Mill's Conception of Happiness as an Inclusive End

Mill's Conception of Happiness as an Inclusive End ROBERT W. HOAG FOR A LONGTIMEJohn Stuart Mill's utilitarianism has been regarded as an implausible, inconsistent ethical hedonism. For example, since the publication of Utilitarianism many critics have charged that the doctrine of qualities of pleasures is inconsistent with Mill's fundamental commitment to ethical hedonism.' Some have also argued that Mill's claims about the intrinsic value of virtue contradict his view of pleasure as the sole intrinsic good.~ And Mill's defense of liberty has often been discounted as a utilitarian argument because it is said to rely on non-hedonistic values such as individuality.3 But these and other traditional objections presuppose that Mill advances a simple, hedonistic theory of value. It is that presupposition that I intend to challenge in this paper. A few commentators have recently begun to challenge the standard interOriginal versions of this paper were completed while participating in a NEH Summer Seminar at the Universityof Arizona, June t8-August lo, 1984. I am thankful for the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities. And for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this work, I thank Fred Berger, Joel Feinberg,John Simmons, Alan Fuchs, and Joan Callahan. ' J. B. Schneewind, "Concerning Some Criticisms of Mill's Utilitarianism," in James and John Stuart Mill/Papers of the Centenary Conference, ed. John M. Robson and Michael Laine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 46-48. Notable proponents of this objection include: Henry Sidgwick, The Method.~ of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: MacMillan, 19o7), 94-95; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, ~d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), 117-2o; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), w167 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o3), 77-81; John Plamenatz , The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1949), 141-42; R. P. Anschutz, The Philosophy ofJ. s. Mill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), xS-19. ' For example: Green, w167 H. J. McCloskey,John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (New York: Macmillan, x971), 62, 7a. 3 Notable proponents of this objection include: James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (London, 1873), 48-51; Plamenatz, 126-33; Anschutz, 5-1o; C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198o). [417] 418 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:3 JULY 1987 pretation of Mill's theory of value. 4 I here develop this work by arguing that Mill conceives of happiness as a higher-order, inclusive end of life, and by using this interpretive approach to explain some of Mill's puzzling remarks about happiness, parts of happiness, and pleasures. In the first section of this paper I briefly consider Mill's account of Art or Practice in order to reveal the status and function Mill assigns his conception of happiness. In the second section I argue that his account of Art strongly suggests Mill employs an inclusive conception of happiness and that this structural feature of his conception explains some puzzling remarks in both Utilitarianism and On Liberty. The following section considers some objections to my interpretation , including difficulties raised by a prominent passage where Mill appears to define happiness simply as "pleasure and the absence of pain" (U,II,~). 5 I conclude by briefly considering some implications of my view of Mill's conception of happiness as an inclusive end. 1. In the final chapter of A System of Logic Mill sketches an account of the logic of Practice or Art. The discussion begins with the distinction between Art and Science: propositions of science are said to be expressed in the indicative mood and to assert matters of fact, while, according to Mill, propositions of Art are expressed in the imperative mood (or in equivalent paraphrases) as rules or precepts and do not assert matters of fact (SL,VI,xii,w Although Mill does not consistently adhere to these criteria,6 the import of the distinction is clear: all types of normative or evaluative propositions belong to the realm of Art, as opposed to Science. 7 Mill's discussion of Practice or Art deals with the logic of the class of all value claims. Although Mill maintains...