Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Temperance in Nicomachean Ethics III.10-11

Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Temperance in Nicomachean Ethics III. 1o- 11 HOWARD J. CURZER 1. INTRODUCTION maNY ¢ONTEMPOX~RYSOCIALeROBL~S arise from inappropriate indulgence in food, drink, and/or sex. Temperance (sophrosyne) is the Aristotelian virtue which governs these three things, and Aristotle's account of temperance (and related failure modes) contains important insights and useful distinctions. Yet Aristotle's account of temperance has been surprisingly neglected, despite the resurgence of virtue ethics. I shall remedy this neglect by providing a passageby -passage commentary on Aristotle's account of temperance in Nicomachean Ethics III. lO-11. I shall describe the sphere of temperance and Aristotle's distinctions among the character traits of temperance, self-indulgence, insensibility , continence, incontinence, and brutishness. I shall also describe the passions and parameters of temperance and argue that Aristotle's account of temperance is compatible with his doctrine of the mean. My interpretation includes several controversial claims. For example, I maintain that Aristotelian temperance governs not only the enjoyment of certain tactile pleasures, but also the desire (and therefore the pain caused by unsatisfied desire) for these pleasures. Aristotle's account clashes with common sense and with his own architectonic at several points. For example, he maintains that a person is intemperate only if he or she goes wrong with respect to all three of the temperance parameters . However, a few modifications will eliminate the tensions in Aristotle's account. Once modified, his account can enhance our understanding of how people relate and should relate to food, drink, sex, and other sensual pleasures. For example, I argue that Aristotle's account includes important distinctions which are absent from our contemporary understanding of alcohol abuse. [5] 6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:1 JANUARY 1997 2. NARROWING THE SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE Aristotle's account of a virtue always begins with a lengthy, detailed description of the sphere (peri ho) of the virtue. He describes the aspects of life governed by the virtue, what the virtue is about. He typically starts with a broad range of objects of passion and then gradually narrows the sphere of the virtue. His account of the virtue of temperance follows this pattern. He devotes the first half of his account to a description of the sphere of temperance . He begins by observing that "temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures" (1117b24-~5), ~ and then narrows the sphere of temperance in four stages. First, Aristotle restricts the sphere of temperance to bodily pleasures. He says: [A] Men who are concerned with [the pleasures of honor or learning] are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent. Nor, again, are those who are concerned with other pleasures that are not bodily; for those who are fond of hearing and telling stories and who spend their days on anything that turns up are called gossips, but not selfindulgent , nor are those who are pained at the loss of money or of friends. (l 1a7b311 t 18al) Why are these people not called temperate or self-indulgent? Why are the nonbodily pleasures excluded from the sphere of temperance? Notice that the pleasures of honor, learning, money, and friends are governed respectively by the virtues of greatness of soul (megalopsychia), wisdom, liberality, and the quasi-virtue of friendship. ~ I suggest that Aristotle restricts the sphere of temperance to bodily pleasures in order to prevent overlap with other virtues. He wants his virtues to have disjoint spheres. Aristotle never explicitly propounds the doctrine that all virtues have disjoint spheres, but attributing this doctrine to him explains passage [A]. It also explains the way in which Aristotle narrows the spheres of courage (1115alo-24), liberality (11~2a3-7), truthfulness (11 ~7a3 3-b 1), and justice (113oa 16- 3~).3 Aristotle's next move is to limit temperance to the pleasures of touch and taste. He says: ' All quotations from Aristotle are taken from The CompleteWorksof Aristotle,ed. J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ~984),except that I translate areteas "virtue" rather than "excellence." Gossip is not governed by any virtue in Aristotle's list. 3See H. Curzer, "Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Justice," Apeiron~8 (1995). Unfortunately , Aristotle does say that...