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Reviewed by:
  • Aristotle on Teleology
  • Tiberiu Popa
Monte Ransome Johnson . Aristotle on Teleology. Oxford Aristotle Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 339 pp. Cloth, $74.00.

Teleology is one of the most extensively studied topics in Aristotle's philosophy. It is all the more impressive that Monte Ransome Johnson has been able to put together such a comprehensive, lucid, and often original account of what we would call Aristotle's teleology, or final causation, and what the Stagirite would have called simply "that for the sake of which."

Johnson starts with a historical survey of several traditions of interpreting Aristotle's teleology and, in doing so, helps us avoid conceptual snags that might hinder an adequate understanding of Aristotle on his own terms. Following this inspired approach, the author sets the notion of cause in its Aristotelian context and subsequently examines the various connections of final causality to metaphysics, natural philosophy, science (from astronomy and what we would call chemistry, to the investigation into the nature of animals) and the realm of human action and intentionality. The first part (roughly half) of Johnson's book ends with a detailed discussion of ta endoxa—the reputable opinions of Aristotle's predecessors. In this chapter (ch. 4), the focus is both on Aristotle's criticism of the rather flawed precursors of the concept of final causation (Anaxagoras' nous and Plato's forms), and on his attack on sheer mechanism, which invoked material necessity while largely or [End Page 323] entirely ignoring teleological scenarios, despite the general regularity noticeable within the confines of any species of plant or animal, and despite the structural and functional complexity of individuals belonging to those species.

Johnson's main contribution to our understanding of Aristotelian teleology comes chiefly in the second half of his study (including an interesting Conclusion, where he suggests how we might want to reconsider the way in which we relate to nature). In this second half, Johnson devotes special attention to the levels at which teleology is presumably at work: the elements (ch. 5), the organisms (chs. 6 and 7), the sphere of morality and political action (ch. 8), and, more generally, the place of final causality in the cosmos (ch. 9). His analysis of the notion of natural place in chapter 5 is certainly helpful, although it seems to obscure other ways of applying teleology to the elements (e.g., it may have been worth further emphasizing that Meteorology IV 12—a text quoted by the author—seems to imply that the simple bodies, namely earth, water, air, and fire, are "for the sake of" uniform compounds such as flesh or bone, just as the latter are for the sake of the organisms of which they are parts). Johnson's study of teleology in a biological context is quite a feat, though, given how much has already been written on this topic. He points out that the study of organisms provides the best and most complete illustration of Aristotle's final causality, as being inherent in nature (although it has certain limitations; see, for instance, the discussion of spontaneous generation). It is also in this context—more than any other domain of Aristotelian science—that teleology proves its explanatory worth. Still, it is important to note, as Johnson rightly urges us to do, that final causes do not merely fulfill a heuristic function, but are part of the texture of the natural world. The final chapter and the Conclusion bring into sharper focus the fact that the extrapolation of final causes from natural science to ethics and politics fails at least to a significant extent, given that the treatment of the notion of substance in a natural context does not fully square with the type of investigation pursued by Aristotle in connection with intentionality and with political action.

I should add that one of the more prominent features of Johnson's analysis of Aristotelian teleology is his firm emphasis on the non-anthropocentric character of Aristotle's view: it is not fundamentally the case that other species fulfill their natural goals by serving human interests. Rather, plants and animals other than human beings count on their own in the order of...

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