Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (review)

210 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY on that other thing, then it would depend on that thing for more than its existence. But what is there besides its existence? Only its non-existence. (177) If B (consisting of one or more members) is the cause of A and is itself caused,, then A cannot depend completely on B for B itself is a per aliud existent. Thus there must be a per se existent. Unfortunately none of Bobik's arguments appear to meet the most obvious objection to Aquinas' proof. It would appear quite possible that each finite thing depends for its existence on various other interdependent finite things. Each thing taken alone would be a per aliud existent and none would be per se existent. To ask what causes the existence of this entire "'block" of interdependent causes might simply be nonsense. It might make sense to ask for the causes of any particular thing, but not for the cause of the entire "block." In Bobik's terms the B upon which A depends might ultimately be everything, and to ask whether B itself is a per aliud or a per se existent might be like asking whether an army has blue or brown eyes. My final criticism concerns a linguistic distinction frequently used by Bobik as a basis for metaphysical assertions. He distinguishes between predicates which can be applied to a subject using the verb "to be" and those which use the verb "to have." For example, we say, "Socrates is a man," but, "Socrates has humanity." While "man" may be used to designate the "whole" individual, "humanity" refers to what Bobik calls the "formal part" of the individual, i.e., the quality which makes him to be a man (94). The distinction between the use of the verb "to be" or "to have" in the application of a predicate to a subject could conceivably be of some metaphysical interest. However, Bobik seems to misuse the distinction and to create proper usages in order to make a metaphysical point. In one case he asserts that the term "entity" expresses the formal content of being and is the equivalent of "beingness." In support of this point he remarks that one can say, "Socrates is a being," while the proper locution in regard to "entity" is "Socrates has entity" (199-200). The problem is that it would appear that the locutions "Socrates has being" and "Socrates is an entity" are equally correct. In fact, the expression "Socrates is an entity" seems much less peculiar than "Socrates has entity." The same criterion is later used to support the claim that whereas "being" signifies as a "whole," "existence" signifies as a "part" (206). Once again the fact that the expression "Socrates has being" is a legitimate expression is not pointed out, although it would seem to demand some qualifications to the distinctions which Bobik is attempting to establish on linguistic grounds. In spite of these objections I must reiterate that I think Bobik's book is quite useful and at times insightful. In general, it is perhaps unhappy that although he escapes the insularity of medieval scholarship he seems unaquainted with the many contemporary discussions of the problem of predication with which On Being and Essence is largely concerned. BRUCE GAP,SIDE McGill University Descartes: A Study o[ His Philosophy. By Anthony Kenny. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. vii+242) According to its preface, this book is designed to be an aid for students. Yet it is not at all an introduction for beginners. It does not offer a comfortable survey of Cartesian BOOK REVIEWS 211 thought; on the contrary, it might rather be called a study of the difficulties and problems of Descartes' philosophy. There may be some doubt, however, if all these problems and difficulties are inherent in Descartes' own thought; perhaps, some of them should better be attributed to what Anthony Kenny supposes to be the thought of Descartes. Above all, Kenny deals with questions of Cartesian epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He usually refers to the "Meditationes de prima philosophia," without however neglecting any other important text. The subjects he treats---Cartesian doubt, "Cogito, ergo sum," the Ontological...