David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System (review)

636 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 I :4 OCTOBER 1993 view of Christianity by conceiving of it as the epistemological consequence of Original Sin. From being one of the main targets of libertine scepticism, the doctrine of the Fall becomes the foundation of scepticism itself. Pascal thus preserves the scepticism that neutralizes the pride issuing from dogmatism, but endeavors to halt conformation to ignorance (ataraxia) and attempts to turn scepticism against Christianity. Finally, because a basic Christian doctrine exhibits a transcendental-foundational status, the fideism of the Christian Pyrrhonians is avoided, notwithstanding the preservation of epistemological scepticism. The scheme of Christian rationalism vs. Christian Pyrrhonism does not fit well Pascal's position, due to the centrality of the "proof from the doctrine" in Pascal's apology. The true religion must explain the human condition and provide solutions to its problems (a requirement inconsistent with Christian Pyrrhonism). But the doctrine that provides this explanation (the doctrine of the Fall of Man) is admittedly at odds with human reason and justice (a position inconsistent with Christian rationalism). It is clear from McKenna's survey that a major transformation of Pascal's thought that led to the secularism of the Enlightenment was the naturalization of Pascal's view of the human condition. The rehabilitation of human nature is of a piece with Voltaire's and the clandestine authors' criticism of Pascal's proof from the doctrine. Basic features of the human condition that Pascal takes as acquired and revealing a double nature (a prelapsarian and a infralapsarian one) are throughout the period covered by McKenna increasingly regarded as natural human phenomena. The difficulty in locating Pascal's proof from the doctrine in either the rationalist or the Pyrrhonist apologetic traditions makes one doubt the usefulness of the scheme for understanding those many apologists in the period who used the argument. Some of them accepted some of Malebranche's theistic proofs. A case in point is Frangois Lamy, whose works, according to McKenna, "r~velent la rivalit~ des influences de Pascal et de Malebranche, et le compromis ing~nu et fragile propos~ par leur disciple" (544). But given that Pascal's proof from the doctrine is Lamy's main argument, one wonders whether McKenna's rough judgment of Lamy would not be biased by his interpretation of Pascal. Jos~ R. MAx^ NZTO Foundationfor Intellectual History Terence Penelhum. David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System. West Lafayette , IN: Purdue University Press, 199~. Pp. xv + ~x8. Paper, $13.75. Terence Penelhum has produced a masterful introduction to Hume's philosophy. His book is a clear, well-written, and readily accessible guide to Hume's views on a wide variety of philosophical subjects. The presentation is historically sensitive, the interpretation undogmatic, and the evaluation sympathetic yet not uncritical. The book has six chapters. Chapter 1 is a short biography of Hume. Chapter provides a general overview of Hume's philosophy, introducing students to its unifying themes of antirationalism, naturalism, the primacy of the passions, and mitigated BOOK REVIEWS 637 skepticism. With each theme Penelhum supplies a brief but helpful account of the historical context geared to a level that does not presuppose any extensive understanding of the philosophical tradition on the part of the student. Each of chapters 3 through 6 begins with a substantial extract from one of the Enquiries. Chapter 3 begins with sections II and III of the first Enquiry. Penelhum's commentary addresses Hume's categorization of perceptions, associative psychology, theory of meaning and notion of the self. Chapter 4 begins with sections IV, V, and VII of the first Enquiry. The commentary deals with the problem of induction, Hume's definitions of 'cause', references to secret powers, questioning of the necessity of causes, and theory of belief. Chapter 5 begins with appendices I and II of the second Enquiry. Issues covered in the commentary include Hume's attack on moral rationalism , the nature of moral approval and disapproval, the principle of sympathy, and the nature ofjustice. Chapter 6 begins with section XI of the first Enquiry,and the commentary concentrates on what Penelhum calls Hume's "secularizing program," the criticism of the design argument, and Hume's notion of...