A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 105 outstanding account of Iamblichus's exegetic methods and a vigorous defense of his intellectual merits; for an account of Iamblichus the philosopher, however, Dillon's work is far superior. R. T. WALLIS University of Oklahoma A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. By Jasper Hopkins. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Pp. ix + 291. $10.50) According to the author himself, the present work is a "hand-book" intended as a supplement to the recent renewal of Anselm study. With a competence that embraces contemporary philosophical method no less than historical scholarship, Hopkins treats the whole of Anselm's thought in six chapters: 1, Basic Writings and Sources; 2, Faith and Reason; 3, Ontological Argument; 4, Doctrine of the Trinity; 5, Doctrine of Man, Freedom, and Evil; 6, Christology and Soteriology. In two Appendices we have Hopkins's translation of Anselm's "Philosophical Fragments" and a discussion of Anselm's method of argumentation. A list of English translations of Anselm's works is provided, plus a 16-page bibliography that alone may be worth the price for students of Anselm. The index is analytical and seemingly exhaustive , making the work indispensible as a secondary source book. Naturally, philosophers will be most interested in the treatment of the ontological argument , which Hopkins rightfully prefaces with a chapter on faith and reason. This is, of course, in keeping with the procedure of Anselm himself, who would be dismayed to see how often reprintings from his Proslogion begin with chapter 2, providing not a hint of the all-important prefatory chapter 1 that sets an epistemological-methodological stage quite alien to the contemporary one: "I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand." But this principle calls for more interpretation than it usually receives. It is often observed, wrongly, that Anselm's ontological argument can be properly understood only by one who already shares his theological-spiritualperspective. Anselm himself saw it holding no less force for the unbeliever, though the unbeliever's motivation is different: unbelievers "seek a reason because they do not believe but we because we do believe, nevertheless we seek one and the same reason as they" (quoted, p. 40). The Augustinian-Anselmic formula credo ut intelligam is, says Hopkins, a "programmatic version of faith's relation to reason" (pp. 38f.), "a spiritual imperative and not a hermeneutical rule" (p. 43), which in no way diminishes the apologetical character of Anselm's work. In a discussion entitled "Unity of approach" (pp. 55ff.), Hopkins argues against the supposed conflict between the Christo remoto approach of the Cur deus Homo and the credo ut intelligam perspective of the Proslogion. The Proslogian, even with its credo, should be viewed in light of, for example, the original title of the Monologion , "An Example of Meditating about the Rational Basis of Faith," and of the Cur Deus Homo, chapter 1, in which Anselm commends the work to those who would be gladdened by understanding what they believe and would like to have rational answres for infidels who challenge the faith. Hopkins thus opposes any attempt to minimize the apologetical nature of Anselm's work such as that sponsored by Barth--who denies an Anknfipfungspunkt between believers and nonbelievers and even denies that the arguments of the Monologion and Proslogion stand in any relation to faith at all except to bring joy to it--and also by Stolz--for whom the Proslogion attempts not at all to prove the existence of God but rather to confront the atheistic Fool with the divine majesty (an exercise in mystical theology) (pp. 56ff.). We must take Anselm seriously when he suspends the authority of Scripture, argues solo ratione, and seems to explain his whole project with the words "Our faith ought to be defended by reason against the impious, but not against those who admit that they delight in the honor of being called Christian. For while to the former it should be shown rationally that they irrationally despise 106 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY us, from the latter it is right to require that they hold firmly to the pledge taken at their baptism" (Ep. 136, quoted, p...