Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis (review)

322 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:2 APRIL 1991 major disappointment. As Hegel makes clear already in the introduction to the Phenomenoh ~gy, our efforts to comprehend, whether in the realm of practice or in the domain of theory, are driven by a series of felt inadequacies that occasion the alteration simultaneously of the mode of our knowing, the object purported to be known, and the criterion of their mutual adequation. This is Hegel's most radical and distinctive contribution to philosophical methodology, and it governs the organization of his more speculative works. Characteristically, the very title of a subsequent chapter or subdivision in Hegel names the criterion that had haltingly emerged towards the end of the preceding one; in each instance, what might be called a noetic threshold of oblivion has been crossed. Professor Steinberger misses this. He states (60) and reiterates (61, 66, t t6f., 169) that in the dialectical resolution of contradictory propositions F and G in a higher, more comprehensive synthesis H, "H is nothing otherthan F + G" (italics his)--a formulation that leaves utterly opaque precisely what it is about H that enables it to synthesize F and G at a higher, more comprehensive level. Steinberger seems to sense that this won't do (67, 194 n. t, 185), hut he does little to rectify the situation. Instead he is, almost in spite of himself, lured by this crucial interpretative lapse into representing Hegel as a deductivist in the conventional sense (84-87, 99-95), and then into undermining the credibility of his book's central contention: "It is clear that the concept of Geist, of a transpersonal faculty [s/c] of thought or reasoning, plays some crucial role in making this connection [i.e., between the "historical unfolding of concepts" and "the process of logical development"]; but that concept itself is difficult to fathom" (lOl). Indeed it is, but everything depends on fathoming it, for it/s the animating principle of Hegelian dialectic. Steinberger's rather desperate assimilation of Hegelian dialectic to currently fashionable notions of "transcendental argument" (lO5-11) not unexpectedly results in ascribing to Hegel just what he had found most abhorrent in Kant's thought, namely, a bizarre and incongruous relative absolutism. Before he is through, Steinberger bifurcates "empirical" and "conceptual" in a fashion that Hegel would never countenance, conflates what Hegel took such pains to keep distinct, namely, reason and understanding, and proffers conceptual results that bear little or no evidence of the experiential struggles that must be undergone to arrive at them. PETER FUSS University o/Missouri, St. Louis Gavin Kitching. KarlMarx and thePhilosophyofPraxis. London: Roufledge, 1988. Pp. xii + 975- Cloth, $49.5 o. Paper, $14.95. How do I reject most of Marx's ideas and still remain a Marxist? That is Gavin Kitching's riddle. Whereas for Luk~ics it was dialectical method, Kitching locates the heart of Marxism in commitment to human liberation. To share that purpose is to be a Marxist, even when you reject Marx's picture of historical materialism, his conception of science, core theses of his economics, and his vision of communism--as does Kitching. The latter's book provides a comprehensive, accessible introductory text as BOOK REVIEWS 323 well as an assessment of "Marx's dubious legacy." From his Wittgensteinian perspecfive , Kitching assails Althusserians for wringing the life out of Marx's "philosophy of praxis." Treating Marx's theory of history in his second chapter, Kitching argues that Marx was not a determinist, that he presented no universal "law" of history, and that his terms "forces" and "relations" of production have no univocai definitions. Kitching believes that Marx's claims in his famous 1859 Preface are mistakenly generalized: they were intended to apply only to the transitions from feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to communism. ~Where Kitching believes that G. A. Cohen's "technological" definition of the "forces" of production is appropriate for capitalism, Derek Sayer reveals that Cohen fetishizes technology. Kitching delivers a brisk, readable exposition of Marx's economics followed by a separate critical chapter. He finds insuperable obstacles to reducing concrete labor m quantities of abstract labor; moreover, labor values are redundant and unhelpful for...