A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (review)

222KOREAN STUDIES, VOL. 19 mate, the difficulties that both the chaebol and Korea will experience as they restructure and liberalize. Here, the knowledge and insights provided by Amsden (1989) and Porter (1990: 453^179) are needed to supplement this work. Based on the more comprehensive understanding of the Korean business environment that the other two works provide, it is not at all clear that the chaebol have yet gained the incentives or the capabilities to restructure their organizations and change their strategies as recommended. Still, all of these authors concur that the chaebol will continue to develop and will remain formidable global competitors. In sum, The Chaebol makes a meaningful contribution to the existing literature on Korean business. It is well written and provides the reader with much knowledge and insight into the strategy and management of these large and successful enterprises. But the book is weak on the subject of Korean industrial structure and the overall business environment. The interested reader will want to look at the other works cited here to gain a more balanced perspective on the merits of Korean industrial policy and the strengths and weaknesses of the chaebol. James Richardson University of Hawai'i at Mänoa REFERENCES Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press. Porter, Michael E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press. A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation ofthe Postwar World, edited by William J. Williams. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993. 265 pp. $24.95, paper. Cold War historians no longer treat the Korean War as a minor episode in postwar global affairs. A consensus appears to have emerged that the conflict in Korea was a major turning point in the Cold War. Lieutenant Colonel William J. Williams, Deputy Head of the Department of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has chosen a title for this anthology reflecting the importance scholars now assign to a war that finally has begun to escape the shadow of Vietnam. A Revolutionary War consists of ten essays first presented as conference papers at the U.S. Air Force Academy's Fifteenth Military History Symposium in October 1992. In his introduction, Williams writes that the Korean War "was a significant watershed" (p. 1) in diplomatic and military history BOOK REVIEWS223 after 1945 because it initiated a pattern of the United States fighting undeclared limited wars for the purpose of maintaining credibility, relying on air power and closely controlling field operations from Washington. Lessons from the Korean War led to restrictions on bombing in Vietnam and refusal to alter initial goals in the Gulf War. Williams contends that the articles in this volume demonstrate that the Korean War "transformed, in revolutionary ways, key aspects of the world's political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military environment" (p. xiii) after 25 June 1950. Two articles in this volume have special value. John E. WiIz, in his 50page contribution (no other essay exceeds 19 pages), surveys U.S. relations with Korea since the nineteenth century. Challenging the judgments of recent scholars and sharply criticizing the "leftist perspective" (p. 77) of Bruce Cumings , he cogently restates traditional opinions on issues ranging from U.S. "betrayal" in permitting Japan's "rape" (p. 30) of Korea after 1905 to Harry Truman's decision "to abandon South Korea to its fate" (p. 50). Solid research and common sense analysis support his assertion that American military withdrawal in 1949 was "a blunder ... of genuinely historic proportions" (p. 59) because it persuaded Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin that South Korea was "ripe for the plucking" (p. 56). While WiIz recultivates a well-worked field, Jon Halliday's essay discussing Soviet participation in a Korean air war of "unparallel" (p. 150) intensity breaks new ground. Interviews with Soviet veterans yield valuable statistics on casualties and downed planes. Soviet air power "was probably the crucial factor in keeping supply lines open" (p. 158), despite the lack of Soviet-Chinese-North Korean coordination. Fearing public pressure for escalation, Washington "decided to keep . . . secret" (p. 159) evidence of Soviet involvement and Moscow's acts of "subterfuge" made possible "high-level collusion in a coverup ... in...