Malebranche's Ontology

Malebranche's Ontology CRAIG WALTON IN RECENT YEARS FATHER NICOLAS!~ff_ALEBRAlqCI-IE'S philosophical star has begun to rise. From the nadir of being almost completely ignored, he has risen of late to the position of "failure.''t Most interpreters have rejected Malebranche's claim to being a philosopher because of one or both of the following "failures": (1) that he constructed a semi-Cartesian ontology which contradicts his epistemology, and that he hoped to repair the contradiction by a deus ex machina maneuver; (2) that whether or not the ontology contradicts the epistemology, both are entirely deductive and therefore epistemologically barren. The ontology could not serve as a theory for the interpretation of experience as we have it. Archetypes would be related to concrete beings only by the mysterious and arbitrary Will of God. My purpose here is to challenge the first of these two "failure"-accusations. I shall state Professor Richard A. Watson's version of that accusation and oppose it by arguing my own interpretation of Malebranche's ontology. Malebranche's attacks on prevailing Scholastic and Cartesian ontologies include his rejection of the prevailing deus ex machina, viz., the arbitrary and sovereign Will of God. Working with analogies borrowed from mathematics and from his faith, Malebranche goes on to interpret those analogies into philosophical constructs, which become the elements and principles of his ontology. Cartesian power or sovereign I wish to thank Dr. Herbert W. Schneider for his careful comment on an earlier version of this study. I am also grateful to the University of Southern California Research and Publication Fund for financial aid. x The phrase is that of Richard A. Watson in his The Downfall of Cartesianism: 16731712 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), passim. An earlier and briefer version was published as "The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics," Journal of the History of Philosophy, I: 2 (Dec. 1963), 177-197; the later version is cited hereafter. For other versions of one or both "failures," see Norman [Kemp] Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1902); R. W. Church, A Study in the Philosophy of Malebranche (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931); James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 86; Lconora Cohen Rosentield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940), p. 42, n. 15; Martial Gueroult, Malebranche (3 vols.; Paris: Aubier, 1955-1959);and Ginette Dreyfus, La Volontd selon Malebranche (Paris: Libraitie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958). This majority has been challenged by three recent works, each of which has contributed to my present study. They are Genevieve Rodis-Lewis, Nicolas Malebranche ("Les Grands Penseurs"; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963); Beatrice K. Rome, The Philosophy of Malebranche (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963); and Andrd Robinet, Syst~me et Existence dana l'czuvre de Malebranche (Paris: Librafi'ie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1965). For my review of Rodis-Lewis and Rome in the context of the "failure" controversy, see lournal of the History of Philosophy, IV: 3 (July 1966), 261-263. 144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Will is replaced by Justice as the governing characteristic of Being. In more contemporary terms, energy, laws, and archetypes are all coordinated in one system. Both the elements and relationships of beings as static, and also the principles and laws of beings as dynamic, are accounted for in one theory of being. The borrowed metaphors do not render the theory epistemologically barren because they are "supposed" hypothetically; their value is secured by the fruits of the system developed therefrom. In this study only the ontology is interpreted. However, that interpretation suggests the direction in which a future study will proceed to challenge "failure" number two 2 by showing that Malebranche's "occasionalism" is based in his ontology and is a coherent and fruitful theory of experience. What is the argument for Malehranche's "failure" number one? "Having broken with the Cartesian ontological framework, he offers no explanation of what might be a new ontological structure. Instead .... he avers again to the mysterious ways of God. ''~ Professor Watson identifies the two horns of the dilemma which is the presumed "actual cause" of (inter alia) Malebrancbe's downfall. If "substance" and "modification" are the only two ways of being...