Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle

Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle HENRY S. RICHARDSON 1. ROLES FOR THE HIGHEST GOOD PHILOSOPHERS HAVE INVOKED the notion of the highest good to solve many distinct problems. For some it is to serve as the lodestone by which to orient the regulation of the virtuous soul, for others as the SOUlCe of value, and for still others as supplying life with meaning or "point." Aristotle's conception of the highest good responds to each of these concerns to some extent: the highest good is virtuous activity of the soul (Nicomachean Ethics [E.N.], o98al 6), yet it is also the "principle" or source of goodness in some sense (11 o2a3-4)., Further, Aristotle suggests that unless there is a highest good, our pursuits would be "empty and vain" (1o94a 18-22). Far from clarifying matters, however, this polymorphous character of Aristotle's nodon of the highest good only increases the chances of misinterpretation, of confusing his notion with others. My aim in the present paper is to recover Aristotle's distinctive notion of the highest good, especially as it is explicated by its connection with the notion of an ultimate end (see esp. 1.2.1o94a18-~u, lo94b6-7; 1.7.1o97a15-~5). The latter notion is explained in 1.7. xo97a25ff., where Aristotle lays out the "degrees of finality." There, he distinguishes between ends that are sought both for their own sakes and for the sake of something else and ends that are sought only for their own sakes. Only the latter are "unqualifiedly final" (hapl~s teleios, l o97a33). AccordAn earlier version of this essaywaspresented at the Summer Institute on Aristotle's Metaphysics , Biology,and Ethics sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1988. I am grateful to the N.E.H. for this opportunity and to those present for their comments. In particular, 1 am indebted to Sarah Broadie, David Charles, Norman Dahl, Aryeh Kosman, Gisela Striker, and Thomas Tuozzo, and ;Rboveall to John Cooper's patient and ineluctable criticism. Later versions drew valuable comments from Martha Nussbaum, Nancy Sherman, and an anonymous reviewer for thisjournal. ' Unless otherwise identified, all Aristotle citations in the text will be to the Nicomac.hean Ethics,and all Aristotle quotations willbe fromJonathan Barnes, ed., TheCompleteWorksofAristotle (,Princeton: Princeton University Press, x984)[the revised Oxford translatior~s]. [3~7] 328 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:• JULY tgg2 ingly, the analysis distinguishes three kinds of ends: ends--such as "wealth, flutes, and in general instruments" (lo97a~7)--that are not sought for their own sakes; ends--such as honor and virtuemthat are sought both for their own sakes and for the sake of the highest good, happiness or eudaimonia; and the highest good itself, which is sought only for its own sake. In addition to being valuable for its own sake, clarifying the conceptual principles that generate Aristotle's degrees of finality will provide a number of surprising insights. To begin with, it will suggest fruitful and genuinely Aristotelian ways of dealing with the best-known interpretive difficulty of the Nicoma~hean Ethics, namely, whether the exercise of moral virtue or contemplative activity, or both, has a place in its final account of the highest good. If the argument about the human function in 1.7 succeeds in showing that the highest good, i.e., happiness, is a life of virtuous activity, then the soulregulation of moral virtue apparently becomes incorporated within the highest good. Contradicting this incorporation, as many think, is the suggestion of 1o.6-8 that perfect happiness (te/e/a eud~mon/a: 1177a17) be identified with contemplative activity., How the attempt by an ordinary mortal to realize a life devoted mainly to contemplation might lead to a well-ordering of the soul is quite mysterious. Conversely, although Aristotle insists that the moral virtues are to be sought for their own sakes (2.4. xxo5a3 a-~), their status as valuable in themselves seems open to question. For instance, the virtue of temperance is easily disparaged: though it may be needed to correct for human proneness to sensual temptations, purer beings would need no such remedy.3 Underlying this tension are two...