Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics ed. by Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams (review)

The main question addressed in this volume is to what extent did Thomas Aquinas “deal with and depend on Aristotle’s Ethics” (1). The editors and contributors discuss the setting and intent of Thomas’s commentary (Sententiae supra libros Ethicorum) on the text of Aristotle, which was likely completed during his magisterial activity at Paris in 1271–72. They consider various scholarly opinions on the commentary, including those concerning its date of composition and whether Thomas expresses his own views, or merely provides a careful exposition of Aristotle’s text. An important topic for all contributors is the consideration of the commentary in light of Thomas’s theological treatises, especially the Summa theologiae, in order to understand how Thomas’s reading of Aristotle’s moral philosophy contributes to his own understanding of important issues in ethics.

The first two articles by Terrence Irwin and Michael Pakaluk discuss the accuracy and general approach of Thomas toward Aristotle. Both rightly indicate that Thomas does not approach Aristotle in the manner of a modern scholar who seeks faithfully to explain the text, but rather as a way to discover truth. Although Thomas always attempts to comprehend Aristotle’s thought thoroughly, he does not hesitate to indicate its limits when compared to religious belief. Thomas is generally reluctant to criticize Aristotle directly and often provides a charitable reading for controversial ideas. When discussing the question of the possibility of perfect beatitude, Thomas claims that Aristotle refrained from such a discussion in Ethics, because the fate of the separate soul belongs to a different science. Irwin concludes that we ought to take Thomas seriously as a historically accurate interpreter of Aristotle, even if he does introduce un-Aristotelian topics, such as the will, into his understanding of Aristotle (30).

Jörn Müller’s article builds upon his earlier work on Albert the Great on the relation between happiness and beatitude. Müller claims that Aristotle offers “not one unified account of happiness, but rather a ‘two-fold happiness’” (55). Albert did indeed accept the notion of two distinct types of happiness (duefelicitates), but Thomas rejects this interpretation in favor of one that views Aristotelian eudaimonia as the single perfection of human beings within a lifetime. Müller indicates the importance of the qualification by Aristotle that human beings can only be beati ut homines for Thomas’s view that perfect beatitude may be attained in the afterlife (62). Here Müller believes that Thomas seems brazenly to ignore Aristotle’s designation of the contemplative life as perfect happiness. Thomas, however, did not have so much difficulty in showing that the philosophical life does not meet the criterion for ultimate finality and self-sufficiency, since he finds support in Aristotle’s own text. In book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does indeed find human contemplation lacking in comparison to the perfect continuous activity of divine beings. Human beings cannot engage in perfect activity since they always must tend to biological and social needs. Contemplation is perfect in that it actualizes the supreme potential within the human soul (nous), but it is not perfect without qualification.

Eight of the remaining nine articles consider individual virtues and their treatment in Thomas’s commentary and in his more systematic theological works. The contributors agree that Thomas’s astute interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy does not unduly limit his ability to draw upon various sources to arrive at his own conclusions. A particularly important essay concerns the virtue of prudence (phronesis), which Tobias Hoffmann discusses clearly and accurately. Hoffmann correctly identifies synderesis, the innate habit of recognizing universal moral principles, as an important element in Thomas’s own thought. Through synderesis, Thomas anchors prudence in natural reason, rather than in the moral virtues themselves, and thereby avoids a circular causal relationship between desire and reason (174). Hoffmann emphasizes the importance of particular judgments, or the minor premises, in the...