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BOOK REVIEWS 47 ~ hand understood as pointing out factuality or presence: quod erat demonstrandum (386; cf. 13). Historically the language factor is found to explain how the resultant essentialist conception has occasioned the two recent extremes that have rendered being either meaningless or a mystery. Only through that historical study, the book concludes (386-87), will one come to understand why the problematic is not illusory and why the question about being cannot be made to vanish from philosophical inquiry. From the historical viewpoint one may well accept the author's conclusions as incisive, convincing and important. Philosophically, however, a reader may be left wondering why the doctrine of Aquinas on being made so little impression, and why Aquinas was regarded merely as the promoter (der F6rderer, 295 ) of Aristotelianism. One is tempted to ask if the author himself is not thoroughly in the grip of the univocity he traces so skillfully. Though recognizing (192) that with Aquinas the differentiating "modes" cannot be abstracted from the basic notion of being, he nevertheless regards the mind's initial object as "completely without analogy" (vollstiindig analogielos, 955), allowing no common core-meaning (ke/ne gemeinsame Kernbedeutung, 382) that would have importance. Analogy, for the author, seems always to presuppose a basic content and an added relation. But would not this mean that in analogy one basically univocal notion has to be related in various ways to its instances? With regard to being, would not the conception that what is most essential to a created thing lies outside the thing's finite nature, rendering the mind's most basic notion multisignificant in its own way from the start, be thereby lost? Perhaps it will inevitably be missed in any approach solely from language. In this perspective 'analogous' may be a deceptive term, suggesting as it does the two presupposed notions of basic content and subsequent relation. In any case, Aquinas' conception of being as the initial object of human intellection calls for much further study. These remarks do not detract from the value of the book within its own set objectives . Limpid in style, its discussions are lively and stimulating from start to finish. The volume is neatly produced, and is almost entirely free from typographical errors. It is equipped with lists of primary sources (389-94) and of secondary literature (395-41 o), and with indexes of persons (411-18) and of subjects (419-~3). JOSEPH OWENS Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Martin L. Pine. Pietro Pompanazzi: Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance. Saggi e Testi, 2 I. Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1986. Pp. 381. Paper, NP. Nonostante l'abbondante bibliografia che dalla met~ del secolo scorso, con moto crescente , si ~.occupata del Pomponazzi, il volume di Pine si pu6 dire rappresenti la prima monografia completa sul pensiero del filosofo italiano del Rinascimento. Sulla scorta delle sue opere maggiori, pubblicate a stampa, essa procede a una ricostruzione analitica e fedele dei temi fondamentali da lui dibattuti sia nei corsi accademici, sia nei trattati: in primis del problema antropologico con l'epocale qu~relle dell'immortalit~ dell'anima, quindi del ferreo determinismo delle leggi della natura con l'esclusione dei 472 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY a7:3 JULY ]989 miracoli, infine deU'impossibilit~ di una libert~ umana, schiacciata tra l'intrascendibilitA delle forze fisiche da un lato, e rinevitabilit~ della conoscenza e dell'onnipotenza divina dall'altro. Con molta onest~, tuttavia, l'autore riconosce che alcuni aspetti della dottrina pomponazziana non sono stati da lui presi in considerazione, precisamente quelli attinenti ad alcune questioni scientifiche gi~ edite, ma scarsamente studiate finora, nonch~ ahre "reportationes" di corsi sulla fisica e sui libri meteorologici solo recentemente recuperate o segnalate dagli studiosi (cf. 33). La qualifica di "radical philosopher," posta come sottotitolo, indica con chiarezza a un tempo sia il punto di vista da cui muove l'interpretazione personale del Pine, sia il guidizio conclusivo cui egli perviene al termine della sua attenta esposizione. Si tratta di una radicalit~ che segna una rottura nei confronti della tradizione del pensiero medievale mediante una estremizzazione del naturalismo aristotelico-averroistico, da cui il Pompanazzi osa dedurre imperterrito tutte le conseguenze etiche e religiose dinanzi a cui i pensatori a...

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