The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom (review)

This interesting and important contribution to scholarship on Kant’s account of sublime feeling develops an argument that the author first makes in an article, “Kant’s Consistency Regarding the Regime Change in France” (Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 [2006]: 443–60). The heart of the argument, presented in chapters 2 through 5, concludes that aesthetic enthusiasm (Enthusiasm, which Clewis distinguishes from Schwärmerei, or fanaticism) is a kind of sublime feeling, which can indirectly support morality and thus elicit an interest of reason (as Kant claims the beautiful does). In chapter 6, Clewis uses the foregoing analysis to resolve an apparent inconsistency between Kant’s remarks on the enthusiasm of uninvolved spectators for the French Revolution and Kant’s moral condemnation of all violent revolution. Although these arguments are strong, they raise difficult questions that Clewis does not consider.

Although it is nowhere presented quite this directly, Clewis’ main argument is an IAI categorical syllogism:

1. 1. Some mental states, which Kant calls “enthusiasm” (Enthusiasm), are instances of what Kant calls “sublime feeling.”

2. 2. All sublime feeling, according to Kant, can indirectly support morality by revealing or “making palpable” human freedom, which elicits an interest of reason.

3. 3. Therefore, according to Kant, some enthusiasm can indirectly support morality and elicit an interest of reason.

In clarification of the first premise, Clewis distinguishes “enthusiasm” (Enthusiasm), which is “the idea of the good with affect,” from “fanaticism” (Schwärmerei), which is the claim to supersensible insight. This important distinction is commonly effaced when Schwärmerei is translated as “enthusiasm.” Clewis also distinguishes “aesthetic enthusiasm,” which is kind of disinterested contemplation that does not set or pursue ends, from “practical enthusiasm,” which does pursue the realization of its object. Of the two, only aesthetic enthusiasm qualifies as a kind of sublime feeling for Kant. Finally, Clewis argues that aesthetic enthusiasm and other sublime mental states are examples of a distinct yet unrecognized category of sublimity, which Clewis calls “the moral sublime”; it is a direct aesthetic response to moral ideas or moral content, rather than to the perceived infinity or overwhelming power of nature.

In support of the second premise, Clewis distinguishes between first-order and second-order interests in order to show how reason can coherently take a second-order interest in the existence of a disinterested aesthetic response to a moral idea (e.g. aesthetic enthusiasm); he also distinguishes five senses of interest and disinterest, which help distinguish aesthetic enthusiasm from the moral feeling of respect. Both are responses to moral ideas, and both are disinterested in some senses, but they differ in that moral feeling produces an interest in the realization of its ends, whereas aesthetic enthusiasm is merely reflective and does not set or pursue ends.

The book discusses many other points related to the sublime; some usefully anticipate objections, whereas others are mere excursuses. For lack of space, I skip over them here and proceed to the culmination of the whole book: Clewis’ claim that, for Kant, the enthusiasm for the French Revolution by uninvolved spectators is an example of sublime aesthetic enthusiasm, and that reason’s interest in this enthusiasm is consistent with reason’s moral condemnation of all violent revolution. The inconsistency lies in the appearance that a morally reprehensible act (violent revolution) is taken by the same reason that condemns it to be a sign of hope that its moral purposes might be achievable in the world. Clewis resolves the apparent inconsistency with two points: (1) morality condemns the means of the revolutionaries, not the goal of republican government; (2) reason takes an interest not in the revolutionary means, but in the enthusiasm of the uninvolved spectators, who likewise are enthused about the goals of the revolution rather than its immoral means.

Conceptually, this solution may resolve the apparent conflict, but it raises some difficult questions. If the true object of aesthetic enthusiasm in this case is the idea of republican government, which the Revolution only...