Kant's Moral Religion (review)

516 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY occur in the human soul" (Psychologia empirica, /~ 1). Wolff insists that empirical psychology is a part of philosophy and metaphysics, and that it provides both principles and after-the-fact confirmation for the demonstrations of rational psychology. The bond between these two parts of psychology is meant to illustrate the "holy marriage" between reason and experience which Wolff sets forth as the goal of his entire philosophical system. In order to show the existence of the human soul, Wolff advances a kind of syllogized version of the Cartesian cogito. The critical minor premise of this argument states that "we are actually conscious of ourselves and other things outside us" (Psychologia empirica, ~ 16). This asserts as an experiential fact our consciousness of a plurality of observers and extramental entities. The major premise of the argument, said to be a "principle of reason," simply states that any being which is so conscious actually exists. On this basis, the human soul is nominally defined as "that being in us which is conscious of itself and of other things outside us" (Psychologia empirica, #20). Obviously, we have come a long way from Descartes in the space of a single century. Once the soul has been shown to exist, the bulk of empirical psychology is devoted to a lengthy descriptive analysis of its various activities. These activities are grouped under the traditional headings of cognition and appetition, each of which is sub-divided into sensory and intellective levels. Sensation is characterized by clarity, but not distinctness; intellection is both clear and distinct. Furthermore, each distinguishable type of activity is said to identify a particular faculty or active potency of the soul. The result is a long list of activities, faculties, and definitions. Two interesting passages discuss Wolff's notions of an art of combining signs and an art of discovery designed specifically for the production of new knowledge. Despite the necessary dependence of appetition and volition on knowledge, liberty is preserved by denying the possibility of a direct external influence on the will or an intrinsic determination stemming from its own essence. At the very end of the volume, Wolff takes note of the experiential fact of a mutual dependence between mind or soul and body. While we do not experience their connection itself, we are aware of a certain commerce or harmony-in-action which will have to be explained in rational psychology. We have mentioned the preceding doctrines in order to indicate the main features of Wolff's metaphysics as it is contained in these three volumes. Many important themes and notions have not been included in this brief sketch, and others will be found in the volumes which have yet to be published. Thanks to the splendid work of Professor l~cole and his publisher, readers who wish to pursue these questions will now find it possible to do so. CHARLES A. CORR Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville Kant's Moral Religion. By Allen W. Wood. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. Pp. xii + 283. $9) Professor Wood sets Kant's doctrine of moral faith in clear, wide, and I think, proper perspective not only by careful, systematic and sympathetic exposition but also by a courteous consideration of sample caricatures (e.g., 49) and apparent misinterpretations (e.g., 38 f, 95). He has no time for aberrations of the sort suggested once by Hans Reichenbach that Kant "was happy and proud to derive in learned books the very morality he was imbued with in his nursery" (in Rise o] Scientific Philosophy, Los BOOK REVIEWS 517 Angeles, 1951, p. 61). He is genuinely concerned with explication and clarification. It is a pleasure to find an interpreter who neither feels under imminent obligation to jump into criticism nor who feels compelled to say something "original." But there is originality indeed. It is found both in the earnest effort to be fairminded and in the endeavor to show that Kant's view of moral faith "exhibits a fully rational yet profoundly sensitive religious outlook on the world" (9). One important thrust of the book is the recognition that Kant had no intention, veiled or direct, of providing finalistic theoretical or speculative solutions...