Equality, Gender, and John Paul II

IT IS WIDELY ARGUED that neither John Paul II nor the Catholic Church could possibly be committed to gender equality, since women cannot be ordained. This argument presupposes that equality precludes gender differentiation. If so, then differentiated gender roles reflect inequality. But is this right? Must all forms of equality obliterate all differences? Or, is it possible for there to be an equality of difference?

On the one hand, it does not seem possible for the different to be equal, because the different—as such—lack some commonality whereby they can be compared and known as equal, or even as inferior/superior. Accordingly, "an equality of difference" would be oxymoronic, if it did not presuppose some type of commonality whereby comparisons could be made. So the question becomes whether the commonality that allows comparison must be identical; must "equality" be a univocal concept? For example, the equality of car drivers is univocal, or the same: the role of driving is the same for each, each must obey traffic rules and each is penalized in the same way for traffic violations. Contrast the univocal nature of driving a car with the analogical nature of being an artist: not all artists function in the same way, for example, some make music, others paintings. Yet Beethoven and Michelangelo are equally great artists. In this sense, the equality of Beethoven and Michelangelo, while based upon the commonality of excellence, is not based upon the same excellence but upon an analogous excellence arising from the relationship of the artist to art: Beethoven is related to music as Michelangelo is related to painting; since those relationships pertain to excellence, they are equals; but since their excellences are different, their equality is analogical. Could it thus be that such an "equality of difference" underlies John Paul II's rejection of ordaining women? If so, then three conditions would have to be met: (1) John Paul II would have to be unequivocally supportive of equality between men and women, while (2) upholding gender roles that would allow equality to be based upon a commonality that is analogous rather than univocal; and, (3) he would also have to hold that ordained priesthood is a gender role.

That John Paul II meets these three conditions can be seen in his Apostolic Letter, On the Dignity and Vocation of Women (Mulieris Dignitatem). ¹ In this letter, John Paul II expresses a commitment to gender equality based upon a sacramental theology wherein nature images the divine and wherein the equality of man and woman was definitively established by Genesis 1:27: "God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them."

At this point, however, we can say that the biblical account puts forth the truth about the personal character of the human being. Man is a person, man and woman equally so, since both were created in the image and likeness of the personal God. (Mulieris Dignitatem n. 6)

Man and woman equally image God.

So, why are these equal images sexually differentiated? Could it be that male and female—as a pair—also image God? John Paul II thinks so:

If . . . we wish to draw also from the narrative of the Yahwist text the concept of "image of God," we can then deduce that man became the "image and likeness" of God not only through his own humanity, but also through the communion of persons which man and woman form right from the beginning. The function of the image is to reflect the one who is the model, to reproduce its own prototype. Man becomes the image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion. . . . [H]e is . . . essentially an image of an inscrutable divine communion of persons. ²

Accordingly, heterosexual love and spousal oneness image nothing less...