Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's Treatment of Types of Equivocity and its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 103 what Plato says about temperance (and the virtues in general) can be better understood by seeing that what he is often doing is examining the similarities and differences between the two types of art. The above distinctions and comments alone by no means solve the problems surrounding the definition of temperance in the Charmides as a science of sciences, but they perhaps point in a fruitful direction. Of particular value in this edition are the many notes which give some information about the historical persons and places referred to in the Laches and Charmides and the notes that refer to and comment on the literature relevant to the two dialogues. GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS University o/ Cali/ornia, San Diego Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's Treatment o] Types o~ Equivocity and its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories. By Walter I_~szl. (Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1970. Pp. xiii+601.) This voluminous work combines a logical inquiry with a rather militant campaign. The way in which they are linked raises some very interesting problems. The logical side begins modestly with Aristotle's distinction (Categories 1) between homonymy and synonymy (or, from the point of view of terms, the equivocal and the univocal). Then a middle zone emerges in the later writings. Its most familiar denizens are analogous meaning and what has come to be called focal meaning. For example, "matter" and "form" in Aristotle's usage are to be understood in the former way, while "being" and "one," the central metaphysical terms as well as "good" are cases of the latter. Aristotle never tires of telling us that "being" is said in many senses. But it is not sheer equivocation. It is like "medical" which has a basic reference to health but in one term or context refers to the condition of the patient, in another to what is productive of health, in another to an instrument used in treatment, in another to a person engaged in the health profession, and so on. This is the paradigm case of focal meaning . The logical issue posed by Leszl is then whether focal meaning is to fall on the side of synonymy or on the side of homonymy. He explores different subtle analyses of the situation, some of which have accumulated and some of which constitute his own advanced probing. One assigns a single nature to the term that has focal meaning --"medical" in its various uses is synonymous. Another opts for straight homonymy-- "medical" means something different in "a medical instrument" and "a medical man." A third gives a complexity account, finding a single nature with different additions for the different uses. A fourth finds a mixture, yielding something in between. The author is all along fighting for a homonymous theory of focal meaning, with a functional explanation of the extensions that are involved. The analytic strength of the book lies in the fine-line study of the different structures in the proposed solutions. It is prefaced with a survey of Aristotle on meaning and definition. It gives serious attention to the role of the categories as ultimate types of being, and it includes excellent critiques of special interpretations; for example, seeing focal meaning as a model-copy situation. And of course throughout there is ample marshalling of Aristotelian passages and intimate disputes about their interpretation. The aim of the book is not merely to expound the logical issues but to study their metaphysical import. This plunges us into the campaign which has historical as well as ontological dimensions. In Jaeger's picture of Aristotle's development, the Platonic elements find their place at the beginning. But in recent revolts against Jaeger's theory, there are attempts to find Platonic elements in the mature Aristotelian doctrine, 104 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY especially when Aristotle advances a science of being qua being in Metaphysics r and E. This looks as if Aristotle is treating being as somehow having a single nature. Moreover , the nee-Platonic tradition and the theological interpreters of Aristotle have always tried to bring being in line with the unitary divine. Now a fixed point in Aristotle is that being is not a genus, that the categories are the...