Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant's Contemporaries

Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant's Contemporaries BRIGITTE SASSEN THE IDEALISMDEBATESbetween Kant and his contemporaries were protracted and vehement. Interestingly, all parties in the debates--Kant's critics, defenders , and Kant himself--began with basically the same conception of (material/ empirical) idealism as a position that is either skeptical with regard to the independent existence of the external world (alternatively referred to, by Kant, as problematic, skeptical, or Cartesian idealism), or that denies the existence of material substance outright (dogmatic or Berkeleyan idealism, for Kant).' Positions quickly diverge, however, when it comes to transcendental idealism. Kant's critics argued consistently that transcendental idealism reduces to material idealism. Kant rejected these arguments, insisting, in turn, that transcendental idealism is the only escape from material idealism. 2Nonetheless, he was influenced by these criticisms. He repeatedly returns to the differentiation between transcendental and material idealism in the years following 1781,3 and he casts these differences ' This is a paraphrase of the definition that appears in the introductory paragraph of the BRefutation (B275). Kant's contemporaries might not have bothered to make the differentiation between skeptical and dogmatic idealism, but they certainly agreed with the general terms in which Kant describes idealism. His definition is closely echoed by Ernst Plamer, one of Kant's critics and an apparently generally respected historian of philosophy (PhilosophischeAphorismen, vol. I [Leipzig: Schwickert 1793], w 409- i 1) to whom even Kant's defenders referred. See, for instance, J. G. Schaumann, who attributes his definition of Berkeleyan idealism to an earlier version of the Aphorismen(Utherdie transcendentaleAesthetic[Leipzig: Weidmann, 1789], 133). References to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (KdrF) are to the pagination of the first and second original editions. References to Kant's other works are to the pagination of the Prussian academy edition of Kant's collected writings, cited as 'Ak' with volume in Roman and page in Arabic numerals. All translations are my own. 9For instance, Prolegomena,w Remark III, Ak. IV, 292. s In the ProlegomenaKant turns to the issue of idealism twice (in addition to the arguments from the A-edition that are paraphrased), first in Remarks II and III following w 3 (Ak. IV, 28894 ), and then more specifically in the Appendix (Ak. IV, 372-76). The B-edition of the Critiqut has the Refutation of Idealism (KdrV, B274-79), of course, as well as the elucidation of that argument in the Preface (KdrV, Bxxxix-xli, note). In addition, there are a number of handwritten [4~1] 429 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:3 JULY 1997 in what appear to be increasingly realist terms. However, while it is clear that Kant was annoyed by the numerous idealism charges and his critics' persistence in, as he saw matters, misunderstanding his thought on this and other issues, it remains unclear just how seriously he took the substance of their criticisms. I want to go some distance in answering this question by considering the development of Kant's treatment of idealism notjust text-internally,4 but by placing it in the context of the criticisms with which he was faced. These criticisms come in basically two groups. The first group contains critiques of the A-edition of the first Critique and of the Prolegomena. Among them are the famous G6ttingen or Feder/Garve review,5 Garve's original version of the review,6 and various other materials that pertain less directly to the idealism problem.7 In the second group are specific criticisms of the B-edition, notes. Prior to the Prolegomena, R5642 (AL XVIII, 279-82 ) stands out as Kant's first reaction to the idealism charge. In the years following the second edition of the Critique, there is a surprising amount of material: R5653-5654, dated t785-9o but see note 96 (Ak. XVIII, 3o5-13); R63126316 , dated t79o-9t (Ak. XVIII, 612-623); a recently found discussion loosely dated 1793 (Reinhard Brandt, "Eine neu aufgefundene Reflexion Kants 'Vom inneren Sinne' (Loses Blatt Leningrad 1)" in Reinhard Brandt/Werner Stark eds., Neue Autographen und Dokumente zu Kants Leben, Schriften und Vorlesungen [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, t987], 1-3o); and additional remarks scattered throughout the Nacldafl and Opus Postumum...