activities: one is internal, and it corresponds to the substance of the thing, whereas the other is external, and it originates from the substance of the thing. Remes refers for discussion to Gerson 1994 and Emilsson 1999. But the fullest discussion of this theory is in Lloyd 1987, who persuasively argues that Plotinus develops the theory of the two activities on the grounds of the Peripatetic distinction between first and second actualities. Since most readers of Neoplatonism are probably already familiar with this distinction, I think that a reference to it could have helped to free Plotinus’ theory from much of its apparent obscurity. One, of course, might disagree with Lloyd’s analysis, but the issue needs some discussion.

Chapter 3 deals with nature and the sensible universe. It begins with an overview of Plotinus’ and Proclus’ conception of nature against the background of Aristotle’s physics and Plato’s Timaeus. Remes points out that in many respects Plotinus and Proclus appropriate Aristotle’s conception of nature as a principle of motion and rest. But she also explains that, in the light of the Timaeus, and in contrast to Aristotle, they insist...

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