Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought (review)

446 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:3 JULY 1992 function (form) is not a pure actuality and thus does not require something (potentially ) distinct to wear it down. Instead decay, like growth, occurs in accordance with form due to the functioning of the parts. Hence, substantial form accounts for unity through time. This consequence undermines Gill's argument for elements' being almost substances. In short, rejecting strict identity yields an alternative account. Unlike Gill's unified treatment, this alternative is consistent with Aristode's twofold treatment of substance: the Physics emphasizes the plurality of form and matter, the Metaphysics their unity. Nevertheless, Gill's book has the merit of discussing clearly alternative interpretations of texts, showing connections between various texts, and raising an important issue. Gill shows clearly that problems about unity are fundamental for understanding Aristotle's metaphysics. EDWARD HALPER University of Georgia Leo Groarke. Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought. McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, Volume 14. Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen 's University Press, 199o. Pp. xv + 176. Cloth, $34.95. Groarke's is an ambitious book. Its first chapter proposes "a new interpretation of the sceptics"; its second provides a panorama of "Greek Epistemology before the Rise of Scepticism," which includes Xenophanes, Heracleitus, Ephicharmus, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. In the third chapter, which deals with "The Rise of Scepticism," the author examines the problem of knowledge, as seen by the ancients from the time of the Sophists until that of Plato. The next three chapters present the author's view on Greek scepticism; and in a last chapter, he compares ancient scepticism with modern epistemology. The book's main thesis, in my opinion, is that ancient scepticism was primarily interested in epistemological questions, more precisely, that the "suspension" of the sceptics "universally rejects all claims to realist truth and thus leaves room for antirealist beliefs" (20). In as much as our leading latter-day interpreters of ancient scepticism (especially Burnyeat, Frede, and Barnes) have argued at length that the ancient sceptics were not primarily interested in the possibility of attaining knowledge, the reader looks forward to a fruitful discussion of the dominant trend in such interpretation ; nevertheless, upon laying down the book one is left feeling unsatisfied. In some cases indeed, it is not clear precisely how Groarke believes himself to be rebutting current theses. For example, one of the classic objections to ancient scepticism is that in its different forms it always displays some dogmatic features, which are incompatible with its generally antidogmadc stance. One of those raising this objection was Bertrand Russell: "Scepticism as a philosophy is not merely doubt, but what may be called dogmatic doubt.., it is this element of dogmatism which makes the system vulnerable" (A History of Western Philosophy, quoted by Groarke, lO). In the same section of his book Groarke claims that "there are no unmitigated sceptics" and that "all the schools of BOOK REVIEWS 447 ancient scepticism mitigate their views in one way or another" (14). But it would be difficult to allow of this being an adequate rebuttal of an opinion such as Russell's. It might be so accepted, if it were accompanied by some proof of the existence of, not "all the schools," but at least one school of ancient scepticism which had modified a//its opinions in Groarke's sense. The author correctly distinguishes Burnyeat's interpretation from that of Frede, and concentrates his criticism upon the former. As is well known, Burnyeat propounded that the "suspension" of the sceptics be interpreted, not as a suspension of knowledge (in which case its beliefs would be beyond the reach of suspension), but as a suspension of the beliefs themselves. Such an interpretation would have it that the ancient sceptics abstained from belief, and took their abstention seriously--as an eminently practical form of scepticism. A preoccupation with knowledge should be considered as something proper to the modern sceptic, who practises a purely theoretical scepticism, which leaves his beliefs intact, and hence does not allow his daily life to be affected by his philosophical doubts. Burnyeat's interpretation is clearly questionable; but it is somewhat remarkable that Groarke...