Selves and Personal Existence in the Existentialist Tradition

the status of the self within the existentialist tradition appears problematic, as one reviews the literature. On one hand, Kierkegaard, who is often regarded as the founding father of the tradition, has one of his pseudonymous authors refer to the self as “the chief thing in life” and “the highest thing, the only thing which truly has significance.”¹ On the other hand, Sartre, who is often regarded as the paradigmatic existentialist, is widely interpreted as denying the reality of a self altogether. Among commentators, apparent differences of an equally sharp nature can be found. On the one hand, David Cooper writes, “The Existentialist does not have, and is not interested in having, a concept of the self”;² and Robert Solomon, in listing the basic characteristics of phenomenological existentialism, includes “rejection of the self.”³ On the other hand, William Barrett laments the fact that twentieth century existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre, in sharp contrast to Kierkegaard, have failed to advance theories of “a stable self.”⁴

What then, is one to make of such a variety of statements? Do existentialists typically affirm or reject the reality of a self? Are they even interested in the concept? Is there a typical existentialist view at all, or is there radical diversity within the tradition, or perhaps even a sharp division? Are the so-called phenomenological existentialists (such as Sartre) opposed to other existentialists (such as Kierkegaard) on this issue? If so, does the difference stem from the methodology of the former group? Or is the status of the self tied to differences of religious outlook? (For instance, does “self” really function as a coded term or buzzword for “soul,” such that the real issue at stake is immortality?)

Another matter of confusion is the relationship between selves and personal existence. Is the self the very core of personal existence, the source of modes of behavior that distinguish us from objects and other animals? If so, then denials of a self are tantamount to denials of personal existence itself. But do existentialists—even if they reject the notion of a self—wish to go that far? That question raises a further one as to the relationship of the existentialist tradition (hereafter, referred to simply as ‘the tradition’) to postmodernist thought. If existentialists do reject the notion of a self, should they be seen as precursors to the poststructuralists? Does the tradition represent a moderate alternative to the extremes of Cartesianism and postmodernism (and thus serve as a last line of defense against the latter), or should it rather be seen as a slippery slope that leads ineluctably into the latter?

Clearly, there is work here to be done, for these are important questions that deserve answers. I shall address many of them explicitly, and others indirectly. My basic approach is to distinguish between entity-based and process-oriented views of personal existence—a move that allows us to discern a great deal of unity within the tradition in place of apparent discord. This thesis concerning unity within the tradition on this matter cannot be substantiated without comment on the views of a number of thinkers within it. Accordingly, I take the following group to be representative (but not exhaustive) of the tradition: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, Marcel, and Merleau-Ponty. What I shall be doing in much of the discussion is simply assembling some reminders as to what each of these philosophers actually did say on our topic. In light of conflicting reports among commentators, this part of the discussion is indispensable. As I do this, however, I am led to address questions concerning the relationship of the so-called phenomenological existentialists (hereafter referred to as PEs) to others in the tradition. Also, the discussion brings into focus a significant ambiguity in talk about selves and personal existence.

1. selves and personal existence

The primary thesis of this paper is that much of the confusion about the status of the self within the tradition can be dispelled by distinguishing between entity-oriented views and process-oriented views of personal existence. I argue...