Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum: Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Dorfes 1944–1953 (review)

The concepts, motives, and strategies behind the collectivization of East European agriculture remain subject to ongoing controversy. While some observers claim that collectivization, as the final outcome of socialist agricultural policy, was determined from the very beginning, other scholars point out that collectivization was an ad hoc decision, taken without preparation or planning. These positions are not, however, necessarily perpendicular to each other. Although the model of socialist agriculture as a large-scale enterprise was never in question, it was accepted that during a given period of transition, undefined in terms of time frame, agriculture could develop on private peasant farms. Thus the real question that remains is whether or not any alternative existed to the final outcome of collectivization. Who decided when the transition period would end, and for what reasons?¹

To understand collectivization, however, we must explore how the Stalinist system functioned. Why did an agricultural policy bound to create large-scale enterprises in all countries start with the splitting up of landholdings during land reforms? Why were the shortcomings of Soviet agricultural policy, which had such fatal and destructive consequences and nearly caused the collapse of the communist regime in 1932–33, never analyzed critically until glasnost′? Under Stalin, Soviet policy was dogmatized and served as the model for every other country engaged in socialist construction, thereby causing destructive and destabilizing effects similar to those experienced in the Soviet Union. Was there any rationale behind this policy, or did it simply follow the whim of the person pulling the strings behind the scenes?

Feest’s excellent study analyzing agricultural policy in Estonia is a fresh attempt to answer these important questions. Collectivization started in Estonia in 1947, two years earlier than in the countries of the Eastern bloc. Thus, hypothetically, it would have been possible to learn from the failures in the Baltic states and to avoid the most negative results while implementing collectivization in Eastern Europe. Feest’s study is not merely a study of agricultural policies inside the Soviet Union; it also contributes to the broader question of Sovietization in Eastern Europe. There is no justification for omitting territories occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939 in the existing studies of Sovietization, as the issues there were very much the same. It is a pity that many recent studies of Sovietization neglect the possibilities of widening and sharpening their analysis through a comparative perspective.²

It has been quite a while, moreover, since comparative studies have been carried out on collectivization.³ A recent reappraisal of comparative perspectives is long overdue. Clearly, agricultural policy faced similar problems in all the countries affected up until 1953. There was permanent interference from Moscow, at first to ensure that communist parties did not put collectivization on their agenda too early, and later to force them to push ahead with class war and ultimately collectivization. The majority of peasants everywhere were resistant to this political meandering. Still under dispute is the extent—if any—that economic considerations of feeding the people played a role. Without doubt, however, all East European countries experienced difficulties with food supply as a result of this policy. Although there is evidence that some national leaders of communist parties, such as Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary in 1948, tried to avoid the order from Moscow to start collectivization, Stalin’s dominance was so overwhelming that, apart from Tito, nobody dared to question the political wisdom (or lack thereof) behind the policy.⁴

Expectations that access to the archives would settle the issues involved in the controversies surrounding this topic have been disappointed. No master plan of agricultural policy for Eastern Europe of any type has been found. This may support the view that the fate of the East European countries was less preordained than has been argued before. Tactical thinking and an attempt to overcome the...