Vernunft und Wirklichkeit. Volume 1, Untersuchungen zur Kritik der Vernunft. Volume 2, Beiträge zur Realphilosophie (review)

246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Each ecstasishas in itself a fully determinate schema, whichmodifies itself with the way in which temporality temporalizes itself, as the ecstases modify themselves. Just as the ecstasesconstitute in themselves the unityof temporality, so there corresponds always to the ecstatic unityof temporality such a schemata horizonal to it. The transcendence of Being-in-the-worldis grounded in its specifictotality in the primordial ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality. If transcendence makes the understanding of Being [Seinsverstiindnis ] possible, and if transcendence is grounded in the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality , then the latter is the condition for the possibility of the understanding of Being. (P. 429) For both Heidegger and Kant, to be is to be in time. Heidegger tries here to clarify Kant's problematic without falling prey to the representationalism that ties Kant to Descartes. The relation of Time to Being was always crucial for Heidegger. He claimed that the Western understanding of Being is highly restricted, guided as it is by our "experience" of Time as a series of "nows," as the frame within which things are "present." Our limited experience of time as the present and of things as "presence" has made possible the "re-presentational" thinking of the modern age, whose goal is the total domination and organization of everything . The revival of the Seinsfrage is at the same time the revival of the question about the nature of the way we live time. Although these lectures are more than a "completion" of Sein und Zeit, insofar as they include much historical analysis not found there, they are also less than a completion, insofar as they fail adequately to explain the "horizonal" nature of Time and its relation to Being, although important steps are taken in that direction. Heidegger did not publish the missing portions of Sein und Zeit because he was not satisfied with his conclusions, at least in part because of the difficulty in avoiding an "idealistic" or subjectivistic" interpretation of Being, while at the same time attempting to understand Being and Time by way of the analysis of Dasein, which he here mentions in the same breath with Geist, ego, psyche, and subject. In these lectures Heidegger does not succeed in explaining the unity-in-differenceof Being, or the relation between Time and Being, or the relation between Dasein and Time. These problems were to occupy him for the rest of his life. MICHAELE. ZIMMERMAN Tulane University Vernunft und Wirklichkeit. Volume 1, Untersuchungen zur Kritik der Vernunft. Volume 2, Beitriige zur Realphilosophie. By Hans-Dieter Klein. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1973 [vol. 1], 1975 [vol. 2]. Pp. 329 [vol. 1], 460 [vol. 2]) This work, although it draws widely upon the historical tradition, reflecting special cognizance of the most significant movements within post-Kantian philosophy, is most fundamentallya reconceptualized and systematically stablized rendition of the Kantian philosophy . While in several ways strikingly original, both in concept and import, it nonetheless reflects the intellectual climate long associated with the Philosophisches Institut of the University of Vienna, which has continued to assert the right of Fundamentalphilosophie, carried on with a strong sense of integrity with respect to tradition and in opposition to movements that have tended to reduce the functions of philosophy to those of the particular sciences. The most novel feature of the work, perhaps, is that the concept of resurrection (regarded as a postulate) is accorded a certain not merely ethical but ontological importance: "It is... implied in the concept of the subject that it is the existence of belief in its individual resurrection.... Therefore ... it implies in its concept as well that it is God-positing consciousness" (2:81). Volume 1 is dedicated to the exposition of the concept of reason as the founding reflection BOOK REVIEWS 247 of philosophy. From the rejection of physicalism, which must presuppose that which it proposes to explain, Klein is led in the direction of a transcendental solipsism for which the difference of subject and object is shown to be one "within" the subject. This is as a difference between action as realization of motivation, on the one hand, and as object, on the other, insofar as the latter is not posited through action, thereby...