Locke on Substance. Robert Boyle. Origin of Forms and Qualities (The Theoretical Part) (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 93 framework, Allison attends constantly to its service to the ethical thrust of the whole philosophy . Some might object that more lofty or fundamental aspects of the system are reduced to common-sense platitudes by emphasis on practical concerns and goals. But here, at least, redisposing our understanding seems to be a healthy corrective. Humanistic and ethical implications are reinstated, and the preliminaryarguments that tend to fascinate us are accorded both due rationality and curious familiarity. These are both higher virtues to which Spinoza pretends . The minor strength of this volume is that the whole exposition is sound, rather than surprising--which is as it should be. WILLIAMSACKSTEDER University of Colorado, Boulder Bill Barger. Locke on Substance. Robert Boyle. Origin of Forrns and Qualities (The Theoretical Part). Manhattan Beach, Calif.: Sheffield Press, 1976. Pp. 206. $8.95. The most notable part of this work consists of an analysis of the historical influence on Locke's philosophy of essence. In addition to comparing and contrasting the views of Aristotle , the scholastics, Descartes, and Locke, Barger presents some interesting theories concerning what Locke meant by substance and real essence. Boyle exerted a considerable influence on Locke's philosophy of qualities, substance, and essence. Barger's text is valuable to the extent that an examination of Boyle's works affords greater insight into many of Locke's views. Unfortunately, the reader will find it difficult to note any continuity to the work; it is not well organized, and too many topics are covered in a cursory way. Barger notes that many key positions throughout the Essay are related to an attack upon scholastic theory, primarily the doctrine of substantial forms. Locke's criticisms of this doctrine are similar to those advanced by Boyle. Proponents of the scholastic doctrine suppose that individual things become of a certain species in virtue of partaking of a fixed number of real essences, that is, forms. In general, Boyle and Locke describe this view as an unintelligible doctrine that incorporates vague and useless forms of speech. Locke denies that anyone has any idea whatsoever of substantial forms except the "idea of the sound 'form'" (2. 31.6). A good portion of Barger's book is devoted to Locke's important distinction between real and nominal essence. Locke repudiates the scholastic view of real essence and replaces it with a doctrine of essence based upon Boyle's corpuscular hypothesis. The real essence of physical objects is not a set of forms designated by a general term, but rather is the internal constitution of an object. Locke follows Boyle in arguing that the real essence of an object "does not consist of observed qualities but of mechanical properties of invisible bodies upon which the observed qualities are causally dependent" (p. 49). According to Locke, human knowledge is limited to observable or sensible qualities of bodies only; the real essence is considered unknown. Consequently, we do not sort species by reference to "real essence" in any sense of the term. Species are determined by noting the similarities among observable properties of objects. The general term that we use to designate these resembling properties is called a "nominal essence." Barger relates the corpuscular hypothesis to Locke's views concerning perception and the existence of physical objects. He claims that Locke's attempt to justify the existence of an external world is the result of a muddle: He is buildinga theoretical model: among the premisesmaking the model possible is the assumption that observable objects are made up of indivisiblebits of matter, whose properties include solidity. This assumption is axiomatic for both Locke and Boyle. As axiomatic, the existence of such a physical world cannot be disproved within the theoretical model utilizingthat axiom. The early empiricists seem not to 94 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have recognized this because they were unclear or confused over what they were doing (metaphysics, explanatory models) when they talked about the relation of perception, mind, and knowledge. (Pp. 33-34) Barger goes on to contend that "the great English thinkers shied away from a position so close to that of the Cartesians. Neither Boyle, Newton, nor Locke had a 'representational' theory of perception: theirs is only a causal...