Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation

Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation J. V. BROWN 1. INTRODUCTION IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE that a philosopher might have a systematically workedout theory of knowledge, the exposition of which is most unsystematic indeed. Such seems to be the case with the theory of knowledge of Henry of Ghent, secular master at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century? Looking at his work in retrospect, 2 it is easy to see that he develops his theory of knowledge under four distinct headings: (1) the external senses; (2) the internal senses; (3) the intellect; (4) divine illumination. But the gift of hindsight, as is well known, is far more common than the gift of prophecy. The texts on Henry of Ghent's theory of knowledge are scattered from one end of his writings to the other. 3 Combine the dispersion of the texts with his 1 On the life of Henry of Ghent, cf. Franz Ehrle, "Beitr~ige zu den Biographien bertihmter Scholastiker, 1, Heinrich von Gent," Archiv fiir Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters , I (1885), 365-401; 507-508. There is a French translation of this article. Cf. J. Raskop, "'Recherches critiques sur les biographies de Henri de Gand, dit le Docteur Solennel," Bulletin de la socidtd historique et littdraire de Tournai, XXI (suppl.), 1887. 2 The only works of Henry whose authenticity is unquestioned are the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum and the Quodlibeta. In this article, these are abbreviated as "SQO" and "Quod.'" respectively. All references are to: SQO. 2 vols. Paris: Iodocus Badius Ascensius, 1520. (Facsimile edition issued at St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1953. 2 vols.), and Quod. 2 vols. Paris: Iodocus Badius Ascensius, 1518. (Facsimile edition issued at Louvain: Biblioth~que S.1., 1961. 2 vols.) Texts are cited according to article, question, volume number, folio, recto ("r") or verso ("v") and section of the folio. For example: "Quod., III, 8c; I, 60rK" would designate the Quodlibeta, quodlibet III, question 8, in the body of the question, volume I of the facsimile edition, folio 60 recto, section K of that folio. In the SQO, the roman numeral would refer to an article rather than to a quodlibet. Within text citations, "c" refers to the corpus of the question; "res. q." to the resolutio quaestionis of the question; "obj." to Henry's opponent's arguments which appear at the beginning of the question; "sed contra" to Henry's in oppositum argument which follows the obiectiones; "ad" to Henry's replies to the initial obiectiones of his opponents. Several times in the SQO Henry promises his readers that he will give a more systematic exposition of his theory of knowledge in the "de homine" section of the work. The promise was never fulfilled; the section remained unwritten. Cf. the pessimistic and discouraging remark of M. Jean Paulus in his Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa mdtaphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), 1. There are a thousand passages scattered throughout Henry's works which would have to be considered in any account of his theory of knowledge. Each passage, moreover, introduces modifications into the others and this makes the task of writing about his noetic that much the more difficult. [15] 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY avowed indebtedness to Aristotle and Augustine, Avicenna and Averroes, and it is no wonder that some of his commentators have been able to see him only as an eclectic, adding nothing of significance either to medieval psychology or to medieval epistemology.4 We do not subscribe to the position that Henry of Ghent was an eclectic; his theory of knowledge at least is something more than a patchwork quilt of opinions passed on by his predecessors. What one must realize at the outset (and this is the dominant impression one gets from reading his works) is that Henry of Ghent, before he is ever a philosopher or even a theologian, is a polemicist. Trying to remain faithful to Augustine against the flood of late 13th century Aristotelianism, he sees that he cannot possibly hope to restore the former to his place of preeminence in the philosophic world without at the same time adopting a two-fold...