Butler (review)

49 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:3 JULY 1988 The second half of the book, "Views on the work of Pascal," is devoted to a more detailed analysis of Pascal's two major works: The Provincial Letters and the Perishes.The chapters on the "letters" are mostly a summarizing review of the eighteen pieces making up Les Provinciales, and Coleman is good at putting them into their politicohistorical context. But the religious and theological background, crucial to understanding the work, is sketched in with insufficient detail. His explanation of the issue of divine grace vs. free will is vague and unhelpful; Molinism is summarized in a single sentence; and there is no discussion of the two important works by Arnauld the controversy over which occasioned Pascal to begin the letters---De lafr~quent communion and Th~ologie morale desJ~suits (there is, moreover, hardly any discussion of Arnauld himself , the central figure of French Jansenism). Even if this is a book "for the general reader," it will not do to gloss over this important material. The chapters on the Pens~es are vastly superior to the earlier parts of the book. Professor Coleman brings together well what he sees as the main themes of Pascal's thought--the utter wretchedness of humankind without God; its eternal happiness with God--and shows how they are developed in and among the fragments (he follows the ordering of the Pleiade edition of the Oeuvres Complktes, 1954). His analyses here are much fuller and more enlightening than those of the other writings, and might be a valuable companion to someone approaching the Pens~esfor the first time. While Professor Coleman's book can serve as an interesting introduction to Pascal, and to the Pens~es in particular, anyone who has read some Pascal or who has more than a passing interest in the seventeenth-century scientific, philosophical and theological context of Pascal's thought will find it a rather disappointing study, one in need of supplementary readings to fill in the necessary details. STEVEN M. NADLER St.John's College,Annapolis Terence Penelhum. Butler. The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. Pp. x + a~l. $39.95. This study is one in the series of volumes, The Arguments of the Philosophers, which stresses an analytical reconstruction of arguments of great philosophers of the past. The concern throughout is to explicate Butler's central arguments in their historical context and to assess their value for our own time. The study is in two parts. The first treats Butler's moral philosophy, the second his philosphy of religion. Butler's moral philosphy may be captured in the maxim that virtue consists in following our nature and that conscience is supreme. Penelhum's study of Butler's ethics is a thorough exploration of what this maxim means. No adequate idea can be conveyed here of the penetrating and subtle character of the account. I shall instead sketch out the main questions pursued and give some indication of how some of them are answered. The first question is: What is meant by human nature? Human nature contains four internal principles which Butler thinks are often confused: (1) particular desires, (2) self-love (which is a second-order desire that particular desires leading to BOOR REVIEWS 49 l our happiness be satisfied), (B) benevolence (which is a second-order desire that particular desires leading to the happiness of another be satisfied), and (4) conscience (which like (a) and (3) is reflective but is not an affection; rather, it is a principle whereby men approve or disapprove of actions). Although Butler holds that moral experience can be understood independent of theology, his moral theory is developed within a theological framework acceptable to a worldy wise Deistic audience which, as a Christian thinker, he is trying to reach. The theological assumption is minimal: that the above principles are implanted in us for our own good. The principles have an hierarchical order. Self-love and benevolence regulate particular inclinations for the good of self and other respectively. Conscience, in turn, regulates self-love and benevolence. To follow our nature, then, is to follow particular inclinations approved...